























I. CONTRABAND OF WAR 
1. Early Attitude toward Contraband 
"The ·word contraband, Latin contrabandu1n~ implied disregard 
of a decree or prohibition. The ·word ·was used in early times in re-
ferring to domestic restrictions usually upon trade in named articles 
as in regard to trade in salt ·which often \Vas a government monop-
oly. Later prohibitions \Vere issued restricting \vithin specified areas 
trade in materials \vhich might be of use in war. 
"The prohibition on export of arms, ... "Tas common in Roman 
and Byzantine periods \Vhen ~t \Vas extended to supplies ,vhich 
might be serviceable to possible enemies. At times religious penalties 
\Yere prescribed by the early church for those ,vho furnished \Var 
materials to infidels. In these instances the measures taken \Vere 
domestic or applied to those under the authority of the source of 
the prohibitions and the prohibitions might be applied both in time 
of peace and in time of \Var. Kings of England in the fourteenth 
century issued prohibitions, sometimes in regard to furnishing arti-
cles to nationals of n~med states and sometimes in regard to 
furnishing specified articles to any foreigner. England also made 
treaties in this century prohibiting the supplying of specified 
articles under penalty of forfeiture to the king ( Edw·ard III, 1370). 
"Gradually the prohibitions aimed at regulating domestic trade 
began to extend to the activities of foreign merchants in time of 
\Var. This extension created the demand that for the security of 
traders the list of prohibited areas should be made kno,vn either by 
previous treaty agreement or by special proclamation, and such 
action became usual from the seventeenth century. The early enum-
erations \vere not based on any uniform principle but \Vere often de-
termined by political or other motives. 
"It \Vas easy to extend the domestic prohibition of furnishing 
certain goods to certain areas or to infidels by analogy to the furnish-
ing of such goods to enemies. 
"As belligerents \Vould have no authority over acts of traders 
\Vithin neutral jurisdiction, they began to seize goods of the nature 
of contraband \vhen these. "Tere outside of the immediate control 
of the neutral state, as in transit on the high sea. Here there \Vould 
be a degree of conflict bet\veen the rights of the neutral to protect 
the shipping under its national flag and the right of the belligerent 
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to prevent the delivery to his opponent of goods which might be used 
for his defeat or injury. The right of the belligerent was to a 
degree gradually conceded as dominant over the right of the neutral 
trader, and the belligerent assumed the right to enumerate by proc-
lamation, or otherwise to determine, what should be regarded as 
under the ban. 
·"The furnishing of contraband was, at first, regarded as an act 
for which the state should be held responsible. Gradually the prob-
lem of supplying of contraband by subjects of neutral states gave 
rise to controv~rsies. Attempts were made to extend to states re-
sponsibility for acts of their subjects. The discussions of these topics 
were often by theologians because prohibitions, had been against 
furnishing contraband to infidels and the course 9f argumentation 
differed from modern discussions though involving like principles. 
This was especially true of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries." 
(United States Naval War College, International Law Situations_, · 
1933, 2-3.) 
2. Mingling of Early and Modern Attitudes. 
The mingling of the modern and earlier attitude is 
demonstrated in the writing of Gentilis ( 1552-1608) 
who emphasized the negative aspect of the Golden 
Rule-
"that one should not do unto others what he would not that they 
should do to him". 
"Let no one have the power to transport wine, oil, or any liquid 
to heathendom even to give them a taste, to say nothing of satisfying 
the demands of trade." "Let 'no one dare to sell to alien heathen ... 
coats of mail, shields, bows, arrows, broadswords, swords, or arm~ 
of any other sort whatsoever. Let absolutely no weapons be retailed 
to them by anyone, and no iron at all, whether already made up or-
not, for it would be harmful to the Roman Empire, and would 
approach treason to furnish the heathen, who ought to be without 
equipment, with weapons to make them stronger. But if anyone 
shall have sold any kind of arms anywhere to alien heathen of any 
nation whatsoever in violation of the interdicts of our holy r~ligion , 
we decree that all his goods be straightway confiscated, and then he 
too suffer capital punishment." Gentilis, Hispanicae A dvocationis _, 
bk. I, chap. XX); (United States Naval War College, Int erna-
tional Law· Situations, 1933, 4.) 
"The neutral began to demand that the evidence that the trade 
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would be dangerous to the belligerent must also be clear not only 
from the nature of the goods themselves which might, if going to 
another neutral, be innocent, but that the goods if liable to capture 
must have an enemy destination. The nature of the goods and the 
destination thus became ea.rly determining factors in liability for 
contraband." (United States Naval War College, International 
Law Situations~ 1933, 4.) 
Grotz" us ( 1583-164 5) : 
"But there often arises the question. What is permissible against 
those who are not enemies, or do not ·want to be called enemies, but 
who furnish our enemies with supplies? For we know that this 
subject has been keenly debated in both ancient and modern times, 
since some champion the relentlessness of \Varfare and others the 
freedom of commercial relations. 
"First, we must make distinctions ·with reference to the things 
supplied. There are some. things, such as ·weapons, which are useful 
only in war; other things which are of no use in war, as those 
which minister to pleasure; and others still which are of use both 
in time of war and at other times, as money, provisions, ships, and 
naval equipment." (Carnegie Endo·wment for International Peace, 
Grotius, De lure Belli ac Paci~ Vol. II, bk. III, chap. I, V, 601); 
(United States Naval War College, International Law Situations~ 
1933, 4-5.) 
3. Ez"ghteenth and Early f.lz"neteenth Centuries 
By the time of the American Revolution no com-
mon treatment or definition of contraband had been 
adopted by the nations of the world, but bilateral 
treaties negotiated by the United States in the late · 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries indicated 
the trend toward adoption of the doctrine of "free 
ships, free goods, except contraband of war." These 
treaties further emphasized "character of the goods" 
as a criterion of contrabc,tnd by the inclusion of lists 
of articles, although attempts to establish definitive 
lists of absolute and conditional contraband were not 
generally favored until late in the nineteenth century. 
Although the nature of contraband remained ob .. 
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scure during this period because of the conflicting 
conceptions held by neutrals and belligerents, two 
simple criteria of contraband emerged stronger than 
before: ( 1) enemy destination and ( 2) belligeren~ 
purpose of the goods as described in appropriate 
treaty lists. To be classed as contraband, goods had to 
full fill both specifications. Ownership, neutral or en-
emy, of goods aboard a neutral vessel did not, in itself, 
determine the status of the goods as contraband or 
noncontraband despite the efforts of some neutral 
countries which argued "free goods always free". 
During this period of conflict and confusion, it 
must be remembered, nations generally recognized · 
the right of belligerents to capture all enemy ships 
as prizes and to seize all enemy-owned goods on 
board. In regard to neutrally owned goods on board 
the captured enemy ship, there was no clear rule to 
apply, for some nations maintained that free or neu-
tral goods are always free while others claimed that 
neutral goods aboard an enemy ship, with the excep-
tion of contraband of war, are free. 
1. ARTICLE 7. "All and every the subjects and inhabitants of the 
Kingdom of Sweden, as well as those of the United States, shall 
be permitted to navigate with their vessels, in all safety and freedom, 
and without any regard to those to whom the merchandizes and car-
goes may belong, from any port whatever, and the subjects and in-
habitants of the two States shall likewise be permitted to sail and · 
trade with their vessels, and, with the same liberty and safety, to 
frequent the places, ports, and havens of Powers enemies to both or 
either of the contracting parties, without being in any wise molested 
or troubled, and to carry on a commerce not only directly from the 
ports of an enemy to a neutral port, but even from one port of an 
enemy to another port of an enemy, whether it be under the juris-
diction o£ the same or of different Princes. And as it is acknowledged 
by this treaty, with respect to ships and merchandizes, that free ships 
shall make the merchandizes free, and that everything which shall 
be on board of ships belonging to subjects of the one or the other 
of the contracting parties shall be considered as free, even though 
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the cargo, or a part of it, should belong to the enemies of one or 
both, it is nevertheless provided that contraband goods shall always 
be excepted; \vhich being intercepted, shall be proceeded against 
according to the spirit of the follo\ving articles. It is likewise agreed 
that the same liberty be extended to persons who may be on board 
a free ship, unless they are soldiers in the actual service of the said 
. " enemies. 
ARTICLE 8. "This liberty of navigation and commerce shall ex-
tend to all kinds of merchandizes, except those only which are 
expressed in the follo\ving article, and are distinguished by the name 
of contraband goods." 
ARTICLE 9. "Under the name of contraband or prohibited goods 
shall be comprehended arms, great guns, cannon-balls, arquebuses, 
musquets, mortars, bombs, petards, granadoes, saucisses, pitch-balls, 
carriages, for ordnance. musquet-rests, bandoleers, cannon-po\vder, 
matches, saltpetr·e, sulphur, bullets, pikes, sabres, swords, morions, 
helmets, cuirasses, halbards, javelins, pistols and their holsters, belts, 
bayonets, horses \vith their harness, and all other like kinds of arms 
and instruments of \Var for the use of troops." 
ARTICLE 10. "These \vhich follo\v shall not be reckoned in the 
number of prohibited goods, that is to say. All sorts of cloths, 
and all other manufactures of \vool, flax, silk, cotton, or any other 
materials; all kinds of \vearing apparel, together \vith the things of 
which they are commonly made; gold, silver coined or uncoined, 
brass, iron, lead, copper, latten, ccals, \vheat, barley, and all sorts 
of corn or pulse, tobacco; all kinds of spices sal ted and smoked 
flesh, salted fish, cheese, butter, beer, oyl, \vines, sugar; all sorts of 
salt and prov~isions \vhich serve for the nourishment and sustenance 
of man. all kinds of cotton, hemp, flax, tar, pitch, ropes, cables, 
sails, sail-cloth, anchors, and any parts of anchors, ship-masts, 
planks, boards, beams, and all sorts of trees and other things proper 
for building or repairing ships. Nor shall any goods be considered as 
contraband \vhich have not been \vorked into the form of any in-
strument or thing for the purpose of war by land or by sea, much 
less such as have been prepared or wrought up for any other use, all 
·which shall be reckoned free goods, as like\vise all others which are 
not comprehended and ·particularly mentioned in the foregoing 
article, so that they shall not by any pretended interpretation be 
comprehended among prohibited or contraband goods. On the con-
trary, they may be freely transported by the subjects of the King 
and of the United States, even to places belonging to an enemy, 
such places only excepted as are besieged, blocked, or invested; and 
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these places only shall be considered as such which are nearly sur-
rounded by one of the belligerent powers." (Treaty of Amity and 
Comn1erce, United States and Sweden, 1783; Malloy, Treaties) 
Conventions) II, 1727-8.) 
2. ARTICLE 16. "This liberty of commerce and navigation shall ex-
tend to all kinds of merchandizes, excepting those only which are 
distinguished by the name of contraband; and under this name of 
contraband or prohibited goods shall be comprehended-
" 1st. Cannons, mortars, howitzers, s·wivels, blunderbusses, mus-
kets, fuzees, rifles, carbines, pistols, pikes, svvords, sabres, lances, 
sptars, halberds and grenades, bombs, powder, matches, balls and all 
other things belonging to the use of these arms. 
"2d. Bucklers, helmets, breast plates, coats of mail, infantry 
belts and clothes made up in the form and for a military use. 
"3d. Cavalry belts, and horses vvith their furniture. 
"4th. i\nd generally all kinds of arms ,and .instruments of Iron, 
steel, brass and copper or of any other materials manufactured, 
prepared and formed expressly to make war by sea or land." 
ARTICLE 17. "All other merchandise and things not comprehend-
ed in these articles of contraband, expressly enumerated and classi-
fied as above, shall be held and considered as free and subjects 
of free and lawful commerce, so that they may be carried and trans-
ported in the freest manner by both the contracting parties, even to 
places belonging to an enemy, excepting only those places vvhich are 
at that time besieged or blockaded; and, to avoid all doubt in this 
particular, it is declared that those places are only besieged or block-
aded which a.re actually attacked by a force capable of preventing 
the entry of the neutral (Treaty, United States and Brazil, 1828; 
United States Naval War College, International Law Situations) 
1933,6.) 
4. Late Nineteenth Century 
With the Declaration of Paris, signed by repre-
sentatives of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, 
Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey in 1856, the nations of 
the world began to agree upon a forrnula for the 
treatment of neutral commerce. 
"2. Le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, a !'ex-
ception de la con trebande de guerre; 
"3. La marchandise neutre, a !'exception de la contrebande de 
guerre, n'est pas saississable sous pavilion ennemi; ... " 
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("2. The neutral flag ccvers enemy goods ·with the exception of 
contraband of vvar. 
"3. Neutral goods, vvith the exception of contraband of vvar, are 
not liable to capture under the enemy's flag.") (Declaration of 
Paris, April 16, 1856; British and Foreig'n State PapersJ vol. 46. 
27.) 
Although the United States never signed the Dec-
laration of Paris, provisions similar to those of the 
Declaration of Paris were included in bilateral trea-
ties concluded by the United States with other coun-
tries. 
ARTICLE 15. "It shall be lavvful for the citizens of the United 
States of America and of. the Republic of Bolivia, to sail 'vith their 
ships, with all manner of liberty and security, no distinction being 
made who are the proprietors of the merchandises laden thereon, 
from ,any port to the places of those ,vho now are, or hereafter 
shall be, at enmity 'vith either of the ,contracting parties. It shall 
likewise be lawful for the citizens aforesaid to sail 'vith their ships 
and merchandise before mentioned, and to trade 'vith the same 
liberty and security, not only from places and ports of those who are 
enemies of both or either party, to the ports of the other, and to 
neutral places, but also from one place belonging to an enemy, 
whether they be under the jurisdiction of one power or of several." 
ARTICLE 16. "The t'vo high contracting parties recognize as 
permanent and immutable the follovving principles, to wit: 
"1st. That free ships make free goods: that is to say, that the 
effects or goods belo·nging to subjects or citizens of a power or 
State at 'var are free from c:tpture or confiscation when found 
on board of neutral vessels, ,vith the exception of articles contraband 
of war. 
"2d. That the property of neutrals on board an enemy's vessel 
is not subject to confiscation, unless the same be contraband of war. 
"The like neutrality shall be extended tn persons who are on 
board a neutral ship 'vit~ this effect, that although they may be 
enemies to both or either party, they are not to be taken out of that 
ship unless they are officers or soldiers, and in the actual service of 
the enemies. The contracting parties engage to apply these prin-
ciples to the commerce and navigation of ·all such powers and States 
as shall consent to adopt them as permanent and immutable." 
ARTICLE 17. "This liberty of navigation and commerce shall 
extend to all kinds of merchandise, excepting those only which are 
. . 
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distinguished by the name of contraband of war, and under this 
name shall be comprehended: 
"1st. Cannons, mortars, howitzers, swivels, blunderbusses, 
muskets, fuses, rifles, carbines, pistols, pikes, swords, sabers, lances, 
spears, halberds, and grenades, bombs, powder, matches, balls, . 
and all other things belonging to the use of these arms. 
"2d. Bucklers, helmets, breastplates, coats of mail, infantry-belts 
and clothes made up in the form and for ,a military use. 
"3d. Cavalry-belts, and horses, with their furniture. 
"4th. And, generally, all kinds of arms, offensive and defensive, 
and instruments of iron, steel, brass and copper, or any other !lla-
terials manufactured, prepared and formed expressly to make war 
by sea or land." 
ARTICLE 18. "All other merchandise and things not compre-
hended in the articles of contraband explicitly enumerated and · 
classified as above, shall be held and considered as free, .and subjects 
of free and lawful commerce, so that they may be carried and trans-
ported in the freest manner by the citizens of both the contracting 
parties, even to places belonging to an enemy, excepting only those 
places which are at that time besieged or blockaded; and to avoid 
all doubt in his particular, it is de'Clared that those places or ports 
only are beseiged or blockaded which .are actually attacked by a 
belligerent force capable of preventing the entry of the neutral." 
(Treaty, United States and Bolivia, 1858; Malloy, Treaties, Con-
ventions, I, 118-9.) 
Continuous Voyage and Contraband 
The doctrine of continuous voyage was developed 
by Great Britain in connection with the so-called 
'Rule of 1756' and was applied by the British Prize·_ 
Courts only to trade between British Colonies and 
foreign coun.tries, especially during the mercantilist 
period. As far as we know, the courts of the United 
States during the Civil War were the first to extend 
and apply the doctrine of continuous voyage to the 
carriage of contraband of war. No reported case be-
fore this time can be found in British courts 'vhere 
this doctrine has been applied to contraband . 
This doctrine was applied by the American courts 
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against British shipping during the Civil War, and 
this application seems to have been acceded to by the 
British Government of the time. This application 
was supported, moreover, by an international com-
mission which sat under an Anglo-American treaty 
of 1871. This commission, composed of an I tali an, an 
American, and a British delegate, unanimously dis-
allowed the claims made in the case of The Peterhoff. 
The application of the doctrine of continuous voy-
age as in The Peterhoff provided a precedent for 
British actions in World War I. After The Peterhoff 
the application of the doctrine of continuous voyage 
to absolute contraband shipped from one neutral 
state to another with a belligerent state as the ulti-
mate destination was adopted in general practice. 
The doctrine could be applied to conditional con-
traband shipped from one neutral state to another 
with a belligerent state as the ultimate destination 
only if it could be proved that the goods were actual-
ly destined for the government, the military forces, 
or some other governmental institution. In The Peter-
hoff the two types of contraband goods were dis-
tinguished, but the names "absolute" and "condi-
tional" were not applied to them. 
The application of the doctrine of continuous voy-
age to contraband necessitated, therefore, as in The 
Peterhoff a clear distinction between absolute and 
conditional contraband in the minds of the court and 
an intensive examination by the court into the true 
ultimate destination of goods shipped from one neu-
tral state to another. 
In the case of The Peterhoff, 1866, Justice Chase, 
speaking for the United States Supreme Court, de-
clared: 
" ... Thus far we have not thought it necessary to discuss the 
question of actual destination beyond Matamoras. Nor need we 
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say more upon that general question than that we think it a fair 
conclusion from the \vhole evidence that the cargo \Vas to be dis-
posed of in l\1exico or Texas as might be found most convenient 
and profitable to the o\vners and consignees, who were either at 
Matamoras or on board the ship. Destination in this case becomes 
specially important only in connection with the question of contra--
band. 
"And this brings us to the question: \Vas any portion of the 
cargo of the Peterhoff contraband? 
"The classification of goods as contraband or not contraband 
has much perplexed text-·writers and purists. A strictly accurate 
and satisfactory classification is perhaps impracticable; but that 
which is best supported by American and English decisions may be 
said to divide all m,erchandise into three classes. Of these classes, the 
first consists of ,articles manufactured and primarily and ordinarily 
used for military purposes in time of \var; the second, of articles -
which may be and are used for purposes of war or peace, accord-
ing to circumstances; and the third, of articles exclusiv,ely us.ed for 
peaceful purposes. Lawrence's vVheaton, 772-776, note; The 
CommercenJ 1 Wheaton, 382, Dana's Wheaton, 629, note; Par-
sons', Mar. La-vv, 93-94. Merchandise of the first class, destined 
to a belligerent, is ahvays con tr,aband; merchandise of the second 
class is contraband only when actually destined to the military or 
naval use of a belligerent; while merchandise of the third class is not 
contraband at all, though liable to seizure and condemnation for 
violation of blockade or siege. . 
"A considerable portion of the cargo of the Peterhoff -vvas of the 
third class and need not be further referred to. A large portion, 
perhaps, was of the second class, but is not proved, as we think, 
to have been actually destined to belligerent use, and cannot there-
fore be treated as contraband. Another portion vvas, in our judg_-
ment, of the first class, or, if of the second, destined directly to the 
rebel military service. This portion of the cargo consisted of the 
cases of artillery harness, and of .articles described in the invoices as 
"men's army bluchers," "artillery boots," and "government reg-
ulation gray blankets." These goods come fairly under the de-
scription of goods primarily and ordinarily used for military purposes 
in time of w ar. They make part of the necessary equipment· of an 
army. 
"It is true that even these goods, if really intended for sale in the 
m arket of lVI atamoras, \Vould be free of liability; for contraband 
may be transported to neutrals to a neutr.a l port, if intended to make 
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part of its general stock in trade. But there is nothing in the case 
which tends to convince us that such was their real destination, 
while all the circumstances indicate that these articles, at least, were 
destined for the use of the rebel forces then occupying Brownsville, 
and other places in the vicinity. 
"And contraband merchandise is subject to a different rule in re-
spect to ulterior destination than that which applies to merchandise 
not contraband. The latter is liable to capture only when a violation 
of blockade is intended; the former when destined to the hostile 
country, or to the actual military or naval use of the enemy, whether 
blockaded or not. The trade of neutrals with belligerents in articles 
not contraband is absolutely free, unless interrupted by blockade; 
the conveyance by neutrals to belligerents of contraband articles is 
always unlawful, and such articles may aways be seized during 
transmit by sea. Hence, while articles, not contraband, might be 
sent to Matamoras, and beyond to the rebel region, where the 
communications were not interrupted by blockade, articles of a 
contraband character, destined in fact to a State in rebellion, or for 
the use of the rebel military forces, were liable to capture, though 
primarily destined to Matamoras. 
"We are obliged to conclude that the portion of the cargo 'vhich 
we have characterized as contraband must be condemned." The 
Peterlzoff~ 1866. An American Case. 5 Wall. 28. Briggs, H. W., 
T:lze Law of Nations~ (Nevv York, 1938) , 917-8.) 
5. Twentieth Century Before World War I 
Belligerent destination and purpose remained, at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, as the general 
criteria for contraband of war. Conscious efforts were 
made to establish two definitive categories and lists 
of contraband: ( 1) absolute and (2) conditional, 
consequently adding refinements and conditions in 
regard to destination and purpose. The doctrine of 
continuous voyage was to apply only to absolute con-
trabrand. 
1. Article 34. "The term 'contraband of war' in-
cludes only articles having a belligerent destination 
and purpose. Such articles are classed under two 
general heads: 
" ( 1) Articles that are primarily and ordinarily used for military 
purposes in time of war, such as arms and munitions of war, mili-
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tary m1aterial, vessels of war, or instruments made for the immediate 
manufacture of munitions of war. 
"(2) A{rticles that may be and are used for purposes of war or 
peace, according to circumstances." 
"Articles of the first class, destined for ports of the enemy or 
places occupied by his forces, are always contraband of war." 
"Articles of the second class, vvhen actually and especially des-
tined for the military or naval forces of the enemy, ,are contraband 
of war." (United States Naval War Code of 1900. United States 
Naval War College, International Law Discussions~ 1903, 82.) 
2. During the Russo-Japanese War, the Vladi-
vostok Prize Court condemned a shipment of flour, 
part of the cargo on board the Arabia. The Ameri-
can Ambassador to Russia reported Russia's attitude 
as being as follows: 
" ... to unconditionally accept as noncontraband all merchandise 
not universally accepted or described in their ov.rn rules as such 
would open the door to contractors in Japan to import food stuffs 
and other merchandise without limit for account of the Japanese 
Government; that is, on account of or in destination of the enemy. 
That the Russian Government could not but consider as contraband 
a cargo of flour consigned to a port at which was quartered a large 
body of troops, and that extending this principle the ultimate des-
tination of the cargo had to be taken into consideration, although 
its direct consignment might be to a merchant in an open port." 
(Ambassador McCormick to Secretary of State Hay, Sept. 21, 
1904, United States Foreign Relations~ 1904, 767-8.) 
3. The Japanese Prize Courts in 1905 held that a 
cargo of rock salt on board the Antiope vvas contra-
band because it was destined for preserving fish for 
the Russian military forces. (Russian and Japanese 
Prize Cases_, II, 389.) 
4. The American attitude during this period 
toward contraband is indicated partially in further 
documents regarding the case of the Arabia. 
"The same criterion of decision is announced by Kent, H.alleck, 
and other authoritative publicists-that if the port be a general 
commercial one, it is presumed that the articles are intended for 
civil use, but if the great predominant character of the port is 
. that of a port of naval equipment, it will be presumed that the 
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articles \Vere going fior military use, and that the presumption of 
innocence exists in all cases when they are destined to ,a commercial 
port." (Instruction of Secretary of State Hay to Ambassador 
McCormick, Jan. 13, 1905. United States Foreign Relations., 
1905, 747.) 
In 1914 the Department of State instructed the 
Charge d'Affaires in Russia to present a claim to the 
Russian Govern1nent for the loss due to the con-
demnation of part of the flour. 
". . . In the absence of information as to the consignees or of 
the transaction in vvhich the flour here in question vvas involved, 
the master . was not in a position to assert the fact of its private 
commercial destination. Ho,vever, this does not in any \Vay affect 
the views of this Government in relation to the case under discus-
sion, namely, in ·the absence of consignment to enemy authorities or 
to an enemy contractor \Vho as a matter of common kno,vledge 
supplied articles of this kind to the enemy, or to a fortified place of 
the enemy or to another place serving as a base for the armed forces 
of the enemy, the non-hostile destination of the flour '\Vas to be pre-
sumed, and therefore that the burden of proving the non-hostile 
destination of the flour \Vas not cast upon the O\Vners or their 
representatives, but that it \Vas for the captors to prove its hostile 
destination." (The solicitor for the Department of State, Johnson, 
to the Charge d'A.ffaires ad interim in Russia, Wilson, July 2, 
1914; Hack,vorth, G. H., Digest of International Law., VII, 79.) 
5. In a case involving an American shipping com-
pany which had canceled a contract for carrying flour 
to Japan because Russia had declared "provisions" 
to be contrband, the follo,ving opinion was expressed 
by an American court: 
"Flour may probably be considered as a provision prepared for 
immediate use; but as to \vhether it \Vas designed that the product 
in the present instance should go to a naval or military equipment 
station, there is no proof except that Japan \vas in a state of vvar. 
Ordinarily, therefore, the presumption \vould prevail that the flour 
\vas going to Japan for civil use, and would not be contraband ex-
cept that it -vvas declared to be so by one of the belligerents. Perhaps 
a mere declaration by a belligerent nation that articles of commerce 
are contraband, \Vhen by the rules of internationalla,v they are not, 
would not make them so. But here is a proclamation touching pro-
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v1s10ns that rest upon the border line, and depend for their real 
char.acter upon the particular state of the port of their destination, 
whether engaged in civil pursuits only, or in the equipping of either 
the army or the navy with war supplies. It would seem that, under 
such conditions, the proclamation of one of the governments at war · 
would be effective to impress the provisions with the character of 
contraband. Ait any rate, I am inclined so to treat the flour con-
cerned here." (Balfour~ Guthrie and Co. v. Portland and Asiatic 
S. S. Co.~ 167 Fed. 1010, 1015. (D. Oreg., 1909.) 
6. In regard to contraband, Secretary of State Root 
charged the American delegates to the Hague Con-
ference of 1907 as follows : 
" ... It is of the highest importance that not only the rights but 
the duties of neutrals shall be most clearly and distinctly defined -
and understood, not only because the evils which belligerent nations 
bring upon themselves ought not to be allowed to spread to their 
peaceful neighbors and inflict unnecessary injury upon the rest of 
mankind, but because misunderstandings regarding the rights and 
duties of neutrals constantly tend to involve them in controversy 
with one or the other belligerent. 
"For both of these reasons, special consider,ation should be given 
to an agreement upon what shall be deemed to constitute contra-
band of war. There has been a recent tendency to extend widely 
the list of articles to be treated as contrahand; and it is probable 
that if the belligerents themselves are to determine at the begin-
ning of a war what shall be contraband, this tendency vvill continue 
until the list of contraband is m,a.de to include a large proportion of 
all the articles which are the subject of commerce, upon the ground 
that they will be useful to the enemy. When this result is reached, 
especially if the doctrine that free ships make free goods and the 
doctrine that blockades in order to be binding must be effective, 
as well as .any rule giving immunity to the property of belligerents 
at sea, will be deprived of a large part of their effect, and vve 
shall find ourselves going baclnvard instead of fonvard in the 
effort to prev.ent every \V"ar from becoming universally disastrous. 
The exception of contraband of war in the Declaration of Pari~ will 
be so expanded as to very largely destroy the effect of the declara-
tion. On the other hand, resistance to this tendency tow;ard the 
expansion of the list of contraband ought not to be left to the 
neutrals affected by it at the very moment when vvar exists, because 
that is the precess by which neutrals become themselves involved 
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in war. You should do all in your power to bring about ,an agree-
ment upon vvhat is to constitute contraband; and it is very desirable 
that the list should be limited as narrovvly as possible." (Secretary 
of State Root to the Delegates of the United States to the Hague 
Conference of 1907, lVIay 31, 1907; United States Foreign Rela-
tions_, 1907, pt. 2, 1138.) 
7. The Hague Conference of 1907 came to no 
agreement on this subject, but the Declaration of 
London in 1909 embodied many provisions for con-
traband. An elaborate attempt was made through the 
Declaration of London to list all articles entering 
into commerce in three categories: ( 1) absolute con-
traband, ( 2) conditional contraband, and ( 3) never 
contraband. 
Article 22. "The follovving articles may, vvithout notice, be 
treated as contraband of war, under the name of absolute con-
trahand: 
" ( 1) Arms of all kinds, including arms for sporting purposes, 
and their distinctive component parts. 
" ( 2) Projectiles, charges and cartridges of all kinds, and their 
distinctive component parts. 
" ( 3) Power and explosives specially prepared for use in war. 
" ( 4) Gun-mountings, limber boxes, limbers, military vvagons, 
field forges, and their distinctive component parts. 
" ( 5) Clothing and equipment of a distinctively military char-
acter. 
" ( 6) All kinds of harness of a distinctively military character. 
" ( 7) Saddle, draught, and p.ack animals suitable for use in war. 
" ( 8) Articles of camp equipment, and their distinctive com-
ponent parts. 
" ( 9) Armour plates. 
" ( 10) Warships, including boats, and their distinctive com-
ponent parts of such ;a nature that they can only be used on a 
vessel of war. 
" (I 1) Implements and. apparatus designed exclusively for the 
manufacture of munitions of war, for the manufacture or repair of 
arms, or war materi.al for use on land or sea." 
ARTICLE 23. "Articles .exclusively used for \Var may be added 
to the list of absolute contraband by a declaration, which must be 
notified. 
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"Such notification must be addressed to the Governments of 
. other Powers, or .to their representatives accredited to the Power 
making the declaration. A notification made after the outbreak of 
hostilities is addressed only to neutral Powers." 
ARTICLE 24. "T:he following articles, susceptible of use in war 
as well as for purposes of peace, may, without notice, be treated as. 
contraband of war, under the name of conditional contraband: 
" ( 1 ) Foodstuffs. 
" ( 2) Forage and grain, suitable for feeding anim.als. 
" ( 3) Clothing, fabrics for clothing, and boots and shoes, suit-
able for use in war. 
'' ( 4) Gold and silver in coin or bullion; paper money. 
" ( 5) Vehicles of all kinds available for use in war, and their 
component parts. 
" ( 6) Vessels, craft, and boats of all kinds; floating docks, parts 
of docks and their component parts. 
" ( 7) Railway material, both fixed and rolling-stock, and mate-
rial for telegraphs·, wireless telegraphs, and telephones. 
" ( 8) Balloons and flying machines and their distinctive com-
ponent parts, together with accessories and articles recogniz;able as 
intended for use in connection with balloons and flying machines. 
" ( 9) Fuel; lubricants. 
" ( 10) Powder and explosives not specially prepared for use 
In war. 
" ( 11) Barbed wire and implements for fixing and cutting the 
same. 
" ( 12) Horseshoes and shoeing materials. 
" ( 13) Harness and saddlery. 
" ( 14) Field glasses, telescopes, chronometers, and all kinds of 
nautical instruments." 
ARTICLE 25. "Articles susceptible for use in war as well as for 
purposes of peace, other than those enumerated in Articles 22 and· 
24, may be added to the list of conditional contraband by a declara- · 
tion, which must be notified in the manner provided for in the 
second paragraph of Article 23." 
ARTICLE 26. "If a Power waives, so far as it is concerned, the 
right to treat as contraband of war an article comprised in any of 
the classes enumerated in Articles 22 and 24, such intention shall 
be announced by a declaration, which must be notified in the man-
ner provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23." 
ARTICLE 27. "Articles which are not susceptible of use In war 
may not be declared contraband of war." 
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ARTICLE 28. "The following may not be declared contraband 
of '~ar: 
" ( 1) Ra'v cotton, \vool, silk, jute, flax, hemp, and other ra\V 
materials of the textile industries, and yarns of the same. 
" ( 2) Oil seeds and nuts; copra. 
" ( 3) Rubber, resins, gums, and lacs; hops. 
" ( 5) Natural and artificial manures, including nitrates and 
phosphates for agricultural purposes. 
" ( 6) Metallic ores. 
" ( 7) Earths, clays, lime, chalk, stone, including marble, bricks, 
slates, and tiles. 
" ( 8) China ware and glass. 
" ( 9) Paper and paper-making materials. 
" ( 10) Soap, paint and colors, including articles exclusively used 
in their manufacture, and varnish. 
" ( 11) Bleaching po\vder, soda ash, caustic soda, salt cake, am-
monia, sulphate of ammonia, and sulphate of copper. 
" ( 12) Agricultural, mining, textile, and printing machinery. 
" ( 13) Precious and semi-precious stones, pearls, mother-of-
pearl, and coral. 
" ( 14) Clocks and \vatches, other than chronometers. 
" ( 15) Fashion and fancy goods. 
" ( 16) Feathers of all kinds, hairs, and bristles. 
" ( 1 7) Articles of household furniture and decoration ; office 
furniture and requisites." 
ARTICLE 29. "Like\vise the following may not be treated as 
contraband of war: 
" ( 1) Articles serving exclusively to aid the sick and wounded. 
They can, ho,vever, in case of urgent military necessity and subject 
to the payment of compensation, be requisitioned, if their destina-
tion is that specified in Article 30. 
" ( 2) Articles intended for the use of the vessel in \vhich they 
are found, as \vell as those intended for the use of her cre'v and 
passengers during the voyage." 
ARTICLE 30. "Absolute contraband is liable to capture if it is 
sho\vn to be destined to territory belonging to or occupied by the 
enemy, or to the armed forces of the enemy. It is immaterial 
\vhether carriage o"f the goods is direct or entails transshipment 
or a subsequent transport by land." 
ARTICLE 31. "Proof of the destination specified in Article 30 
is complete in the following cases: 
" ( 1) When the goods are documented for discharge in an enemy 
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port, or for delivery to the armed forces of the enemy. 
" ( 2) When the vessel is to call at enemy ports only, or when she 
is to touch at an enemy port or meet the armed forces of the enemy 
before reaching the neutral port for which the goods in question 
are documented." 
ARTICLE 32. "Where a vessel is carrying .absolute contraband, -
her papers are conclusive proof as to the voyage on which she is 
engaged, unless she is found clearly out of the course indicated by 
her papers and unable to give adequate reasons to justify such 
deviation." 
ARTICLE 33. "Conditional contraband is liable to capture if it 
is shown to be destined for the use of the armed forces or of a 
government department of the enemy State, unless in this latter 
case the circumstances show that the goods cannot in fact be used 
for the purposes of the wa.r in progress. This latter exception does _ 
not apply to a consignment coming under Article 24 ( 4) ." 
ARTICLE 34. "The destination referred to in Article 33 is pre-
sumed to exist if the goods are consigned to enemy authorities, or 
to a contractor established in the enemy country who, as a matter 
of common knovvledge, supplies articles of this kind to the enemy. 
A similar presumption arises if the goods are consigned to ,a forti-
fied place belonging to "the enemy, or other place serving as a base 
for the armed forces of the enemy. No such presumption, however, 
arises in the case of a merchant vessel bound for one of these 
places if it is sought to prove that she herself is contraband. 
"In cases where the above presumptions do not arise, the destina-
tion is presumed to be innocent. 
"The presumptions set up by this Article may be rebutted." 
ARTICLE 35. "Conditional contraband is not liable to capfure, 
except when found on board a vessel bound for terri tory belonging 
to or occupied by the enemy, or for the armed forces of the enemy,· 
and when it is not to be discharged in an intervening neutral port. 
"The ship's papers are conclusive proof both as to the voyage 
on which the vessel is engaged and as to the port of discharge of 
the goods, unless she is found clearly out of the course indicated 
by her papers, and unable to give adequate reasons to justify such 
deviation." 
ARTICLE 36. "Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 35, 
conditional contraband, if shown to have the destination referred 
to in Article 33, is liable to capture in cases ,vhere the enemy 
country has no seaboard." 
ARTICLE 37. "A vessel carrying goods liable to capture as ab-
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solute or conditional contraband may be captured on the high seas 
or in the territorial waters of the belligerents throughout the whole 
· of her voyage, even if she is to touch at a port of call before reaching 
the hostile destination." 
ARTICLE 38. "A vessel may not be captured on the ground that 
she has carried contraband on a previous occasion if such carriage 
is in point of fact at an end." 
ARTICLE 39. "Contraband goods are liable to condemnation." 
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ARTICLE 40. "A vessel carrying contraband may be condemned 
if the contraband, reckoned either by value, weight, volume, or 
freight, forms more than half the cargo." 
ARTICLE 41. "If a vessel carrying contraband is released, she 
may be condemned to pay the costs and expenses incurred by the 
captor in respect of the proceedings in the national prize cour/ 
and the custody of the ship and cargo during the proceedings." 
ARTICLE 42. "Goods \vhich belong to the o\vner of the contra-
band and are on board the same vessel are liable to condemnation." 
ARTICLE 43 . . "If a vessel is encountered at sea \vhile unaware 
of the outbreak of hostilities of the declaration of contraband which 
applies to her cargo, the contraband cannot be condemned except 
on payment of compensation; the vessel herself and the remainder 
of the cargo are not liable to condemnation or to the costs and 
expenses referred to in Article 41. The same rule applies if the 
master, after becoming a\vare of the outbreak of hostilities, or of 
the declaration of contraband, has had no opportunity of discharg-
ing the contraband. 
"A vessel is deemed to be a\vare of the existence of a state of war, 
or of a declaration of contraband, if she left a neutral port sub-
sequently to the notification to the Po\ver to \vhich such port 
belongs of the outbreak of hostilities or of the declaration of 
contraband respectively, provided that such notification was made 
in sufficient time. A vessel is also deemed to be aware of the ex-
istence of a state of war if she left an enemy port after the outbreak 
of hostilities." 
ARTICLE 44. "A vesse~ which has been stopped on the ground 
that is she carrying contraband, and which is not liable to condemna-
tion on account of the proportion of contraband on board, may, 
when the circumstances permit, be allo\ved to continue her voyage 
if the master is willing to hand over the contraband to the 
belligerent warship. 
"The delivery of the contraband must be entered by the captor 
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on the logbook of the vessel stopped, and the master must give the 
captor duly certified copies of all relevent papers. 
"The captor is at liberty to destroy the contraband that has been 
handed over to him under these conditions." (Declaration of Lon-
don, 1909. Not ratified. Correspondence and Documents Respecting_ 
the International Naval ConferenceJ held in London, Dec. 1908-
F:eb. 1909, Parliamentary PapersJ [Cd. 4554], Misc. No. 4 
( 1909) ' 7 8-84. ) 
8. In 1910 Russia, in answer to an American claim 
on behalf of the American owners of cargo of kero-
sene, seized and condemned by Russia during the 
Russo-Japanese War, declared: 
"The Court of course could not but take note of the decisive 
circumstance in this instance that had the destination of the 'Old-
hamia's' cargo really been innocent and not destined for military 
purposes, the following characteristic facts, thoroughly verified in 
Court, certainly could not have occurred: 
" ( 1) At the moment of her detention by the Russian cruiser the 
steamer 'Oldhamia' was proceeding ~vithout lights. 
"(2) Upon detention of the vessel no charter-party was pro-
duced to the Russian naval authorities during the examination of 
the steamer and cargo. 
" ( 3) The manifest stated that the vessel was to discharge at 
HongKong, 'vhereas when detained she vvas proceeding from 
HongKong in the direction of Japan. 
" ( 4) Similar incorrect evidence as to the course of the vessel to 
HongKong was given by the crew of the 'Oldhamia' during the 
examination. 
" ( 5) Subsequently, upon searching the vessel, there was found 
correspondence addressed to the Captain of the 'Oldhamia' from-
which it was made clear that the cargo had been accepted by the 
steamer from the Standard Oil Company especially for carriage to 
Japan. 
"These facts are of course of the first importance, and the con-
duct of the Captain and crew-especially as the question is one 
of 'relative' contraband, i. e., liable to confiscation only if destined 
for military purposes-proved in this instance the deciding factor 
in arriving at a conclusion respecting the hostile or harmless des-
tination of the cargo. The Imperial Government therefore can in no 
way agree with the point of vie':v of the note of July 10/23 declar-
ing that 'the character of the cargo itself is the sole essential question 
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here, and the conduct of the crew has no significance'. In contra-
distinction to cases of carriage of absolute contraband-where such 
argument (with certain reservations) generally speaking would 
be true-in cases of carriage of relative contraband, its character 
(i.e., the real distinction of the cargo) is often ascertained pre-
cisely from the conduct of the crevv, and such facts as for instance 
the concealment of papers or the false evidence of the crew, from the 
point of vie\v of modern international la\v, are unquestionably 
decisive in the sense of presumption of the military destination of the 
cargo, which is liable in such event to confiscation ... " (The 
Oldhamia~ 1910. Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International Law~ 
VII, 65-6. See Russian and Japanese Prize Cases~ I, 145.) 
9. "It is not seen ... that according to the Declaration of London, 
the misleading character of the ship's papers in this case and the 
action of the Captain and crew raised a presumption of hostile des-
tination. They simply destroyed the value of the ship's papers as 
evidence of the destination, and apparently showed that the vessel 
\Vas destined, generally, to Japan. Their destination in Japan is still 
presumed innocent, unless the consignment is addressed or destined, 
as set forth in Article 34, and it is not understood that there is any 
direct proof thereof in this case." (Memorandum of the Office of 
the Solicitor for the United States Department of State, Nov. 22, 
1910 in regard to The Oldhamia and the Russian reply to the 
A:merican claim. Hackworth, G. H ., Digest of International Law~ 
VII, 66.) 
10. "In 1800 an American vessel carrying an American-owned 
cargo which included seven horses, bound to the British island of 
Antigua, was seized by a French privateer, and the vessel and cargo 
were condemned by a French prize court, inter alia~ for carriage of 
contraband. The Court of Claims, passing on this as one of the 
French Spoliation Claims, upheld the findings of the French court 
the Antigua was a base of military and naval equipment. The 
court stated that whether horses vvere contraband depended on the 
probable use to be made of them at their destination and that such 
use was presumed to be hostile because of the character of the 
port." (The Brig Rensalaer, 1913. Commentary, Hackworth, G. 
H., Digest of International Law~ VII, 70. See 49 Court of Claims 
1.) 
11. "An American brig sailed in 1797 from Baltimore bound for 
the Swedish island of St. B:artholomew, carrying a cargo of pro-
visions. The vessel was shown to have the Britsh island of Antigua 
as 'its real destination. It was seized on the high seas in the vicinity 
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of Antigua by a French privateer and condemned by a French prize 
court for carrying food assumed to be for the British Army at An-
tigua. The Court of Claims-passing on this as one of the French 
Spoliation Claims-held that the condemnation was illegal regard-
less of the treaty of 1778 between the United States and France: 
The court examined at some length the situation prevailing on the 
island at the time, including the fact that a food shortage existed, 
that slaves were greatly in the majority, and that troops were held 
there to guard against an uprising, 'and concluded that 'All of the 
foregoing goes to negative any presumption that food-stuffs destined 
for the island of Antigua were for the supply of a few troops- sta-
tioned there.'" The Brig Sally~ 1915, Commentary, Hackworth, G. 
H., Digest of International Law~ VII, 70. See 50 Court of Claims 
129, 136.) 
12. The following dispatch of October 19, 1911 
shows that the Declaration of London of 1909 was 
operative during the Turco-Italian War in 1911-12: 
"By a royal decree of October 13 the following instructions were 
approved in conformity with the. principles of the Declaration of 
P,aris, April 16, 185~, which belligerent countries are bound to re-
spect, with the rules of The Hague Conventions of October 18, 
1907, and of the Declaration of London of rebruary 26, 1909, 
which the Government of the King desires to be respected as well, 
so far as the provisions of the laws in force in the Kingdom allow, 
although they have not yet been ratified by Italy; and they will 
serve to regulate the conduct of naval commanders in the opera-
tions of capture and prize during the war." (United States Naval 
War College, International Law Situations~ 1912, 108.) 
6. World War I. 
At the outbreak of World War I, most of the pro- -
visions of the Declaration of Paris and the unratified 
Declaration of London were followed by the war-
ring nations in treating neutral and enemy commerce. 
As the war continued some of these provisions were 
retained, but most of them were altered as methods 
of warfare developed and conditions changed. 
( 1) Rules as of 1914. 
1. In 1914 the following propositions concerning 
contraband were generally accepted as law: 
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1. "Even enemy goods are safe on a neutral ship, if they are not 
contraband .... " 
2. "Neutral goods are safe even on an enemy ship, if they are 
not contraband .... " 
3. "A fortiori_, neutral goqds are safe on a neutral ship but only 
if they are not contraband .... " 
4. "Contraband goods are divided into t\VO catagories: absolute 
and conditional." 
5. "Absolute contraband consists of goods exclusively used for 
\var and destined for an enemy country, even if passing through a 
neutral country en ~oute; the rule of 'continuous voyage' applies." 
6. "Conditional contraband consists of goods \vhich may have a 
peaceful use but \vhich are also susceptible of use in \var and \vhich 
are destined for the armed forces or a government department of a 
belligerent state; the rule of 'continuous voyage' does not apply." 
(P. C. Jessup's preface to Neutrality_, Its History_, Economics and 
Law: vol. III, The World War Period (Turlington, 1936), x.) 
2. "The sale or shipment of contraband of \\'"ar by citizens of the 
United States to citizens or subjects of any of the belligerent po\vers, 
in course of commerce, is not prohibited by the neutrality la\vs or 
the President's proclamation. But contraband, \vhether shipped 
in vessels of the belligerents or neutrals, is subject to seizure and 
confiscation by the belligerents, and \Vhen so seized is not entitled 
to the protection or intervention of this Government." 
"When absolute contraband is destined to one of the countries 
at war_, w,hether to the government or to an indiv.idual of that 
country_, it is subject to seizure and confiscation by any of the oppos-
ing belligerents \vhen beyond the territory of the neutral govern-
ment from \vhich it is shipped." 
"Vessels flying the flag of one of the belligerents are subject to 
seizure and confiscation by the opposing belligerents. Contraband of 
\var on board of such vessel is, of course, subject to confiscation, 
though the property of a neutral. 
"Goods, not contraband, belonging to a neutral aboard a captured 
vessel are subject to delay and interruption consequent upon the seiz-
ure of the vessel, but not to confiscation, upon manifestation of 
neutral o\vnership and the non-contraband character of the goods. 
"When a vessel containing cargo of a citizen of the United 
States is captured and is carried before a prize court, as it \Vill be 
presumably, he should give notice of his claim of property to the 
p11ize-court authorities and be prepared to furnish proof of his 
o\vnership and the non-contraband character of his goods. 
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"Goods of a neutral, not contraband of war, shipped on a neutral 
vessel are not rightfully subject to seizure or confiscation by any of 
the belligerents, and it is not presumed that the vessels of neutrals 
carrying only non-contraband cargoes will be interfered with." 
Contraband. of war "is ranked und~r two heads, namely, absolute 
and cond,itional." Absolute contraband "includes those article·s 
which are peculiarly adapted to war, such as arms and ammunition 
and military and naval equipment." Conditional contraband "con-
sists, generally speaking, of articles which are susceptible of use in 
war as well as for purposes of peace," and, therefore, "their des-
tination determines whether they are contraband or non-contra-
band." (Public circular issued by the Department of State, j\u~. 
15, 1914; United States Foreign Relations, 1914, Supplement, 
274-7.) 
3. "His Majesty's Government cordially concur in the principle 
enunciated by the Government of the U nitedl States that a belliger- · 
ent, in dealing with trade between neutrals, would not interfere 
unless such interference is necessary to protect the belligerent's 
national safety, and then only to the extent to which this is neces-
sary. We shall endeavor! to keep our action within the limits of this 
principle on the understanding that it admits our right to interfere 
when such interference is not with bona fidei. trade between the 
United States and another neutral country, but with trade in con-
traband destined for the) enemy's country, and we are ready, when-
ever our action may unintent:ionally exceed this principle, to make 
redress." (British Foreign Office reply to American note. Ambas-
sador Page to Secretary of State Bryan, telegram, Jan. 7, 1915; 
United States Foreign Relations} 1915, Supplement} 299-300.) 
Changes in Contraband Lists. 
The government of the United States attempted to 
gain in the early days of the war a general agreement 
to the Declaration of London from all belligerents. 
The belligerents, however, declared it necessary to 
transfer certain goods, aircraft for example, from the 
conditional to the absolute list. Such transfers. were 
even allowed under the terms of the unratified Decla-
ration of London. Although there was n1uch inter-
change of opinion bet,veen the belligerents and neu-
trals in regard to contraband, no general agreement 
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\Vas ever reached. As the war continued, the bel-
ligerents surpassed each other in going beyond the 
ordinary bounds of international la,v, using retalia-
tion in self-defense as a justification for avoiding its 
obligations under international law. The generally 
\Veaker neutral nations had to submit to these actions. 
In the case of contraband lists, the lists remained, but 
as goods \Vere rapidly shifted from the free to the 
conditional and then to the absolute list, the distinc-
tion between absolute and conditional disappeared. 
By the end of the war, all contraband \vas absolute 
contraband, for with total warfare it was soon pre-
sumed that all goods even food stuffs, were destined 
to the enemy government. 
1. "On August 6, 1914, the American Secretary of State address-
ed to the American Ambassadors in the belligerent states and the 
Minister to Belgium an inquiry as to whether the respective states 
were '-willing to agree that the laws of naval vvarfare laid down by 
the Declaration of London, 1909, shall be applicable to naval vvar-
fare during the present European! conflict, provided that the gov-
ernments vvith 'vhom' they were or might be at vvar also agree to 
such application. The Secretary also said, 'You will further state 
that this Government believes that acceptance of these lavvs by the 
belligerents would prevent grave misunderstandings which may 
arise as to the relations benveen belligerent and neutral povvers. It , 
therefore, earnestly hopes that this inquiry may receive favorable 
consideration.'" (United States Naval War College, International 
Law Situations~ 1933, 10; United States Foreign Relations~ 1914, 
Supplement~ 216.) 
2. "The British Government had on August 5, 1914, made 
known that it would regard as contraband the articles named as 
absolute and conditional contraband in the Declaration of London 
with the transfer of aircraft from the conditional to the absolute 
list." (United States Naval War College, International Law Sit-
uations~ 1933, 10; United States Foreign Relations~ 1914, Supple-
7nent~ 215-6.) 
3. For British-lists and changes therein, see United 
States Foreign Relations1 1914, Supplenlent1 215-216, 
236, 245, 261-262, 269-270; United States Foreign 
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Relations, 1915, Supplement, 137, 160, 165, 174-177; 
United States Foreign Relations, 1916, Supplement, 
385-387, 405, 453, 486; United States Foreign Rela-
tions, 1917, Supplement I, 492; United States Foreign 
Relations, 1918, Supplement I, 917-918. 
French contraband lists conformed to the British. 
4. At the beginning of the war, the German and 
Austro-Hungarian Governments announ,ced that 
their lists of contraband would conform to those in 
the Declaration of London. For these lists and later 
changes, see United States Foreign Relations, 1914, 
Supplement, 216, 222, 266; United States Foreign 
Relations, 1915, Supplement, 162-163, 607; United 
States Foreign Relations, 1916, Supplement, 281. 
5. Japan also announced a list which conformed 
to the Declaration of London except for the inclusion 
of aircraft as absolute contraband. See United States 
Foreign Relations, 1914, Supplement, 179; United 
States Naval War College, I ntern~tional Law Do cu-
m ents, 1925, 146, 152. 
6. " ... The United States stands ready ·either to accept the 
declaration as a whole, provided all of the belligerents accept 1t, or, 
to accept it for the period of the war with modifications and addi-
tions acceptable, on the one hand, to the United States and the 
Netherlands, the two neutral signatories, and, on the other hand, 
to all of the belligerents. 
"This Government in seeking general acceptance of the declara-
tion as a code of naval warfare for the present war had in mind 
the adoption of the declaration as a whole and not such part of it 
as might be acceptable to certain belligerents and not to other bel-
ligerents. It considered that the declaration was to be applied as a 
complete code of which no rule could be ignored or supplemented, 
and in so doing it followed A;rticle 65 of the declaration, which 
stipulates: 'The provisions of the present declaration must be treat-
ed as a whole and cannot be separated.' 
"The only reasonable explanation for the inclusion in the declara-
tion of this requirement is that the instrument is composed largely 
of compromises on the part of the government represented at the 
conference. Although the declaration is introduced with a general 
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statement that 'the signatory powers are agreed' that the rules 
contained in the declaration 'correspond in substance with the 
generally recognized principles of international law,' the pro-
ceedings of the conference as \Veil as the documents relating to it 
prove that an agreement on many of the articles was reached 
through reciprocal concessions. Being conceived in compromise and 
concession the declaration was accepted by the Government of the 
United States at the conference in London in the earnest hope that 
it might finally compose the differences vvhicb: existed as to neutral 
rights and neutral duties, although in so accepting this Government 
was compelled to abandon certain rules of conduct which it has 
heretofore always maintained. 
7. "As might be expected in a settlement of divergent views and 
practices by mutual concession the Declaration of London contains 
provisions both advantageous and disadvantageous to the respective 
interests of neutrals and bellige.rents. But it is now proposed by 
Great Britain to retain all the provisions favorable to belligerents 
and to recast other provisions so that they will be less favorable to 
neutral interests. The result is a set of rules which limits neutrals' 
rights far more than does the declaration itself treated as a whole. 
War, in any event, bears heavily upon a neutral nation. The inter-
ruption of its commerce and the limitations placed upon its trade 
are sufficiently burdensome under the rules of t'he Declaration of 
London. In consenting to those rules the Government of the United 
States made great concessions on its part and it does not feel that it 
can, in justice to its own people, go further. It cannot consent to 
the retention of a part of this compromise settlement and to the 
rejection of another part. The adoption of the declaration so 
modified is contrary to the customary procedure incident to com-
promise settlements, to the express provisions of the declaration it-
self, and to the spirit which induced its signature." (Acting Secre-
tary of State, Sept. 26, 1914. (United Stl{lltes Foreign Relations_, 
1914, Supplement_, 227. United States Naval War College, Inter-
national Law Situations_, 1933, 11-12.) . 
8. "A discussion of the provisions of the order in council followed 
in which the Ambassador said that he agreed that the Order in 
Council practically made foodstuffs absolute contraband, which 
was contrary to the British traditional policy as well as to that of 
the United States. He said that the immediate cause had been the 
introduction through Rotterdam in first days of the war of large 
quantities of food supplies for the German army in Belgium, and 
that it seemed absolutely necessary to stop this traffic. 
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"I replied that, while I appreciated that such reasons must weigh 
very heavily with those responsible for the successful conduct of the 
\var, it seemed unfortunate that some other means could not have 
been found to accomplish the desired purpose, either by getting the 
Netherlands to place an embargo on foodstuffs and other condition-
al contraband or by agreeing not to export such articles. The 
Ambassador said that he agreed that would. be much the better 
way, and that he believed it could be done. 
"He said that now the chief anxiety to be in regard to shipments 
of copper and petrole~m and also of S·wedish iron, and that the 
British Government was stopping vessels with such cargoes and pur-
chasing them. He suggested that possibly the difficulty created by the 
Order in Council could be removed by rescinding it and adding 
to the list of absolute contraband petroleum · products, copper, 
barbed wire and other articles of like nature now used almost ex-
clusiv,ely for war purposes. 
"I said that as to this suggestion I could not speak for the Gov-
ernment but that it seemed worthy of consideration as it might offer 
a means of getting rid of the order in council ·which certainly men-
aced the very friendly relations existing if it became the subject of 
discussion by the press. I told- him that I did not think that the 
feeling which the Order in Council would arouse when generally 
understood, would be among the shippers as much as among the 
American public at large; and that, even if no case arose under it, 
the fact that the British Government had issued a decree, which 
menaced the commercial rights of the United States as a neutral, 
in violation of the generally accepted rules of international law, 
would undoubtedly cause irritation, if not indignation, and might 
change the sentiment of the American people, of which Great 
Britain had no reason to complain at the present tin1e." (A m,emor-
andum of a conference of Acting Secretary Lansing with the British 
Ambassador on September 29, 1914. United States Foreign Rela-
tions., 1914, Supplement., 234. United States Naval War College, 
International Law Situations., 1933, 12-13.) 
9. "The desire of this Government is to obtain from the British 
Government the issuance of an Order in Council adopting the 
declaration without any amendment whatsoever and to obtain from 
France and Russia like decrees, which they will undoubtedly issue 
if Great Britain sets the example. Such an adoption by the allied 
Governments will put in force the acceptance of the Declaration 
of London by Germany and Austria, which 'vill thus become for 
29 
all the bellige rent powers the cod e of naval warfare du r ing the 
present conflict. 'l'his is the ai1n of the United States. 
"It cannot be accmnplished if the declaration is changed in any 
way as Gern1any and Austria would not give their consent to a 
change. 
"In the frequ cn t informal and confidential conve rsations \vhich 
have taken place here and in the admirable frankness \vith \vhich 
Sir Ed\vard Grey has stated the reasons for the action which Great 
Britain has deetned it necessary to take in regard to the declaration, 
this Governmen t feels that it fu lly understands and appreciates the 
B ritish pos,i tion , and is not d isposed to place obstacles in the way 
of the accomplishment of the purposes w hich th e. British representa-
tives have so f rankly stated. 
" T 'he confidence thus reported in this· Government makes it ap-
preciate more than ever the staunch fr iendship of Great Britain for 
the U nited States, \vhich it hopes al·ways to deserve. 
"1'his Government \vould not feel ·war ranted in offering any 
suggestion to the British Government as ~to a course which would 
meet the wishes of this Government and at the same time ac-
complish the ends ·which Great Britain seeks, but you might in the 
strictest confidence intimate to Sir Edward Grey the following 
pl an , at the same time stating very explicitly that it is your personal 
suggestion and not one for which your Government is responsible. 
"Let the British Government issue an Order in Council accept-
ing the Declaration of London without change or addition, and 
repealing all previous conflicting orders in council. 
"Let this Order in Council be followed by a proclamation adding 
articles to the lists of absolute and conditional contraband by virtue 
of the authority conferred by ATticles 23 and 25 of the declaration. 
"Let the proclamation be followed by another Order in Council, 
of vvhich the United States need not be pr·e:viously advised, declaring 
that, \vhen one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State is 
convinced that a port or the territory of a neutral country is being 
used as a base for the transit of supplies for an enemy government 
a proclamation shall issue declaring that such port or territory has 
acquired enemy character in so far as trade in contraband is con-
cerned and that vessels trading there\vith shall be thereafter subject 
to the rules of the declaration governing trade to enemy's territory. 
"It is true that the latter Order in Council would be based on a 
new principle. The excuse \vould be that the Declaration of London 
failing to provide for such an exceptional condition as exists, a bel-
ligerent has a right to give a reasonable interpretation to the rules 
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of the declaration so that they will not leave him helpless to prevent 
an enemy from obtaining supplies for his military forces although 
the belligerent may possess the power and would have the right to 
do so if the port or territory was occupied by the enemy. 
"When the last-mentioned Order in Council is issued, I am con-
vinced that a full explanation of its nature and necessity would 
meet the liberal consideration by this Government and not be the 
subject of serious objection. 
"I repeat that any suggestion, which you may make to Sir Ed-
\vard Grey, must be done in an entirely personal way and with the 
distinct understanding that this Government is in no way respon-
sible for what you may say." (Telegram from the Department of 
State to the Arnerican Ambassador in Great Britain, October 16, 
1914. United States Foreign Relations~ 1914, Supplement, 249. 
United States Naval War College, lnternatianal Law Situations~ 
1933, 14-16.) 
10. "1"he question seems wholly different here from what is prob-
ably seen1s in Washington. T'here it is a more or less academic 
discussion. Here it is a matter of life and death for English-speak-
ing civilization. It is not a happy time to raise controversies that can 
be avoided or postponed. Nothing can be gained and every chance 
for useful cooperation for peace can easily be thrown a way and is 
now in jeopardy. In jeopardy also are our friendly relations with 
Great Britain in the sorest time of need in her history. I know that 
this is the correct, larger view." (Telegram from the Ainerican 
Ambassador in Great Britain to the D·epartment of State. United 
States Foreign Relations~ 1914, Supplement, 248. United States 
Naval War College, International Law Situations~ 1933, 16.) 
"Beg that you will not regard the position of this Government 
as merely academic. Contact ·with opinion on this side the water 
would materially alter your vie·w. Lansing has pointed out to you 
in personal confidential despatch of this date hovv completely all 
the British Government seeks can be accomplished without the least 
friction with this Government and \vithout touching opinion on this 
side the water on an exceedingly _tender spot. I must urge you to 
realize this aspect of the matter and to use your utmost persuasive 
efforts to effect an understanding, \vhich we earnestly desire, by 
the method we have gone out of our vvay to suggest, \Vhich \vill put 
the whole case in unimpeachable form. 
"This is private end for your guidance." 
"W oodro\v vVilson" 
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( President of the United States to the J\n1erican Ambassador in 
Great Britain. United States Foreign Re!ationsJ 1914, SupplementJ 
252. United States Naval War College, lntenzational Law Eitua-
tio nsJ 1933, 16. ) 
12. "1~·h ere is no Hague convention ·which deals vvith absolute or 
conditional contraband, and, as the Declaration of London is not in 
force, the rules of in ternational law only apply. A s to the articles 
to be regarded as contraband, there is no general agreement betvveen 
nations. It is the practice for a count ry, either in time of peace 
or afte r the outbreak of war , to declare the articles which it will 
consider as absolute or condition al contraband. It is true that a 
neutral government is seriously affected by this declaration, as 
the rights of its subj ects of citizens may be irnpaired. But the 
rights and interests of belligerents and neutrals are opposed in 
respect to contraband articles and trade and there is no tribunal 
to 'vhich questions of difference may be readily submitted. 
"The record of the United States in the past is not free from 
criticism. When neutral, this Government has stood fo r a restricted 
list of absolute and conditional contraband. A s a belligerent, 
we have contended for a liberal list, according to our conception 
of the necessities of the case. (Secretary of State Bryan to Senator 
Stone, January 20, 1915. United States Foreign Relat io nsJ 1914, 
SupplementJ ix.) 
13. "Petrol and other petroleum products have been proclaimed 
by Great Britain as contraband of war. In vi·ew of the absolute 
necessity of such products to the use of submarines, aeroplanes, 
and motors, the United States Government has not yet reached the 
conclusion that they are improperly included in a list of contra-
band. Military operations to-day are largely a question of mot.ive 
pow·er through mechanical devices. It is therefore difficult to argue 
successfully against the inclusion of petroleum among the articles 
of contraband .... " 
"Great Britain and France have placed rubber on the absolute 
contraband list 8nd leather on the conditional contraband list. Rub-
ber is extensively used in the manufacture and operation of motors 
and, like petrol, is regarded by some authorities as essential to mo-
tive po,ver to-day. Leather is even more vvidely used in cavalry and 
infantry equipment. It is understood that both rubber and leather, 
together with wool, have been embargoed by most of the belligerent 
countries. It vvill be recalled that the United States has in the 
past ex·ercised the right of embargo upon exports of any commodity 
vvhich might aid the enemy's cause." (Secretary of State Bryan to 
. ' 
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Senator Stone, Jan. 20, 1915. United States Foreign Relations~ 
1914, Supplement, x.) 
14. "I note your excellency's statement that in taking the measure 
of placing resinous products and turpentine on the list of contraband, 
His Brittannic Majesty's Government followed the usage of all 
maritime nations, and notably that of the United States, when at 
war, who have invariably clain1~ed and exercised the right of making 
additions from time to time to their lists of contraband-a right 
explicitly conferred in the Declaration of London. 
"I do not for a moment suppose that by this statement your 
excellency intends to advance the principle that helligerents have 
the right to add at their pleasure to the list of contraband without 
reference to the character of the article in vel v~ed, for in that case 
I would be compelled to question the principle." -(Secretary of State 
Bryan to the British Ambassador to the United States, Spring-
Rice, January 13, 1915. United States Foreign Relations~ 1915, 
Supplement~ 306-7.) 
15. The spirit of retaliation between the belligerents which made 
all neutral protests futile is illustrated by the German War Zone 
proclamation of February 4, 1915, which stated that the waters 
surrounding Great Britain and Ireland were to be considered as 
"within the seat of vvar and that all enemy merchant vessels found 
in those waters after the eighteenth instant will be destroyed al-
though it may not always be possible to save crews and passengers. 
,. "Neutral vessels expose themselves to danger within this zone 
of war since in view of the misuse of the neutral flag ordered by 
the British Government on January thirty-first and of the con-
tingencies of maritime 'varfare it cannot always he avoided that 
neutr~l vessels suffer from attacks intended to strike enemy ships." 
(United States Foreign Relations~ 1915, Supplement~ 94. United 
States Naval War College, International Law Situations~ 1933, 17.) 
16. "Unofficial critics praise the courtesy and admit the propriety 
of our communications, but they regard them as remote and im-
practicable. They point out that we have not carried our points: 
namely, that copper should not be contraband, that ships should be 
searched at sea, that to-order cargoes should be valid, that our 
export trade had fallen off because of the war. They point out these 
in good-natured criticism as evidence of the American love of pro-
test for political effect at home. While the official reception of our 
communications is dignified, the unofficial and general attitude to 
them is a smile at our love of letter writing as at Fourth of July 
orations. ,_fhey quietly laugh at our effort to regulate sea warfare 
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under ne\v conditions by \vhat they regard as lawyers' disquisitions 
out of textbooks. 'They [receive J thetn \vith courtesy, pay no fur-
ther attention to them, proceed to settle our shipping disputes ·with 
an effort at generosity and quadruple their orders from us of war 
materials. T'hey care nothing for our definitions or general protests 
but are \villing to do us every practical favor and \vill under no 
conditions either take our advice or offend us. T'hey regard our 
\vri tings as addressed either to con1plaining shippers or to politicians 
at home. 
"For these reasons complaints about concrete cases as they arise 
are tnore effective than general comtnunications about rules of 
sea \Varfare, \vhich must be revised by the submarine, the aeroplane, 
the mine and our own precedents." ('felegrams from the American 
ambassador in Great Britain to the Secretary of State, May 21, 
1915. United States }'oreign Relations~ 1915, Supplement~ 147. 
United States Naval War College, International Law Situations~ 
1933, 17-18.) 
17. "The most difficult questions in connection with conditional 
contraband arise with reference to the shipment of foodstuffs. No 
country has maintained mor·e stoutly than Great Britain in modern 
times the principle that a belligerent should abstain from inter-
ference with the foodstuffs intended for the civil population. The 
circumstances of the present struggle are causing His Majesty's 
Government some anxiety as to \vhether the existing rules with 
regard to conditional contraband, framed as they were with the 
object of protecting so far as possible the supplies which \Vere in-
tended for the civil population are effective for the purpose, or 
suitable to the conditions present. T_!Ie principle which I have 
indicated above is one \vhich His Majesty's Government have 
constantly had to uphold against the opposition of contintental 
powers. In the absence of some certainty that the rule would be 
respected by both parties to this conflict, we feel great doubt 
whether it should be regarded as an established principle of inter-
national law .... " 
"The reason for dra\ving a distinction het\veen foodstuffs in-
tended for the civil population and those for the armed forces or 
enemy Government disappears when the distinction bet\veen the 
civil population and the armed forces itself ,disappears. 
"In any country in which there exists such tremendous organiza-
tion for war as now obtains in Germany there is no clear diversion 
' [division] bet\veen those whom the Govern~ent is responsible for 
feeding and those whom it is not. Experience sho,vs that the power 
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to requisition will be used to the fullest extent in order to make 
sure that the wants of the military are supplied, and however much 
goods may be imported for civil use it is by the military that they 
will be consumed if military exigencies require it, especially now 
that the German Government have taken control of all the food-
stuffs in the country. (Note from the British Foreign Secretary to 
the American Ambassador, Feb. 12, 1915. United States Foreign 
Relations_, 1915, Supplement_, 332. United States Naval War Col-
lege, International Law Situations_, 1933, 18-19.) 
"In Department's consideration of destinatibn of conditional 
contraband, it is necessary to ascertain to "\vhat extent the military 
authorities have superseded civil authorities in the Government of 
Germany so far as control over imports are concerned, and to what 
extent the Government controls the use of .articles on contraband 
list of Great Britain and her allies. Are private consignees free to 
import such articles without interference by authorities?" (An in-
quiry by the United States Department of State in regard to the 
control of German resources and imports by the German Govern-
ment, October 28, 1915.. United States Foreifln Relations_, 1915, 
Supplement_, 603. United States Naval War College, International 
Law Situations_, 1933, 19.) 
19. "Following information communicated verbally by [Ger-
man] Foreign Office; "\vritten answer promised: 
" ( 1) Owing to proclamation issued at outbr,eak of war, mili-
tary authorities theoretically have power to supersede civil authori-
ties, but, practically, power has been exercised in only few instances 
and not at all in connection with customs authorities. 
" ( 2) In so far as control of use of imported goods is concerned, 
Government regards enemy's list of conditional contraband as of 
no importance. 
" ( 3) Receipt and distribution of certain imported food and 
fodder products may take place only through central organization 
which distributes to civil parties only, but military authorities have 
power to requisition against paym·ent anything needed by army 
or navy. 
" ( 4) Chancellor has power to grant exemption from control and 
distribution and military authorities have power to guarantee in 
advance freedom froin requisition of de~ignated imported consign-
ments in whole or part." ( R,eply to the United States Department 
of State by the American Embassy in Berlin, December 4, 1915. 
United States Foreign Relations_, 1915, Supplement_, 622. United 
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States Naval War College, International Law Situations~ 1933, 
19-20.) 
20. " .. . The circumstances of the present war are so peculiar 
that His Majesty's Government consider that for practical pur-
poses the distinction between the two classes of contraband has 
ceased to have any value. So large a proportion of the inhabitants 
of the enemy country are taking part, directly or indirectly, in the 
vvar that no real distinction can novv be drawn between the armed 
forces and the civilian population. Similarly, the enemy Govern-
rrlent has taken control, by a series of decrees and orders, of prac-
tically all the articles in the list of conditional contraband, so that 
they are novv available for Government use. So long as these 
exceptional conditions continue our belligerent rights with r·espect 
to the two kinds of contraband are the same, and our treatment of 
them must be identical." (Explanation of the British Government 
after notification of a revised contraband list. Vice Consul in Lon-
don to Secretary of State Lansing, April 20, 1916 (enclosure). 
United States Foreign RelationsJ 1916, Supplement~ 385.) 
21. "Sir: With refer~ence to the announcem·ent made by the 
British Foreign Office, under date of April 13, 1916, of the inten-
tion of the British Government to treat alike absolute and condi-
tional contraband, you are instructed to communicate to the Foreign 
Office '! formal r·eservation, in regard to this announcement, in the 
sense that, in view of the established practice of a number of 
maritimr. nations, including Great Britain and the United States, 
of distinguishing between absolute and conditional contraband, the 
GovernnH~nt of the United States is impe1led to notify the British 
Government of the reservation of all rjghts of the U riited States 
or its citizens in respect of any American interests which may be 
adversely affected by the abolition of the distinction between these 
two classes of contraband, or by the illegal extension of the contn:~­
band lists during the present vv-ar by Great Britain and her allies." 
(Instructions from Secretary of State Lansing to Ambassador Page 
in Great Britain, Nov. 11, 1916. United States Foreign Rela-
tions~ 1916, Supplement p 483. United States Naval ·war College, 
International Law Situations~ 1933, 20.) 
22. "In modern times the two chief points of controversy have 
related to the carriage of contraband and the trading through block-
aded ports." " ... I only wish to note and ·extract the principle upon 
'vhich they are based. Broadly, the principle is that the maritime 
commerce of neutrals is subject to restriction by the acts of States 
at war, if that commerce tends to assist an enemy either directly in 
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his warlike operations, or indirectly in the carrying on of his own 
trade upon which his power of continuing the war may largely, or 
even entirely, depend. 1""'he object, and the enemy's commerce. The 
result, and the inevitable result, to neutrals is interference with 
their trade." 
"In 'the application of the principle, the boundary of the law of 
nations has been extended from time to time to adapt itself to new 
and ever-changing conditions. This law must from its nature have 
room for expansion. It cannot and never could be squeezed into 
a mould of a particular siz,e or shape. It never had or could have 
the quality of immutability attributed to the laws of the Medes 
and Persians. It could not be confined within artificial limits like 
an Act of Parliament. It has the essence and qualities of a living 
organism' like the common law· of this realm." 
"In the two branches already mentioned, namely, contraband and 
blockade, this natural development is clearly illustrated. Contra-
band goods were at one time comprised within a very limited 
catalogue. At the present day, the list is extensively enlarged. The. 
result to neutrals has been that their trade in such goods has to 
run greater and increasing risks and penalties. Moreover, in recent 
times not only have the contraband goods themselves been subject 
to confiscation, but the neutral vessels which carry them have also 
been rendered confiscable in many cases. It has become established 
law, too, that other goods on the same vessel belonging to the , 
same neutral character or enemy destination. It may be added, also, 
that the application of the doctrine of continuous voyage to contra-
band trade has greatly ~encroached upon and fettered the trade 
of neutrals in time of war. This doctrine was originated in con-
nection with the so-called .'Rule of 17 56,' but since its extension 
to trade in contraband goods by the Courts of North American 
States at the time of the Civil War it has hecome established as 
part of the law of nations." (Sir Samuel Evans, February 16, 1917, 
supporting the Retaliatory Order in Council in The Leonora and 
0 ther Vessels ( 1918), a British case. VII Ll oyds Prize Cases~ 
262, 300. 
23. The United States Naval Instructions of 1917 
retained, in name if not in reality, the distinction 
between absolute and conditional contraband even 
though it was out of step with the practice of the time. 
23. "In the absenoe of notice of change which the Government 
of the United States may make at the outbreak of or during war, the 
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follo\ving classification and enumeration of contraband \vill govern 
commanders of ships of war." 
24. 'vfhe articles and materials mentioned in the followin g para-
graphs (a), (b), (c), and (d), actually destined to terri tory belong-
ing to or occupied by the enemy or to armed forces of the enemy, 
and the articles and materials mentioned in the follovving para-
graph (e) actually destined for the use of the enemy Government 
or its armed forces, are, unless exempted by treaty, regarded as 
contraband." 
"( ~a) All kinds of arms, guns, ammunition, explosives, and 
machines for their manufacture or repair; component parts thereof; 
materials or ingredients used in their manufacture; articles neces-
sary or convenient for their use." 
"(b) All contrivances for or means of transportation on land, 
in the wat~er or air, and machines used in their manufactu re or 
repair; component parts thereof; materials or ingredients used 1n 
their manufacture; instruments, articles or animals necessary or 
convenient for their use." 
" (c) All n1eans of communication, tools, implements, instru-
ments, equipment, maps, pictures, papers and other articles, ma-
chines, or documents necessary or convenient for carrying on hostile 
operations." 
" (d) Coin, bullion, currency, evidences of debt; also metal, 
'materials, dies, plates, machinery or other articles necessary or 
convenient for their manufacture." 
" (e) All kinds of fuel, food, foodstuffs, feed, forag·e, and cloth-
ing and articles and materials used in their manufacture." 
25. "Articles and materials even though enumerated in 
paragraph 24, if exempted, by special tr·eaty provisions, are not 
regarded as contraband." 
59. "The neutral or enemy character of merchandise found on 
board an enemy private vessel is determined by the neutral or 
enemy cmnmercial domicile of the owner, whether the owner be an 
individual, a firm, or a corporation. In the abs·ence of proof of 
the neutral character of goods found on board an enemy vessel, 
they are presumed to be enemy goods." 
67. "The neutral flag covers enemy goods vvith the ·exception 
of contraband of vvar." (Declaration of Paris, 1856, art. 2.) 
68. "Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, 
are not liable to capture under the enemy's flag." (Declaration of 
Paris, 1856, art. 3.) 
69. "Contraband, in paragraph 24 (a), (b), (c), and (d), is 
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liable to capture if its actual destination is the territory belonging 
to or occupied by the enen1y, or the armed forces of the enemy. It 
is immaterial whether the carriage of the contraband to such actual 
destination be direct in the original vessel or involve trans-shipment 
or transport overland." 
70. "Contraband, in paragraph 24 (e), is liable to capture if 
it is actually destined for the use of the enemy government or its 
armed forces. It is immaterial whether the carriage of contraband 
be direct in the original vessel, or involves trans-shipment or 
transport overland." 
71. "A destination for the use of the enemy government or its 
anned forces re£,erred to in paragraph 70 is presurned to exist if the 
contraband is consigned-
"(a) ri'o enemy authorities. 
" (b) To a part of equipment or supply of the armed forces of 
the enemy or other place serving as a. base for such armed forces. 
" (c) To a contractor or agent in enemy territory who, by com-
mon knowledge, supplies articles of the kind 1n question to the 
enemy authorities·} ' 
72. "A destination to territory belonging to or occupied by the 
enemy or to the armed forces of the enemy, referred to in paragraph 
69, is presumed to exist if the contraband is consigned 'to order/ 
'to order or assigns,' or with an unnamed consignee, but in any 
case going to territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy, or to 
neutral territory in the vicinity thereof." (Instructions for the 
Navy of the United States Governing Maritime Warfare_, June, 
1917, 15, 24, 27-28.) 
24. "When Great Britain inquired in April of 1918 whether the 
United States would concur in the addition to the British list of 
absolute contraband of ( 1) willo·ws and osiers; (2) sodium fluoride; ~ 
( 3) tin waste; ( 4) tin and lead and their alloys, salts, compounds, 
and ores; and ( 5) wire steel and iron, the: Navy Department, to 
which the inquiry was referred, replied that the American contra-
band list already was broad enough to embrace these items, since 
willows and osiers could be used in the manufacture of aircraft 
parts, sodium fluoride was involved in the production of aluminum 
vvhich was used in the manufacture of aircraft and of n1unitions, 
and the remaining items were all 'employed or capable of being 
employed' in the manufacture of munitions. The British Ambassa-
dor was inform,ed that these items were included in the list issued 
' 
by the United States in June 1917. When the British Government 
later inquired concerning the addition of citric acid and citrates 
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to the list of British absolute contraband, the State Department 
replied that these products were regarded as included within the 
Arnerican contraband list of June 1 917, since citric acid was the 
active principle of lime juice, which was included in the naval 
ration of some governments, and since citrates were drugs or medi-
cines useful to the armed forces as well as to the general popula-
tion." (The A:cting Secretary of State Phillips to the Secretary of 
the Navy Daniels, June 4, 1918; Daniel!' to Secretary of State 
Lansing, June 18, 191 8; Acting Secretary of State Polk to the 
British Ambassador on Special l\1ission Reading, July .1 0 and July 
18, 1918. Comment in Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International 
Law~ VII, 23-4. United States Foreign Relations~ 1918, Supple-
ment~ vol. II, 917-22.) 
25. "Immediately on the outbreak of vvar an Examination Serv-
ice was established at Kirkwall, the Downs, Port Said, and Gibral-
tar, and the North Sea between the Orkneys and N onvay was 
patrolled. Merchant vessels were brought into port and examined 
there, for boarding and search at sea were rendered dangerous by 
submarines, and officers afloat could not be kept adequately in-
formed of the intricate developments in policy. The Examining 
Officers in the ports acted under direct, and constantly more 
stringent, orders from London as to the v~essels and cargoes which 
they were to seize or release. In London the work of translating 
the developing policy into detailed rules and orders wer~e undertaken 
by a Contraband Committee representing the Admiralty and the 
Foreign Office." 
"Naval seizure and search was, ho,vever, only one, and in time 
perhaps not the most important instrument, of the blockade. 
Throughout the war the Foreign Office \iVere supplementing it by 
elaborate and very effective agreements with neutral countries, by 
\vhich, in return for permission to import themselves, they under-
took to control export to Germany. There was throughout com-
petitive pressure on the contiguous northern neutrals by Germany, 
\vho could threaten to invade them, and by the Allies who could 
withhold many vital supplies. In this competition the balance 
inclined gradually on the side of the Allies, and the Allied 
agreements .became more and more complete. It was nearly a year, 
however, before the blockade became really effective. In the early 
months supplies of all kinds, except finished munitions, flowed 
abundantly into Germany. l\1erchants had learnt how to send 
'conditional contraband' through the contiguous neutrals. The 
diplomatic position, both with these neutrals and America, \iVas 
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making more drastic action difficult; but it was evident that with-
out it the blockade might almost as well be abandoned." 
"Germany's declaration, however, that after February 1915 she 
would instruct her submarines to attack all merchant vessels in 
British waters, created an outburst of indignation in neutral coun-
tries, vvhich Great Britain at once used to make the blockade 
comprehensive. In the Reprisals Order of March 11, 1915, she 
announced her intention to stop all goods of enemy origin or 
destination, and proceeded henceforth to stop supplies intended for 
Germany, without regard to the destination of the earlier contra-
band rules or to the fact that the supplies might be consigned 
~uough a neutral port. Even this, however, was not enough. It wa.'" 
usel~ess to prohibit every cargo of food destined for Germany, 
':vhether sent through contiguous neutral countries or not, if these 
neutral countries could themselves import freely for their o'vn 
uses, and with the sufficiency so obtained, ·export their own produce 
to Germany by routes which the Allies could not control. This 
was the reason for the 'rationing' policy, ,vhich was begun in 1915, 
and subsequently became the central feature in the whole blockade 
system. D,etailed statistics were compiled as to the pre-war imports 
and consumption of all the neutral countries which _ had uncon-
trolled acc~ess to Germany; and only enough war imports were 
allowed to give a bare sufficiency for internal consumption. The 
neutral countries were therefore compelled to adopt internal ration-
ing measures, so that the system of official control extended over 
almost the whole worl~-neutral and belligerent alike." (Salter, 
]. A., Allied Shipping ControlJ (Oxford, 1921), 99-100. Sir 
Arthur Slater was Secretary to the Allied Maritime Transoort 
Council and Chairman of the Allied Mari tim~e Transport Execu-
tive during World "\Var I.) 
26. "As was sh9wn in the World War, it is difficult and at 
times impossible to distinguish between absolute and conditional 
contraband. By nature, some goods may equally serve the combatant 
and noncombatant population. If a consignment of goods is unques-
tionably for the civil population in a given ar,ea, these goods may 
in fact make it possible to send to the forces other goods ·which 
would 'have been essential in that area without the consignment and 
it has been held that it thus makes little difference which goods go 
to the forces as the result is the same. The means of transportation 
and methods of warfare have so far changed that nearly all parts 
of a state may serve its forces and nearly all goods may be of use for 
the forces. Indeed in the World War German courts seemed to 
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regard all ports of England as ports which could be considered 
bases and the British seemed to regard practically all goods as of 
military use. 
"The distinctions between absolute and conditional contraband 
came to have little significance and to be little applied in practice. 
During the World War most sta tes participating in the conflict 
formally abolished or tacitly disregard the distinction." 
"Contraband consists of articles which a neutral may not furnish 
to one belligerent \vithout risk of capture by the other belligerent. 
rfhe essential items for consideration would be the nature of the 
article and the destination. 
"Goods of the nature of contraband of which capture might be 
justified would be such as would aid the belligerent in the conduct 
of the war. In early days when the conduct of the ·war depended 
almost wholly upon supplying the enrolled armed forces with the 
·simple implements of war, lists v1ere comparatively easy to draw 
up and did not vary greatly from year to year. Pitch-balls and 
javdins might be included in a contraband list, as in the treaties 
with Sweden, 1783, and some other early treaties of the United 
States, but cotton and oil and many other articles \Vere definitely 
excluded from the list, and it was provided they 'shall not by any 
pretended interpretation be comprehended among prohibited or con~ 
traband goods' unless bound to places 'besieged, blocked, or invested' 
so as to be 'nearly surrounded by one of the belligerent po,vers.' " 
"The intention of such agreements was to confine the list of con-
traband to such articles as were actually for 1var use. Manifestly 
therefore for all contraband articles the destination was a matter of 
equal importance \Vith the nature of the article itself, for if the 
article whatever its nature, was not destined for vvar use it would 
not be liable as contraband. Speaking of articles of ordinary use 
such as provisions, Mr. Justice Stor.y in the case of the Commercen_, 
1816, said, "if destined for the army: or navy of the enemy, or for his 
ports of naval or military equipment, they are deemed contraband.' 
(1 Wheat. 387.)" 
"The attitude of leading states has varied in r,egard to what ar-
ticles and when articles might be treated as conditional contraband. 
Even during the World War there \Vere many conflicting opinions." 
"If a state mobilizes its whole population and all its resources 
for war, ~evidently it will be difficult if not impossible to distinguish 
among consignments destined for that state, and anything bound for 
the state, unless exempted on humanitarian grounds, m ay be liable 
to capture as contraband. The grounds of humanity vvould exempt 
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articles whose sole use would be for medicinal and surgical purposes 
and articles nece3sary for Red Cross operations." 
"The changing use and impossibility of determining \Vhat may 
be of use in war from day to day and the possibility of mobilization 
of population would therefore justify the declaration that the dis-
tinction between absolute and conditional contraband is abolished." 
"All goods other than those solely for humanitarian and Red 
Cross use might be declared contraband." (United Stat·es Naval 
War College, I nternationa[ Law Situations., 1933, 25-8.) 
Continuous V uyage and Contraband. 
The problem of determining destination in it?elf, 
of goods increased in importance as the distinction . 
between absolute and conditional contraband di-
minished and the contraband list grew longer, for 
in total warfare goods consigned to a neutral country 
but with an e"'nemy country as the ultimate or prob-
ably ultimate destination
1 
could not be tolerated by 
any belligerent. As a result of these trends, the doc-
trine of continuous voyage, previously applicable to 
only a share of the goods, now became applicable to 
most goods, all contraband. 
1. " ( 5) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 35 of the said 
declaration [of London], conditional contraband, if sho\vn to have 
the destination referred to in Articl·e 33, is liable to capture, to 
whatever port the vessel is bound and at \vhatever port the cargo 
is to be discharged." (British Order in Council, Aug. 20, 1914. 
United States Foreign Relations, 1914, Supplement 220). 
2. For French ·and Russian decrees corresponding to the British 
Order in Council, see United States Foreign Relations., 1914, Sup-
plement., 222, or the A m.erican 1 ournal of International Law., Vol. 
9, Special Supplement., (July 1915) 31-3. 
3. " ... it is manifest that this article nullifies the \Vords 'and 
when it is not to be discharged in an intervening neutral port' 
which appear in Article 35 of the Declaration of London. This then 
is a reversion to the doctrine of continuous voyage in the tnatter 
of conditional contraband, which was abandoned by the London 
conference according to the official report of the drafting com-
mittee." 
"'rhis Government, therefore, feels compelled to state that 
Articles 3 and 5 of the Order in Council are inadmissible in them-
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sel vcs, and that the purpose for which they have apparently been 
devised, as explained by the tnctnorand urn of the Foreign Office, 
namely, to 'intercept neutral cmnmerce on its way to a neutral na-
tion, is, in the opinion of this Governtnent, equally inadmissible." 
(Acting Secretary of State Lansing to Ambassador Page, Sept. 26, 
1914. United States Foreign Relations,~ 1914, Supplement,~ 229-
230). 
4. "1. During the present hostilities the provisions of the con-
vention kno\vn as the Declaration of London shall, subject to the 
exclusion of the lists of contraband and non-contraband, and to the 
modifications hereinafter set out, be adopted and put in force by His 
Majesty's Government. 
''The modifications are as follows : 
" ( i) A neutral vessel, with papers indicating a neutral des-
tination, \Vhich, notwithstanding the destination shown 
on the papers, proceeds to an enemy port, shall be liable 
to capture and condemnation if she is encountered before 
the end of her next voyage." 
" (iii) N ot\vithstanding the provisions of Article 35 of the 
said declaration, conditional contraband shall be liable 
to capture on board a vessel bound for a neutral port 
if the goods are consigned 'to order,' or if the ship's 
papers do not show who is the consignee of the goods, 
or if they sho\v a consignee of the goods in terri tory 
belonging to or occupied by the enemy." 
" ( iv) In the cases covered by the preceding paragraph (iii) 
it shall lie upon the o\vners of the goods to prove that 
their destination was innocent." 
"2. Where it is shown to the satisfaction of one of His Majesty's 
Principal Secretaries of State that the enemy Government is draw-
ing supplies for its armed forces from or through a neutral country, 
he may direct that in respect of ships bound for a port in that coun-
try, Article 35 of the said Declaration shall not apply. Such direc-
tion shall be notified in the London Gazette and shall operate until 
the same is withdrawn. So long as such direction is in force, a vessel 
\Vhich is carrying conditional contraband to a port in that country 
shall not be immune from capture." (British Order in Council, 
Oct. 29, 1914. (Enclosure in a dispatch from Ambassador Page 
to Secretary of State Bryan, Nov. 3, 1914. United States Foreign 
Relations,~ 1914, Supplement,~ 262-3.) 
5. For French and Russian regulations similar to 
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the British decree of October 29, 1914, see the Ameri-
can ] ournal of International Law, Vol. 9, Special 
Supplenzent, 24, 26, 31, 35-36. 
6. For a similar _ German ordinance of April 18, , 
1915 justified as "in retaliation of the regulations 
adopted by England and her allies, deviating from the 
London declaration," see the American Journal of 
International Lau', Vol. 9, Special Supplement, 45-6. 
"The United States has made earnest representations to Great 
Britain in regard to the seizure and detention by the British auth-
orities of all American ships or cargoes bona fide destined to neutral 
ports on the ground that such seizures and detentions were contrary 
to the existing rules of international law. It will be recalled, however, 
that American ~Qurts have established various rules bearing on the 
matters.' The rule of 'continuous voyage' has been not only asserted 
by American tribunals but extended by them. They have exercised 
the right to determine from the circumstances whether the osten-
sible was the real destination. They have held that the shipment of 
articles of contraband to a neutral port 'to order,' from which, as 
a matter of fact, caroges had been transhipped to the enemy, is 
corroborative evidence that the cargo is really destined to the enemy 
instead of to the neutral port of delivery. It is thus seen that some 
of the doctrines which appear to bear harshly upon neutrals at the 
present time ar,e analogous to or outgrowths from policies adopted 
by the United States when it was a belligerent. The Government 
therefore cannot consistently protest against the application of rules 
which it has follow,ed in the past, unless they have not been prac-
ticed as heretofore." (Secretary of State Bryan to Senator Stone, 
January 20, 1915. United States Foreign Relations~ 1914, Supple-
ment~ ix.) 
8. "No one in these days will dispute the g-eneral proposition 
that a belligerent is entitled to capture contraband goods on their 
way to the enemy; that right has now become consecrated by long 
usage and g'eneral acquiescence. Though the right is ancient, the 
means of exercising it alter and develop with the changes in the 
methods and machinery of commerce. A century ago the difficulties 
of land transport rendered it impracticable for the belligerent to 
obtain supplies of sea-borne goods through a neighboring neutral 
country. Consequently the belligerent actions of his opponents nei-
ther required nor justified any iiHerference with shipments on their 
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·way to a neutral port . 'l'his principle \vas recognized and acted 
· on in the decisions in vvhich Lord Sto\vell laid do\vn the lines on 
\vhich captures of such goods should be dealt \vith. 
"'The advent of steam power has rendered it as easy for a belliger-
ent to supply himself through the ports of a neutral contiguous 
country as through his own, and has therefore rendered it impos-
si ble for his opponent to refrain from interfering with commerce 
intended for the enemy merely because it is on its way to a neutral 
port. 
"No better instance of the necessity of countering new devices 
for despatching contraband goods to an enetny by new methods of 
applying the fundamental principle of the right to capture contra-
band can be given than the steps \vhich the Government of the 
United States found it necessary to take during the American 
Civil War. It was at that time that the doctrine of continuous voy-
age was first applie~ to the capture of contraband, that is to say, 
it \Vas then for the first time that the belligerent found himself 
obliged to capture contraband goods on their \Vay to the enemy, even 
though at the time of capture they wer,e en route for a neutral port 
from which they were intended subsequently to continue their 
journey. The policy then followed by the Government of the United 
States was not inconsistent \Vith general principles already sanction-
ed by international law, and met with . no protest from His Ma-
jesty's Government, though it was upon British cargoes and upon 
British ships that the losses and the inconvenience due to this new 
development of the application of the old rule of international la\v 
principally fell. The criticisms which have been directed against 
the steps then taken by the United Stat,es came, and come, from 
those who sa\v in the methods employed in Napoleonic times for the 
prevention of contraband a limitation upon the right itself, and 
failed to S'f~e that in Napoleonic times goods on their way to a 
neutral port were imQlune from capture, not because the immediate 
destination. conferred a privilege, but because capture under such 
. " circumstances were unnecessary. 
"The most difficult questions in connection \vith conditional 
contraband arise with reference to the shiprp.ent of foodstuffs. No 
country has maintained more s~outly than Great Britain in modern 
times the principle that a belligerent should abstain from inter-
ference with the foodstuffs intended for the civil population. The 
circumstances of the present struggle are causing His Majesty's 
Government some anxiety as to whether the existing rules with 
regard to conditional contraband, named as they were \Vith the 
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object of protecting so far as possible the supplies \vhich \Vere 
intended for the civil population are effective for the purpose, or 
suitable to the conditions present. The principle ·which I have in-
dicated above is one \vhich His l\1ajesty's Government have 
constantly had to uphold against the opposition of continental 
powers. In the absence of some certainty that the rule \vould be 
respected by both parties to this conflict, we feel great doubt 
whether it should be regarded as an established principle of inter-
nationalla\v." (British Foreign Office note of February 10, 1915. 
United States Foreign Relations, 1915, Supplement, 324, 327-8, 
332.) 
9. "In October and November 1914 the Kim, the A !fred Nobel, 
the Bjornsterjne Bjornson, and the Fridland, all N on¥egian ships 
except the Fridland, which \Vas s,vedish, ssiled from Ne\v york for 
Copenhagen. In their cargoes \Vere foodstuffs, rubber, and hides." 
"In these cases inference as to ultimate destination to Germany 
of goods consigned to Copenhagen \Vas based in the first instance 
upon the rapid increase in the relative amount of such goods shipped 
to Copenhagen in corresponding months of 1913 and 1914. There 
was also an argument on the ground of evident deception and 
misinformation." (United States Naval War College, Interna-
tional Law Situations, 1933, 20-21.) 
10. Sir Samuel Evans in holding the cargoes of the Kim and the I 
three other ships liable to condemnation as contraband declared: 
"T,vo important doctrines familiar to international la\v come 
prominently forward for consideration: the one is embodied in the 
rule as to 'continuous voyage,' or continuous 'transportation'; the 
other relates to the ultimate hostile destination of conditional and 
absolute contraband respectively. 
"The doctrine of 'continuous voyage' was first applied by the 
English Prize Courts to unla\\rful trading. There is no reported 
case in our Courts where the doctrine is applied in terms to the 
carriage of contraband; but it \Vas so applied and extended by the 
United States Courts against this country in the time of the Ameri-
can Civil War; and its application \Vas acceded to by the British 
Government of the day; and was, moreover, acted upon by the 
International Commission which sat under the Treaty bet\veen 
this country and America, made at Washington on l\1ay 8, 1871, 
when the commission, composed of an Italian, an American, and 
a British delegate, unanimously disallo,ved the claims in The Peter-
hoff, \vhich was the leading case upon the subject of continuous 
transportation in relation to contraband goods. . . . " 
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"1 axn not going through the history of it, but the doctrine was 
asserted by Lord Sa lisbury at the time of the South African war 
with reference to German vessels carrying goods to Dclagoa Bay, 
and as he \Vas dealing ·wi th Gcnnany, he fortified hi1nsclf by refer-
ring to the vic\v of Bluntschli as the true vievv as follows : 'lf the 
ships or goods arc sent to the destination of a neutral port only 
the better to come to the aid of the enemy there \vill be contraband 
of \var, and confiscation will be justified.' " 
• "1 t is essential to appreciate that the founda tion of the lavv of 
contraband, and the reason for the doctrine of continuous voyage 
,vhich has been grafted into it, is the right of a belligerent to 
prevent certain goods frotn reaching the country of the enemy for 
his tnilitary use." 
"A compromise \vas attempted by the London Conference in 
the unratified Declaration of London. rfhe doctrine of continuous 
voyage or continuous transportation was conceded to the full by 
the conference in the case of absolut,e contraband, and it \Vas 
expressly declared that 'it is immaterial whether the carriage or 
the goods is direct, or entails transshipment, or a subsequent trans-
port by land. 
"As to conditional contraband, the attempted compromise vvas 
that the doctrine vvas excluded in the case of conditional contra-
band except where the enemy country had no seaboard. As is usual 
in compromises, there seems to be an absence of logical reason for 
the exclusion. If it is right that a belligerent should be permitted 
to capture absolute contraband proceeding by various voyages or 
transport with an ultimate destination for the enemy territory, why 
should he not be allowed to capture goods \vhich, though not ab-
solutely contraband, become contraband by reason of a further 
destination to the enemy Government or its armed forces? And 
vvith the facilities of transportation by sea and by land vvhich now 
exist the right of a belligerent to capture conditional contraband 
would be of a very shado~vy value if a mere consignment to a 
neutral port were sufficient to protect the goods. It appears also 
to be obvious that in these days of easy transit, if .the doctrine of 
continuous voyage or continuous transportation is to hold at all, it 
must cover not only voyages from port to port at sea, but also 
transport by land until the real, as distinguished from the merely 
ostensible, destination of the goods is reached." 
"I have no hesitation in pronouncing that, in my vievv, the doc-
trine of continuous voyage, or transportation, both in relation to 
carr.iage by sea and to carriage over land, had become part of the 
48 
law of nations at the commencement of the present vvar, in .accord-
ance with the principles of recognized legal decisions, and vvith the 
view of the great body of modern jurists, and also with the practice 
of nations in recent maritime warfare. 
"The result is that the Court is not restricted in its vision to 
the primary consignments of the goods in these cases to the neutral 
port of Copenhagen; but is entitled, and bound, to take a more 
extended outlook in order to ascertain whether this neutral destina-
tion was merely ostensible and, if so, wha~ the real ultimate 
destination vvas." (The KimJ· The Alfred N obelJ· T:he Bjornsterjne 
BjornsonJ· The Fridland ( 1915). III LloydJs Prize Cases 167, 
355-359.) 
11. In deciding that the goods were ultimately 
destined for enemy territory, Sir Satnuel Evans, 
stated: 
"As to the real destination of a cargo, one of the chief tests is 
whether it was consigned to the neutral port to be there delivered 
for the purpose of being imported into the common stock of the 
country." 
". . . I have no hesitation in stating my conclusion that the 
cargoes (other than the small portions acquired by persons in 
Scandinavia whose claims are allowed) were not destined for con-
sumption or us·e in Denmark or intended to be incorporated into 
the general stock of that country by sale or otherwise; that Copen-
hagen was not the real bona fide place of delivery; but that the 
cargoes were on their way at the tim·e of capture to German terri-
tory as their actual and real destination." (The KimJ· The Alfred 
NobeL· The Bjornsterjne BjornsonJ· The Fridland. III LloydJs 
Prize Cases) 167, 359, 362.) 
12. "1. The provisions of the Declaration of London, Order in 
Council No. 2, 1914, shall not be deemed to limit or to have 
limited in any way the right of His Majesty, in accordance vvith 
the la,v of nations, to capture goods upon the ground that they 
are conditional contraband, nor to affect or to have affected the 
liability of conditional contraband to capture, vvhether the carriage 
of the goods to their destination be direct or entail transshipment 
or a subsequent transport by land. 
"2. rfhe provisions of Articl·e 1 ( ii) and (iii) of the said Order 
in Council shall apply to absolute contraband as well as to condi-
tional contraband. 
"3. The destinations referred to in Article 30 and in Article 33 
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of the said Declaration shall (in addition to any presumptions 
laid do\vn in the ,said Order in Council) be presumed to exist, if 
the goods are consigned to or for a person, \vho, during the present 
hostilities, has fonvarded imported contraband goods to territory 
belonging to or occupied by the enemy. 
"4. In the cases covered by Articles 2 and 3 of this Order, it 
shall lieu upon the o\vner of the goods to prove that their destina-
tion \Vas innocent." (British "Decla.ration of London Order in 
Council, 1916," March 30, 1916. United States Foreign Relations_, 
1916, Supplement_, 361.) 
13. In regard to the meaning of Article 1 of the 
above Order in Council, see The Kronprinsessan 
JJ1 argareta, ( 1921), VIII Lloyd's Prize Cases, 241, 
267-9. Also Briggs, H. W., Doctrine of Continuous 
Voyage, (1926), 111-112. 
14. " (a) The hostile destination required for the condemna-
tion of contraband articles shall be presumed to exist, until the 
contrary is sho\vn, if the goods are consigned to or for an enemy 
authority, or an agent of the enemy State, or to or for a person in a 
territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy, or to or for a 
person who, during the present hostilities, has for\varded contra-
band goods to an enemy authority, or an agent of the enemy State, 
or to or for a person in territory belonging to or occupied by the 
enemy, or if the goods are consigned 'to order,' or if the ship's 
papers do not show who is the real consignee of the goods. 
"(b) The principle of continuous voyage or ultimate destina-
tion shall be applicable both in cases of contraband and of blockade." 
(British order in Council of July 7, 1916. United States Foreign 
Relations_, 1916, Supplernent, 413-4.) 
14. The Departtnent of State through its Ambas-
sador to Great Britain protested against this Order 
in Council, stating that the rules asserted in this 
Order in Council were in conflict \Vi th the law and 
practice of nations in several instances and that the 
United States reserved its rights. (Secretary Lansing 
to the Charge d'Affaires in Great Britain, Laughlin, 
Sept. 18, 1916. United States Foreign Relations, 1916, 
Supplement, 446-7.) , 
15. ·In the case of The Balto, the British had seized 
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leather on board this Norwegian vessel bound from 
the United States to Sweden as contraband of war. 
The owners claimed that the leather was destined for 
use only in Sweden. The Crown "sought discovery 
with respect to the books of the consignee-claimant 
concerning its transactions in boots as well as 1n 
leather.'' 
Sir San1uel Evans granted discovery and said: 
"The objection for the claimant is that the leather cannot in any 
circumstances be seized as prize, if it was intended to be manu-
factured into boots in Sweden, although the boots were to be sent 
to the forces of the enemy." 
"It is the claimant's contention, that contraband goods cannot . * 
be seized on a continuous voyage, unless they wer~e on their way 
to a final enemy destination in the same condition as they were 
at the time . of seizure sound? As at present advised, I think it is 
quite unsound." 
"One of the tests applied [in the Kim case] was vvhether the 
goods imported were intended to become part of the common 
stock of the neutral country into which they were first brought. 
In my view the notion that leather, imported to a neutral country 
for the express purpose of being at once turned into boots for the 
enemy forces, becomes incorporated in the common stock of the 
neutral country, is illusory. Instances can be given and multiplied 
which appear to reduce to an absurdity the argument that if work 
is done in the neutral country upon goods which are intended ulti-
- mately for the enemy, that circumstance of necessity puts an end 
to their contraband character, and prevents their being confiscable 
according to the doctrine of continuous voyage." 
"Suppose coffee beans and cocoa beans were imported into a 
neutral country with the object of their being convert~ed into coffee 
or cocoa to be sent on to the enemy, would the fact that the 
coffee beans were ground in to coffee, or the cocoa beans were 
ground and mixed with sugar to make cocoa in the neutral country, 
be enough to render those goods immune from capture, if they 
would be capturable as coffee or cocoa foodstuffs when afloat? 
. .. If a field gun was imported, would it be protected from seizure 
because it would, in fact, be mounted upon its appropriate carriage 
before being exported from a neutral country to the enemy's front? 
"The Court could not give affirmative answers to such questions 
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as these unless it cut itself adrift from the safe anchor of common 
sense." (The Balta_, (1907). VI Lloycts Prize Cases_, 141, 147- 9.) 
16. "69. Con traband, in paragraph 24 (a), (b), (c), and (d), 
is liable to capture if its actual destination is the territory belonging 
to or occupied by the enemy, or the armed forces of the enemy. It 
is immaterial whether the carriage of the contraband to such actual 
destination be direct in the original vessel or involve trans-shipment 
or transport overland. 
"70. Contraband, in paragraph 24 (e), is liable to capture if it 
is actually destined for the use of the enemy governm·ent or its 
armed forces. It is immaterial whether the carriage of contraband 
be direct in the original vessel, or involv,es trans-shipment or 
transport overland. 
"71. A destination for the use of the enemy government or its 
armed forces referred to in paragraph 70 is presumed to exist if 
the contraband is consigned-
" (a) To enemy authorities. 
" (b) To a part of equipment or supply of the armed forces of 
the enemy or other place serving as a base for such armed forces. 
" (c) To a contractor or agent in enemy territory who, by com-
mon knowledge, supplies articles of the kind in question to the 
enemy authorities." 
"72. A destination to territory belonging to or occupied by the 
enemy or to the armed forces of the enemy, referred to in para-
graph 69, is presumed to exist if the contraband is consigned 'to 
order,' 'to order or assigns,' or with an unnam·ed consignee, but in 
any case going to territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy, 
or to neutral territory in the vicinity thereof." (United States 
Naval Instructions, 1917. Instructions for the Navy of the United 
States Governing Maritime Warfare_, June, 1917, 27-8.) 
17. : 'In modern times the two chief points of controversy have 
related to the carriage of contraband and to trading through 
blockaded ports." " ... I only wish to note and extract the principle 
upon which they are based. Broadly, the principle is that the mari-
time commerce of neutrals is subject to restriction by the acts of 
States at war, if that commerce tends to assist an enemy either 
directly in his warlike operations, or indirectly in the ·carrying on 
of his own trade upon which his power of continuing the war may 
largely, or even entirely, depend. The object, and the enemy's com-
merce. The result, and the inevitable result, to neutrals is inter-
ference with their trade." 
52 
"In the application o.f the principle, the boundary of the law of 
nations has been extended from time to time to adapt itself to new 
and ever-changing conditions. This law must from its nature have 
room for expansion. It cannot and never could be squeezed into a 
mould of a particular size or shape. It never had or could have 
the quality of immutability attribl;lted to the laws of the Medes 
and Persians. It could not be confined within artificial limits like 
an Act of Parliament. It has the essence and qualities of a living 
organism like the common law of this realm." 
"In the two branches already mentioned, namely, contraband and 
blockade, this natural development is clearly illustrated. Contra-
band goods were at one time comprised within a very limited cata-
logue. ~t the present day, the list is extensively enlarged. The 
result to neutrals has been that their trade in such goods has to 
run greater and increasing risks and penalties. Moreover, in recent 
times not' only have the contraband goods themselves been subject 
to confiscation, but the neutral vessels w·hich carry them have also 
been rendered confiscable in many cases. It has become established 
law, too, that other goods on the same vessel belonging to the 
same neutral cha.racter or enemy destination. It may be added, also, 
that the application of the doctrine of continuous-voyage to contra-
band trade has greatly encroached upon and fettered the trade 
of neutrals in time of war. This doctrine wras originated in con-
nection with the so-called 'Rule of 17 56,' but since its extension 
to trade in contraband goods by the Courts of North American 
States at the time of the Civil War it has become established as 
part of the law of nations." (Sir Samuel Evans, February 16, 
1917, supporting the Retaliatory Order in Council in The Leonora 
and Other f/esseJ[s (1918). VII Lloyd~s Prize Cases~ 262, 300.) 
18. On March 7, 1918, the German Supreme Prize 
Court upheld the seizure of conditional contraband 
bound from Rotterdam to Norway on board The 
Norden as contraband of war. The court declared 
that a presumption of enemy destination arising from 
the fact that the shipment of conditional contraband 
was consigned "to order" was not overcotne by the 
fact that the goods were to be processed in a neutral 
country. The court maintained that a further demon-
stration was required that the product 'vould not be 
of use to the enemy. (Garner, J. W., Prize La'v 
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During the World War ( 1927), 573.) 
19. "1~he lists of contraband both absolute and conditional have 
va ried fron1 tiinc to time and according to circumstances. 'fhc 
belligerent has usually stood for an extended list while the neutral 
has desired a restr icted list . Destination has ahvays been a deciding 
factor in determining contraband. T'his has been particularly irn-
portant in the application of the doctrine of continuous voyage. 1 t 
has been maintained that the ultimate destination is to the country 
in ·which the goods arc actually to become 'a part of the cmnmon 
stock.' 
"lV1any of the questions relating to ultimate destination vvcrc 
raised in the American Civil War. 'rhe party to whom the goods 
may be consigned does not always prove the ultimate destination. 
Goods often in time of peace are 'to order or assigns.' Even the 
British Government in the American Civil War did not deny 
that such consignments on British vessels might not be open to 
suspicion 'which might be dispelled by the shippers.' Some\vhat 
similar qu.estions might arise in shipments of goods to Lranches or 
agents or when no consignee is named." (United States Naval vVar 
College, International L{[fU) Situations~ 1933, 20-1.) 
By the end of World War I, the doctrine of con-
tinuous voyage tended to include a doctrine of sub-
stitution. For example, in the case of The Bonna 
(1918) the British had seized a cargo of Swedish-
owned cocoanut oil (conditional contraband) on 
board this Norwegian vessel. The cocoanut oil was 
destined to Sweden to be used in the making of mar-
garine for consumption in Sweden. The Crown 
claimed that the cocoanut ·oil was liable to capture 
on the ground that "to the knowledge of the manu-
facturer, the margarine was to be consumed in Svve-
den in substitution for Swedish butter which in turn 
would be shipped to Germany." The B_ri.tish court 
held, however, that the cocoanut oil was not liable to 
condemnation as conditional contraband destined for 
German military use. See The Bonna) ( 1918), VII 
Lloyd}s Pr£ze Cases, 367, 376-8. 
( 4) Destination-Conditional Contraband. 
With or without the doctrine of continuous voyage, 
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the question of destination was of vital importance 
in the determination of conditional contraband. At 
the beginning of \IV orld War I most nations agreed 
that articles (as named in a list) which can be used 
in vvar as well as in peace can be considered contra-
band of war only if destined to the army, navy, or 
other department of the governtnent of one of the 
belligerents or to a place held by military forces. As 
the war continued not only the line bet\veen absolute 
and conditional contraband tended to becon1e ob-
scured but also the line betvveen government and 
private enterprise, for World War I had developed 
into a total \var. Consequently, by the end of the 
conflict the fe\v goods remaining on the conditional 
contraband list v;ere seized by the belligerents aboard 
ships bound from one neutral country to another neu-
tral country as being destined for the enemy govern-
ment. 
1. Conditional contraband "consists, generally speaking, of ar-
ticles 'vhich are susceptible of use in 'var as 'veil as for purposes 
of peace ... " 
'~Articles of the character stated are considered contraband if 
destined to the army, navy, or department of government of one 
of the belligerents or to a place occupied and held by military forces; 
if not so destined they are not contraband, as for example, \vhen 
bound to an individual or private concern." (Department of State 
circular, 1914. United States Foreign Relations~ 1914, Supple-
ment~ 274, 276.) 
2. "Destination to enemy territory is not, and cannot properly 
be, considered a good and sufficient ground for seizure of foodstuffs 
or other conditional contraband, unless they are destined for the 
use of the armed forces or of a government department of the enemy 
state." (Acting Secretary of State Lansing to the Ambassador to 
Great Britain Page, Sept. 26, 1914. United States Foreign Rela-
tions~ 1914, Supplement~ 229.) 
3. " ... the right of neutrals to ship foodstuffs and other condi-
tional contraband to the territories of belligerents, 'vhen destined 
and intended for use by the civilian population and not destined 
or intended for ultimate delivery to a department of the belligerent 
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government, or its armed forces, is \veil established. But shippers 
proposing to send foodstuffs to Germany should consider the situa-
tion produced by reported recent decree of the German authorities, 
\vhich, from the accounts of it received by the Department, appears 
to establish a governmental control, if not to constitute expropria-
tion, of the food supply in Germany. 'fhe British Government 
have said that, in vie\v of this decree and its effect, they must regard 
shipn1ents of foodstuffs to Germany as, in fact, destined for the 
Germ an Government. Without at this t ime undertaking to deter-
mine the effect of the decree, the text of which we have not, the 
Department feels that interested persons sould be advised that the 
status of shipments of provisions to G ermany is put in doubt by 
reason of the decree mentioned." (Secretary of State Bryan to the 
Secretary of the 'f reasury McAdoo, Feb . 3, 1915, in reply to an 
inquiry. U nited S tates Foreign R elation s_, 1915, S upplement_, 318, 
31 9.) 
4. Great Britain and F rance in 19 15 informed the Department 
of State " that on account of a German decree by which all foo d-
stuffs were taken over by the Government all such commodities 
destined for Germany would be considered subject to capture. " 
(Ambassador Page to Secretary of State Bryan, Jan. 27, 1915 and 
French Ambassador J usserand to Secretary of State Bryan, Feb-
ruary 6, 1915. United States Foreign Relations_, 1915, Supplement_, 
317, 322.) 
5. "A N onvegian sailing vessel which left a British port before 
the outbreak of \Var in 1914 with a cargo of coal for Chile w·as 
forced by damage to deviate from the direct route to its destina-
tion. The cargo was seized by a German war vessel on suspicion 
that it \Vas destined for English naval forces, but the vessel w as 
allowed to go free because it could not be taken to port. Claims 
were brought before the Hamburg Prize Court for the coal taken 
and for the damage suffered by the ship. The court upheld the 
capture, but the decision was reversed upon appeal to the Imperial 
Supreme Prize Court, on the basis of article 35 of the Declaration 
of London and the corresponding article 36 of the German Prize 
Ordinance. It was stated that the coal was conditional cont raband, 
that no proof \Vas furnished of its destination to the enemy armed 
forces, and that full faith would be given to the ship's papers." 
( The Helicon, (1916). Hackworth, G . H., Digest of Interna-
t ional Law_, Vol. VII, 67.) 
6. "The cargo consisted of 3,238 barrels of salted herrings, con-
signed from Haugesund to Lubeck. Lubeck is a German base of 
56 
supply. It is also a port which has been used on a very extensive 
scale since the war for the importation of goods from Scandinavia 
into Germany. Moreover, orders have been made by the German 
Federal Council regulating the import of salted herrings into the 
German Empire, whereby they must all be delivered to the Central 
Purchasing Company, Limited, of Berlin, a company acting under 
the directions of the German Imperial Chancellor. ... " ~ 
"1--.here is no doubt of its contraband character, or of its destina-
tion for the enemy Government or its forces." (Sir Samuel Evans. 
in The 1-lakan case~ (1916). V. Lloyd~s Prize Cases~ 161, 168-9, 
188.) 
7. "A French court condemned food shipped on a neutral Italian 
steamer, The Sibilla~ as conditional contraband with a hostile des-
tination. The steamer was sailing from Barcelona to Genoa, and the 
food was apparently destined for Germany." (Hackworth, G. H., 
Digest of International Law~ Vol. VII, 70. For other similar 
French cases see Garner, J. W., Prize Law During the World 
War~ ( 1917), 555n.) 
8. 70. "Contraband, in paragraph 24 (e), is liable to capture 
if it is actually destined for the use of the enemy government or 
its armed forces. It is immaterial whether the carriage of contra-
band be direct in the original vessel, or involves trans-shipment or 
transport overland."· 
71. "A destination for the use of the enemy government or its 
armed forces referred to in paragraph 70 is presumed to exist if 
the contraband is consigned-
" (a) To enemy authorities. 
" (b) To a part of equipment or supply of the armed forces of 
the enemy or other place serving as a base for such armed forces. 
" (c) To a contractor or agent in enemy territory who, by com-
mon knowledge, supplies articles of the kind in question to the 
enemy authorities." (Instructions for tlze Navy of tlze United 
States Governing Maritime Warfare~ June, 1917, 27-8.) 
9. "It is clear that the ultimate as opposed to the ostensible 
destination of goods would seldom, if ever, appear on the ship's 
papers or be within the knowledge of the master of crew. It would 
have to be proved or inferred frorn other sources, and it could 
hardly be contended that if the Crown were in possession of evi-
dence obtained from such other sources from which an ultimate 
destination in an enemy country could be inferred as reasonably 
probably, the seizure of the goods would not be justified." (The 
Baron Stjernblad~ (1918), VI Lloyd}s Prize Cases~ 89, 102.) 
·I~ 
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10. The British seized and condemned a cargo of cocoa shipped 
frmn N e\V York to Scandinavian consignees. 'I'he cargo \vas con-
demned as conditional contraband after it ·was demonstrated that 
the stocks of cocoa in Germany \Vere controlled by the G erman 
Government and that the goods had an ultimate German destina-
tion. Lord Sterndale held that the cocoa \vould be used for the 
German military forces. (The Esrom., (1919). VIII Lloyd"'s Prize 
Cases., 492.) 
11. "If a distinction is made bet\veen absolute and conditional 
contraband, the distinction benveen enemy country and enemy 
forces becomes important. If an unfortified area becomes fortified, 
its status changes as a place to \vhich goods may without liability 
be shipped. If the population of an area which has been subject only 
to the civil lavv is mobilized and put under military control~ the 
status of the population changes as a population to which goods may 
\Vithout liability be shipped." (United States Naval War College, 
I nte·rnational Law Situations_, 1933, 21-2.) 
( 5) Destination-Further Refinements. 
The question of destination is even more compli-
cated than it appears on the surface. Before and 
• 
after the question of absolute or conditional contra-
band has been resolved by really establishing one 
absolute list and the line between government and 
private enterprise has been erased, there has still 
been the difficulty of actually proving enemy destina-
tion from the ship's documents, for many deceptions 
have been practiced by shippers to conceal enemy 
destination. On the other hand belligerents, desirous 
of preventing all goods of any value in an all-out war 
effort from reaching the enemy, have resorted to 
stringent methods such as the examination of trade 
statistics in order to prove enemy destination, with 
or without the intention of applying the doctrine of 
continuous voyage. 
1. Lord Parker gave an order for discovery in a 
case concerning the condemnation of hides and tan-
ning materials abroad a Swedish vessel bound from 
South America for Sweden and said: 
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"The goods having been shipped in a neutral vessel, and ostensi-
bly destined for a neutral port, can only be contraband of war if, 
on the princiJ?le of continuous voyage, and according they had a 
further or ultimate destination in an enemy country. Intention is 
rarely the subject of direct evidence. As a rule it has to be inferred 
from surrounding circumstances, and every circumstance which 
could, either alone or in c9nnection with other circumstances, give 
rise to an inference as to the intention of the parties concerned in 
a transaction both relates and is relevant to the question what 
that intention really was." (The Consul Corfitzon~ ( 1917). VI 
Lloyd~ s Prize Cases~ 268, 274.) 
2. See above, No. 16 under Destination-Continu-
ous Voyage and Contraband, for U. S. Naval Instruc-
tions, 1917. 
(a) Exporter's intention unimportant. 
1. "It is not sufficient for the appellants to establish that Enrique 
Rubio was a Spanish fruit exporter, who had no intention of send-
ing his goods either to any enemy government or to an enemy base 
of supply. The voyage is not limited to that which a shipper of 
goods sets in motion. Whether goods in any particular instance 
are contraband, by application of the doctrine of continuous voyage, 
is a question of fact. Under the terms of' the Order in Council the 
appellants must discharge the burden of proving that the destina-
tion, if the voyage had not been interrupted, would have been 
innocent. When an exporter ships goods under such conditions that 
he does not retain control of their disposal after arrival at the port 
of delivery, and the control, but for their interception and seizure, 
would ha~e passed into the hands of some other persons, who had 
the intention either to sell them to an enemy government or to 
send them to an enemy base of supply, th-en the doctrine of con-
tinuous voyage becomes applicable, and the goods on capture are 
liable to condemnation as contraband." (Lord Parmoor in the case 
of TheN orne and Other Vessels~ ( 1921). IX Lloyd~s Prize Cases 
402, 427.) 
(b) Neutral port auction. 
1. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
condemned a cargo of oranges shipped from Spain 
to neutral dealers in the Nether lands for auction in 
theN ether lands. Lord Parmoor, said: 
" ... Their Lordships are unable to hold that the mere fact that 
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the goods vvill be offered for sale by auction at the port of arrival 
is in itself conclusive of the innocency of their destination. It would 
appear to them to be too wide a generalization that vvhatever the 
special conditions may be, the goods could never be condemned as 
contraband if once it is established that they would be offered at 
public auction in a neutral auction in a neutral market." (The 
N orne and Oth er Vessels, ( 1921). IX Lloyd} s Prize Cases, 402, 
4:31-2.) 
( c) Concealment. 
1. uy he Lyngenfjord, a N orwegian vessel, was bound from 
New York to N orvvay, carrying according to its bill of lading and 
manifest sacks of coffee. The sacks were seized and condemned 
by the British when it was discovered that the sacks contained not 
coffee but a mixture of coffee and rubber (rubber being absolute 
contraband). No appearance or claim was made by the shippers. 
Th~ British, of course, induced the German destination from the 
fact of concealment." (The Lyngenfjord, (1916). VI Lloyd}s 
Prize Cases, 115.) 
(d) Sales agent. 
1. "In the opinion of their Lordships it would be impossible to 
say- that an ordinary agent for sale is a 'consignee of the goods' 
within the Order in Council of October 29, 1914. Such an agent 
would not have the real control of the destination of the goods. It 
would be within the power of his principal to give instructions 
from time to time." (The Urna, ( 1920). IX Lloyd's Prize Cases, 
104, 116. See also The Kronprins Gustaf, (1919). IX Lloyd's 
Prize Cases, 137.) 
2. The British shipped a cargo of cocoa and coffee 
(conditional contraband) shipped by an American 
company on a Danish vessel for Copenhagen, con-
signed to the American company's agent in Copen-
hagen. The American company claimed that the 
cargo was intended for consumption in Denmark. Sir 
Arthur Channell, speaking for the Judicial Con1mit-
tee of the Privy Council declared that there were 
' grounds for the conden1nation of the cargo and said: 
" ... In the present case there is no doubt that the burden of 
that proof is thrown on the respondents, inasmuch as the consignee 
named in the bills of lading is admitted to be an agent for sale 
of the goods on behalf of the claimants, the consignors, and there-
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fore was not the real consignee under the Order in Council of 
October 29, 1914, as interpreted in the Louisiana and other cases." 
(The United States, (1921). X Lloyd~s Prize Cases~ 61, 65-66.) 
(e) Enemy agent. 
1. 1V1odification of the Declaration of London by 
the British Order in Council of Oct. 29, 1914: 
" ( ii) The destination referred to in Article 3 3 of the said dec-
laration shall (in addition to the presumptions laid down in Article 
34) be presumed to exist if the goods are consigned to or for an 
agent of the enemy state." (United States Foreign Rell{l:tions., 1914, 
Supplement~ 258, 262.) 
2. Sir Samuel Evans in condemning cattle feed on 
board a Norwegian vessel traveling from Brazil to 
Norway declared: 
" ... These goods were sent nominally to people who are, accord-
ing to the evidence before me, agents for the German Government 
• and conduit pipes for the transmission of such goods as these to 
Germany .... Upon the evidence before me, it would not be violent 
presumption to say that these goods were on their way through 
these agents to German territory for the use of the German forces. 
Upon that ground also the goods, being conditional contraband, 
are confiscable." (The Tysla~ ( 1916), V Lloyd~ s Prize Cases~ 433, 
436. See also T.he Liv and Other Vessels~ (1917). VII Lloyd~s 
Prize Cases~ 85.) 
(f) Consignment uto Order.n 
1. Before the announcement of the Order in Coun-
cil of October 29, 1914, the British Foreign Office 
sent a draft to the Department of State. In regard to 
articles (iii) and (iv) of this Order in Council, the 
British Foreign Office state: 
"With regard to conditional contraband, Article 35 of the Dec-
laration of London is left standing and will, therefore, exclude the 
application of the doctrine of continuous voyage in respect of goods 
consigned to a neutral firm at a neutral port. The right to seize 
conditional contraband on a ship bound for a neutral port is main-
tained ... in respect of cases ·where no consignee in the neutral 
country is disclosed in the ship's papers. A great proportion of the 
cargo shipped to Rotterdam is consigned merely 'to order' and may 
be inrended for transit to the enemy country. In such cases, and 
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,vhere the goods are carried with a through bill of lading to the 
enemy country, Article 35 would not apply." (United States For-
eign Relations) 1914, SupplernentJ 246.) 
"2. Department reiterates its position, as stated in the case of the 
Kroonland respecting shipments 'to Order,' and holds that ship-
ments of ccnsignrnents to neutra l countries, though to shippers' 
order, being in usual course and in accordance with established 
custom of trade for protection of shipper against refusal of draft, 
cannot rightfully be seized as contraband in absence of facts tend-
ing to sho,v that they are in fact destined for belligerents; and as 
to the legality of the action of Great Brita.in in seizing American 
shipments on neutral ships to neutral countries as in the above 
cases on ground merely that shipments are consigned to order, the 
Government of the United Stat~s enters an explicit denial." (In-
struction from Secretary ·of State Bryan to Ambassador to Great 
Britain Page, Dec. 3, 1914. United States Foreign Relations) 1914, 
Supplement) 354.) 
3. "Another circumstance which has been regarded as important 
in determining the question of real or ostensible destination at the 
neutral port was the consignment 'to order or assigns' without 
. . " naming any consignee. 
"I am not unmindful of the argument that consignment 'to order' 
is common in these days .... " 
"The argument still remains good, that if shippers, after the 
outbreak of war, consign goods of the nature of contraband to 
their ovvn order without naming a consignee, it may be a circum-
stance of suspicion in considering the question whether the goods 
, were really intended for the neutral country, or whether they had 
another ultimate destination. Of course, it is not conclusive. The 
suspicion arising from this form of consignment during vvar might 
be dispelled by evidence produced by the shippers. It may be here 
observed that some point was made that in many of the con-
signments the bills of lading were not made out 'to order' sim-
pliciter, but to branches or agents of the shippers. That circum-
stance does not, in my opinion, make any material difference." 
( 1,he Kim; The Alfred Nobel; The Bjornsterjne Bjornson; The 
FridlandJ (1915). III Lloyd~s Prize Cases (167, 300-1.) 
4. "The French Prize Council, in February 1915, said that in 
the case of conditional contraband it was, as a matter of principle, 
incumbent upon the captor to establish that the goods 'vere destined 
for the use of the forces or government of the enemy but that 
vvhen the consignment was 'to order' it did not possess the means 
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of doing so and could not be required to do so. It stated that in 
such a case there was justification for inquiring into any facts 
serving to establish the true destination of the goods." (Comment 
on the case of The Nieuw-A msterdam~ ( 1915), in Hack\vorth, 
G. H., Digest of International Law~ VII, 73.) 
5. "Shipments of honey and coffee (conditional contraband) 
were sent from the West Indies before the war in 1914 on a Nether-
lands vessel consigned 'to order' at Hamburg. The vessel was seized, 
and proceedings were brought to condemn the cargo as contra-
band. T'he French Prize Council held that condemnation \Vas not 
justified, as there was no evidence that the consignees vvere inter-
mediaries of the German state or of the German administration. 
1-.he Council released the goods to the claitnants on condition that 
they pay the freight to the ship-o,vner; it ordered the French Gov-
ernment to pay the ship-owner damages caused by the delay to the 
vessel and interest on the freight." (Comment on the case of The 
Ora:nje Nassau~ (1915), in Hackvvorth, G. H., Digest of Inter-
national Law~ VII, 73.) 
6. "In August 1915 the French Prize Council restored to the 
owners a cargo of conditional contraband destined for Amsterdam 
and consigned 'to order,' stating that the latter circumstance did 
not constitute proof of ultimate destination to the armed forces or 
government of the enemy." (Comment on the case of The Kam-
bangan~ ( 1916), in Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International 
Law~ VII, 73.) 
7. "A N onvegian vessel carrying ·a cargo of pyrites and fish from 
Norway destined to Rotterdam was seized -by a German cruiser 
and brought into port. The pyrites \vere consigned to the Nether-
lands Oversea Trust or order. The Hamburg Prize Court con-
demned the vessel and its cargo, as pyrites vvere absolute contra-
band. The German Supreme Priz~ Court of Berlin affirmed the 
decision. It pointed out that the consignment was 'to order' and 
therefore there was a presumption that the destination \Vas to 
enemy territory. The court refused to accept the distinction argued 
for by the claimants between consignments ' 'to ord~r' and con-
signments to a n~med consignee or his order, saying: 
" ' ... Indeed a bill of lading intended to pass from hand to 
hand does not permit one to know from its ovvn contents whether 
the first consignee which is found mentioned therein 'vill be the 
one who is to receive the merchandise when the transportation has 
once been completed. It is just this uncertainty \vhich ... is de-
cisive with respect to the legal presumption in prize la\v. The 
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situation is then ahnost the san1e for bills of ladi ng of the sort here 
in question as for bills of lading purely to orde r .' ('franslation)" 
"The court also pointed out th at the Ne therlands Oversea 'frust 
\vas set up in cooperation \vith the Bri t ish ; that under th e contracts 
bet\veen Netherlands i1nporters and the N .O.T'. there \vas no 
obstacle to the re-export of goods to England ; and that, indeed, 
under the arrangements \Vith the N .O.T. in certain circumstances 
goods might be sent back from Netherlands P? r ts to E nglish por ts 
for submission to the British prize courts. It held that the legal 
presumption of enemy destination had not been overcmnc by the 
particular circumstances of the case." (Comment on the case of 
Tlze Lupus_, (1917), in Hack,vorth, G. H., Digest of Int ernational 
Law_, VII, 55-6.) 
. (g) Intervening belligerent port. 
1. The Gern1an Imperial Suprerr~e Prize Court 
condemned The Alexandra) a Danish vessel bound 
from Copenhagen to the neutral port of Boston, and 
its cargo. The gonds, absolute contrab,and under the 
German rules, was ·condemned because the ship had 
intended to stop en route at an enemy British port for 
coal. The court stated: 
"It must be admitted, in effect, that the enemy destination of 
the goods is proven, ~ince before reaching Boston the ship had to 
touch there ... only for the purpose of coaling. This interpretation 
tough there ... only for the purpose of coaling. This interpretation 
follo\vs even from the text of the disposition (Art. 30, par. 1 b. of 
the German prize ordinance), and it is confirmed by Article 30 
of the Declaration of London and by the commentary thereon con-
tained in the General Report. If the ship touches an enemy port, says 
the commentary, there will be a strong temptation for the master 
to disembark the contraband which he could probably sell at a 
high price and there vvould be an equal temptation for the loc~l 
authorities to requisition it. It may be remarked at the same time 
that the claimants are not allo,ved to prove that there \Vas a really 
neutral destination that this \Vas the intention of the owners." 
(The Alexandra_, ( 1917). Garner, ]. W., Prize Law During the 
World War_, ( 1927), 536-7). 
2. "The N onvegian vessel Semant ha_, \vhile carrying a cargo 
listed by Germany as conditional contraband, \Vith directions to 
stop at one of the British ports of Queensto\vn, Falmouth, or Ply-
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mouth for orders, was seized by a German vessel and sunk. In 
upholding the condemnation of the goods, the Supreme Prize Court 
of Berlin admit~ed that the actual destination of the goods in the 
case of conditional contraband was decisive. However, there was 
no proof as to the destination intended for these goods. The court 
applied article 3 7 of the German Prize Ordinance, to the effect 
that an enemy destination may be presumed as to a vessel carrying 
conditional contraband whose papers either do not show a destina-
tion for the voyage or permit the vessel to enter an enemy port. 
It held that one of the three ports named in the Semanthd's papers 
could be regarded as. the port of destination and that, since all the 
ports in question were considered bases of supply for the enemy 
armed forces, a presumption of hostile destination arose against the 
goods which the claimants did nothing to rebut." (Comment on the 
case of The Semantha~ (1916), in Hackworth, G. H., Digest of 
I nternationa1l Law., VII, 72.) 
(h) uDummyn consignees. 
1. " ... the named 'consigned' must be a real and genuine con-
signee in the business and commercial sense. The fact that a person 
who happens to be in existence is named, if he be merely a nominee 
without any interest, or dummy consignee, is not enough." (The 
lndianic and The Sydland., (1917). V Lloyd"'s Prize Cases., 267, 
279.) 
(i) Real consignee not shown. 
1. Lord Parker, in upholding the condemnation 
of certain cargoes. of conditional contraband con-
signed to named consignees in Sweden, declared : 
" ... The effect of the Order: [the Order in Council of Oct. 29, 
1914] is, therefore, to waive the doctrine of continuous voyage 
except· in those cases expressly referred to in the modification. The 
appellants contend that none of the goods in question in these 
appeals can be brought within any of the cases referred to. None 
of the goods were consigned 'to order.' The bill of lading, which 
formed one of the ship's papers, show·ed in every instance, ':vho was 
the consignee of the goods, and neither the bill of lading nor any 
other of the ship's papers showed in any instance a consignee of 
the goods in territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy. 
"Their Lordships are of the opinion that this contention cannot 
be sustained. It assumes that the words 'if the ship's papers do not 
show· the consignee of the goods' mean 'if the ship's papers do not 
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sho\v a consignee of the goods.' ... the reason for not waiving 
the doctrine of continuous voyage in the case of consignments to 
order can only have been that jn the case of such consignments the 
shipper retains the control of the goods, and can alter their des-
tination as his interests may dictate or circurnstances may admit. 
T'hi3 control may, however, be retained by the shipper, even if he 
consigns to a named person, provided that the consignee be bound 
to indorse or otherwise deal with the bill of lading as directed 
by the shipper. It ·would be useless to retain the doctrine of con-
tinuous voyage in the case of consignments to order, if the shipper 
could escape the doctrine by consigning to a clerk in his office and 
• 
procuring the clerk to indorse the bill. He would in this manner 
retain as full control of the goods as if the consignment had been 
to order. It is impossible, in their Lordships' opinion, to construe 
the Order as an intimation to neutrals that provided they make 
their consignment to named persons not residing in territory be-
longing to or occupied by the enemy, they may, in the case of 
conditional contraband, safely disregard the doctrine of continuous 
voyage .... In their Lordships' opinion, the words 'the consignee 
of the goods' must mean some person other than the consignor 
to whom the consignor parts with the real control of the goods . 
. . . the effect of the Order is to make a considerable concession. 
Under it merchants in one neutral country can, without risking 
the condemnation of their goods, consign them for discharge in 
the ports of another neutral country to the order of buyers or others 
to whom the principal in the ordinary course of business finally 
transfers the control of the goods. They are not concerned to inquire 
how such buyers or other persons in tended to deal with the goods 
after delivery. No intention on the part of the latter to fonvard the 
goods to the enemy Government will render the goods liable to 
condemnation." (T.he Louisiana and Other Ships_, (1918). V 
Lloyd"s Prize Cases_, 230, 263-5. See also The J(im and other ships, 
III Lloyd"s Prize Cases_, 167, 215, 365.) 
(j) Named consignee. 
1. Coffee, destined from Brazil to a Swedish com-
pany in Sweden and carried on The Kronprinsessan 
Victoria, a Swedish vessel, was condemned as condi-
tional contraband which \Vas to be forwarded to 
Hamburg, Germany. The Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council in .Great Britain, ho\vever, al-
, 
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though · recognizing that the British Prize Court was 
justified in finding that the ulterior destination, ruled 
that since the consignees were not "sham" consignees 
article 35 of the Declaration of London as modified 
by the Order in Council of Oct. 29, 1914, prevented 
the capture of the cargo. 
The Judicial Committee through Lord Sumner 
stated: 
" ... Here the claimants are the_ named consignees, and, upon 
the case made in the Prize Court, they were consignees to whom 
the property has passed before seizure-in fact, the day before. Not 
only so, but they were consignees to whom the consignors had 
parted with the real control of the goods. Their intention, how-
ever, was to give the goods an ulterior enemy destination. Does this 
intention prevent them from being persons the insertion of whose 
names in the bills of lading causes the ship's papers to 'show who 
is the consignee of the goods'? On principle their Lordships think 
not .... " 
" ... This appear~ to be precisely the case, or one of the cases, 
in which, under the Order in Council in question, the ship's des-
tination and the form of the ship's papers covered the goods. To 
extend the qualities which may be predicated of the consignee, 
whom the ship's papers are to show, to qualities connected with his 
general trade or with particular contracts, independent of the con-
tract of carriage, would be to protect the goods onl when the 
ship's papers show something which in maritime practice they never 
do and rarely could show. The coffee was accordingly in this case 
immune from condemnation, its ulterior enemy destination not-
'vithstanding." (The Kronprinsessan Victoria_, (1919). VII Lloyd-'s 
Prize Cases_, 230, 256.) 
2. In The Oranje Nassau and Other Ships case, the 
British seized and condemned cargoes of coffee and 
cocoa shipped by a German national domiciled in 
Haiti on neutral vessels. The cargoes were destined to 
The Nether lands and were consigned to the Nether-
lands Overseas Trust, for the shipper or a Nether-
lands bank. 
" ... The N.O.T. was established in order to prevent contraband 
being sent into Germany, and in order that goods might be 
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shipped to them to avoid interference from the British authori-
ties, so that neutral trade might not be molested more than \vas 
necessary. But the character in which the N.O.rf. received the 
consignments seems to me to depend upon the facts of each particu-
lar case. If they received consignments as agents for consignees 
who had bought, or purchasers who had bought, the goods, and 
who, when they arrived in Holland, had the control over them, 
and could direct their ultimate destination as they liked, then the 
character of the N.O.T. 'vas that of the purchaser to whom the 
goods were going, and the N .O.T. would be consignees within the 
meaning of the Order in Council, and the decisions upon it. But 
if the N.O.T. were only receiving goods as agents for the consignor, 
to dispose of them later for the consignor in the way in which he 
directed, then in my opinion they would not be such consignees, 
and their position again would be that of the person for 'vhom 
they were receiving the goods .... it does not seem to me that it 
can be said that the N.O.T. were persons other than the consignor 
who had the complete control of the goods." (The Oranje Nassau 
and Other Ships., (1919). IX Lloyd.~s Prize Cases., 189, 192-3. See 
also The Noordam., ( 1919). VIII Lloyd.~s Prize Cases., 337.) 
(k) Trade Statistics. 
1. "A French decree of July 7, 1916 established the presumption 
of hostile destination in the case of absolute contraband on a ship 
destined to the ports of a neutral country adjacent to enemy terri-
tory when the imports into the neutral country 'vere largely in 
exces~ of · the normal pre-war importations. The French Prize 
Council applied this decree in condemning a cargo of wine and 
spirits sent from Spain to Denmark on a Danish vessel, when it was 
sh~wn that the normal peacetime importation of wines and spirits 
amounted to 4,318 metric tons, while the 1916 importations 
amounted to 35,832 metric tons." (Comment on the case of T lze 
Tiber., ( 1918), in Hackworth, G. "H., Digest of International 
Law.~ VII, 52-3.) 
2. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
in dismissing the appeal of the shippers from .a con-
demnation of a cargo of dried fruits, stated: 
" ... The President has found that the statistical evidence estab-
lishes a case 'vhich throws upon the appellants the onus of show-
ing that the goods were not going to Germany. Thei~ Lordships 
concur in this opinion. There is ample statistical evidence to replace 
an obligati9n on th~ appellant? t9 ?how that the destination of the 
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goods is innocent. The President fu r ther finds that it is impossible 
for him to say that the appellants have discharged the onus thrown 
) 
upon them, and their Lordships concur in this finding." (The U rna_, 
(1920). IX Lloyd's Prize Cases 104, 114.) 
3. See also the following cases: T.he Kim_,· The A !fred Nobel_,· 
The Bjornsterjne Bjornson_,· The Fridland_, ( 1915). III Lloyd~s 
Prize C'ases_, 167, 294-5. The Kronprinse.ssan Victoria_, ( 1919). 
VII Lloyd"'s Prize Cases_, 230, 246. The Oranje .. Nassau and Other 
Ships_, (1919). IX Lloyd~s Prize Cases_, 189, 201. 
(I) Assurances against re-export. 
Some of the European neutral countries tried to 
assure the belligerents that certain goods if imported 
into the country would not be re-exported. This 
assurance was attempted by the promulgation of laws 
prohibiting the export of those certain commodities 
and the establishment of government purchasing com-
missions. Both Great Britain and Germany _did not 
believe that the laws at least, were enough to pre-
vent re-export. 
1. " ... It is true, no doubt, that the municipal laws of both 
Denmark and Sweden prohibit the export of fodder stuffs, but it 
is not clear that this prohibtion includes transshipment at Danish 
or Swedish ports, or that licenses for export are not readily granted 
by the Danish or Swedish authorities, at any rate if the stuffs in 
question are not really needed for home consumption. The experi-
ence of the laws referred to, however stringent, can be evaded." 
(The Louisiana and Other Ships_, ( 1918). V Lloyd"'s Prize Cases_, 
230, 257-8.) 
2. "In a case involving the consignment of dried fruits to the 
Swedish Victualing Commission, which dealt in such goods for the 
purpose of 'monopolizing that trade for bona fide Swedish con-
sumption,' the British Prize Court found that the Commission did 
its best to carry out its announced purpose and that the goods in 
question belonged to the Commission and were bonar fide intended 
for consumption in Sweden." (Comment on the case of The Pacific~· 
The San Francisco_, ( 1917), in Hackworth, G. H., A Digest of 
International Law_, VII, 62-3. See VII Lloyd"' s Prize Cases_, 7 5.) 
3. "In the case of The Brage_, the German Imperial Supreme 
Prize Court sustained the decision of the Kiel Prize c ·ourt to con-
demn a cargo of conditional contraband ·which \Vas destined for 
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Sweden but consigned ' to order.' T'he German Imperial Supreme 
Prize Court held that it had been shown that in the contract of 
sale for the goods ·it had been stated that the goods were for con-
sumption in Sweden and that the Swedish Government prohibited 
export from Sweden of goods such as these." ( 1'he Brage_, ( 1917). 
Garner, J. W., Prize L !arw During the World War} ( 1927), 573.) 
4. "A Norwegian vessel carrying linseed oil (conditional con-
traband) from Rotterdam to Norway, consigned to order of named 
consignees living in Norway, was seized by a German warship. 
rfhe claimants showed that the oil was to be used in Norway for 
the manufacture of edible fats which would not be consumed in 
Norway but which would be held there until the end of the war. 
The Norwegian Government prohibited the export of these prod-
ucts. The German Imperial Supre1ne Prize Court upheld the con-
demnation of the cargo as conditional contraband with a hostile 
destination. The court said that when goods were consigned to 
order there was a presurnption of hostile destination although the 
ship was seized while on a voyage to a neutral port and that the 
existence of an export prohibition in the neutral country was not 
sufficient to overcome this presumption of hostile destination. The 
intention of the claimants was held to be not decisive." (Comment 
on the case· of The Norden} (1918) in Hackworth, G. H., Dig·eiSt 
of International Law_, VII, 63.) 
( 6) N avicerts. 
In order to avoid friction with neutral countries 
as much as possible, Great Britain in 1916 instituted 
a system of navicerts or letters of assurance. Under 
this system, neutral goods were given a kind of com-
mercial passport before they were shipped, insuring 
in passage more freedom from interference by the 
British Contraband Control System. 
1. "The term n:arvicert (or letters of assurance) is applied to 
documents issued by officials of a belligerent state, indicating that 
the cargo of a vessel sailing from a neutral port corresponds to the 
manifest. Its purpose is to serve as a 'sort of· commercial passport,' 
to facilitate the passage of the vessel and avoid the necessity of 
search of the cargo by the belligerent, but it does not convey any 
guaranty that the vessel and cargo 'vill be free from seizure or 
interference." (Comment in Hackworth, G. H., Digest of Inter-
national Law_, VII, 212.) 
70 
2. "This system, which first became operative in March, 1916, 
\vhen it was made applicable to cargoes shipped from the United 
States to the Scandinavian countries adjacent . to Germany, \vas 
in substance a system \vhereby particular consignments of goods 
were given what might be called a commercial passport before 
they \vere shipped; this passport, which derived its name from the 
code-word 'navicert,' insured the consignment an undisturbed 
passage." (Ritchie, H., The uNavicertn System during the World 
If/ arJ (Washington, 1938).) 
3. "N avicerts were given a validity of two months extending 
from the date of issue up to the time of shipment. No fee was 
charged for their issue, bu~ the applicant was expected to defray his 
share of the cost of the abbreviated telegrams to London \Vhere 
such inquiry was necessary. It was arranged by the Ernbassy that 
the navicert issued, or if need be a duplicate, should be furnished 
to the shipping company, in order that it might accomp~ny the 
shipment, being removed by the boarding officer on the vessels' 
arrival at a British port. It was further arranged that the dis-
tinguishing mark and number of each navicert should be entered 
against the item of cargo on the ship's manifest covered by it, and 
British consular officers at ports in the United States \Vere notified 
by the Embassy of the issue of navicerts, and instructed to exercise 
a general supervision over the entries so made. On the arrival of 
the vessel at a British port each consignment covered by a navicert 
could thus be readily identified by the boarding officer, and tele-
graphed to the Contraband Committee for purposes of verification 
and record." (Ritchie, H., The uNavicertn Sy~tem during the 
World War, (Washington, 1938), 10.) 
4. "N avicerts were worded as follows: 'As far as is at present 
kno\vn there would appear to be no objection on the part of the 
British Government to this consignment.'" (Ritchie,. H., The 
uNavicertn System during the World WarJ (Washington, 
1938), 1.) 
5. "From the outset the system is said to have \vorked satis-
fact?rily, and, as it attained fuller development, to have conferred 
advantages which have been shortly summarized as follo\vs: Ex-
porters and shipping companies were exposed to a minimum of 
delay and inconvenience; parties were spared the cost of insurance 
against risk of detention; quicker clearance could be given to 
vessels; obj ectionable shipments were to a large extent eliminated; 
British ports did not have to be encumbered by the discharge of 
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cargoes; w hile the syste1n also enabled a statistical record to be 
maintained in advance of the imports of the receiving countries." 
(Ritchie, H. , Th e uNavicer() System during the World War) 
10-1.) 
6. " . .. About the time I \vas appointed the Consul-General 
of the United States came to see me, and he pointed out to me. 
'You say in your diplomatic representations to the United States 
that, after all , British goods suffer just as much as American goods 
from the blockade, and that we are not really injuring American 
goods and American traders in any w ay beyond the injury which 
the British trader suffers. T'hat is not quite righ t, because the 
British trader can go to your War 'frade D epa r tment before he 
makes any arrangements \Vith regard to the shipping of the goods 
and he can obtain a license ... . That is not the case in the United 
States. Cannot you· do something to supply that want? ' \Ve there-
upon organized a system of Letters of AJssurance, as it is called 
in the States. It is perfectly voluntary. Nobody need take out 
letters of assurance unless he wished to do so, but if he likes to 
go to our authorities there and make inquiries whether a particular 
ship is likely to meet with difficulty, he can obtain from those 
authorities in America letters of assurance, and then the goods, 
generally speaking, unless something exceptional intervenes, go 
through without any trouble or difficulty. That device has been 
of enormous importance in smoothing the difficulties which had 
before then existed with America, and it has been of equal im-
portance in enabling us to know exactly what is going on in ref-
erence to exports from the United States to these neutral countries. 
It has enabled us, without any unfairness or injustice, to regulate 
the supplies to these neutral countries." (Lord Robert Cecil, as 
Minister of Blockade in the House of Commons, Mar. 27, 1917. 
Parliamentary Debates~ House of Commons, 5th ser., vol. 92, 
col. 254.) 
7. "At the present time all goods which leave the United Kingdom 
[States] for European destinations, practically without exception, 
are covered by British 'letters of assurance' or equivalent documents. 
This means that the shippers consult the British authorities in the 
United States before forwarding their goods, and give certain 
guarantees that the ultimate destination of the goods is satisfactory. 
Then the ship proceeds on its way, and the cargo is examined 
either at Halifax, Kirkwall or Lerwick, .to see that it is in order, 
and the enforced call at an intermediate port of course involves 
considerable danger to the ship, and great loss of time of time in the 
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manipulation of the cargo." (Consul General at London, Skin-
ner, to Ambassador to Great Britain, Page, April 3, 1917, 
enclosure. United States Foreign Relations_, 1917, Supplement 2, 
vol. II, 804.) 
8. "In a discussion between the American Consul General at 
London and representatives of the British War Trade Intelligence 
Department 'It was agreed that the navicert system, which has been 
in operation for over a year and which is now thoroughly under-
stood both by shippers and importers, should if possible be main-
tained .... It was considered that the proportion of navicerts which 
had been dishonoured was extremenly small, probably no more than 
one in five hundred." (Memorandum of the British War Trade In-
telligence Department. Com~ent in Hackworth, G. H., Digest of 
International Law_, VII, 214. United States Foreign Relations_, 
1917, Supplement 2, vol. II, 803, 806~) 
9. During negotiations between Great Britain and 
the United States concerning enemy commerce, the 
Joint Subcommittee on Export Licenses reported on 
May 14, 1917: 
"Hitherto, the only control over exports from the United States 
has been carried out by the system of letters of assurance issued 
by the British Embassy in the case of shipments to Norway, Sweden 
and Denmark. These letters of assurance represent simply a state-
ment made to such American exporters as may apply to the British 
Embassy that so far as the .British Government is aware, and subject 
to new fac~s coming their knowledge subsequent to the issue of the 
letter, there ·is no objection to the shipment of the articles through 
the British naval patrols. Consequently, a letter of assurance is not 
a license but simply a facility and operates as a pass attached to 
the goods for the information of the examining officer at the British 
port of call, or the British naval patrol. 
"In order that such a pass may be as certain and effective as pos-
sible applications for letters of assurance are referred by the 
British Embassy to London by telegraph in all cases where the char-
acter of the consignee or the amount of the shipment raises any 
doubt as to its ultimate destination. The letter of assurance thus 
merely aims at assuring the exporter a maximum of certainty that 
the goods will reach their destination without difficulty and with the 
minimum amount of delay in examination." ( Unite.d States Foreign 
Relations_, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. II, 849.) 
~ 
10. " ... There was also in existence at that time a system de-
, 73 
signed for the convenience of honest Neutral traders \vhereby 
British Consular Officers in Neutral ports issued certificates upon 
being satisfied as to the character and destination of cargo intended, 
so far as appea red, for Neutral consumption. The fact that the 
British Consul-General issued a certificate for this cargo has been 
treated as tending to found a claim. I cannot give effect to that. 
It was a mitigation in favour of Neutrals of the stringent procedure 
which was being exercised and intended to be exercised by the Brit-
ish Government in the exercise of its rights as a belligerent, and the 
Neutral shipowner or shipper or consignee who took advantage of 
it, took advantage of it \Vith the defects which were inherent in it, 
and subject to the defects which arose by the nature of the system 
out of which the giving of certificates arose." (The F. ]. Lisman~ 
1919. Hackworth, G. H., Digest of lnterna:tional Law~ VII, 215.) 
7. Neutral Goods on Enemy Ships. 
Neutral goods were safe on an enemy ship if they 
'were not contraband. Most of the cases involving 
this principle arose out of captures made in the first 
months of vVorld War I. 
1. In The Schlesien case, 1914, the British Prize Court said that 
a submarine signaling device, American-ow ned, in a German mer-
chant vessel was not "neutral goods" within the meaning of the 
Declaration of Paris. Therefore, the device was condemned. (The 
Schlesien~ 1914, II Lloyd's Prize Cases, 92.) 
2. In regard to a shipment of pepper on the German vessel 
Schlesien~ the United States Department of State said: " ... it 
appears that the shipment of pepper in question was made on a 
German merchant vessel from Batavia bound for Bremen, fro~ 
which point the pepper was to be transshipped to Baltimore. Under 
the generally recognized principles of international law, this pepper, 
consigned to a neutral and shipped before the outbreak of hostili-
ties, is not contraband and is not the lawful subject of confiscation 
or condemnation. But you are informed that the vessel in which 
the pepper was shipped, being a German vessel, is subject to seizure 
on the high seas by any of the countries with \Vhich Germany is 
at war, and if the vessel is or shall be captured, the part of your 
goods vvhile not subject to confiscation, will necessarily undergo 
the delay and risks of the seizure of the vessel." (Counselor for the 
Department of State, Lansing, to Parrish Brothers, Inc., Aug. 1), 
1914. Comment In Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International 
Law, VII, 11.) 
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3. The Acting Secretary of State Lansing in October 1914 in-
quired of the Ambassador to Germany Gerard, who in turn asked 
the German Government, whether prize court proceedings would 
be held in regard to American-owned cargoes on board British 
vessels sunk by German belligerent action. The reply was in the 
affirmative. (United States Foreign Relations~ 1914, 330, 336.) 
4. In two cases in 1915, The Glitra and The Indian Prince~ Ger-
man courts refused to compensate or restore to neutral owners of 
goods on enemy ships seized or sunk. (The Glitra:~ 1915, United 
States Foreign Relations~ 1915, Supplenzent~ 350, 572. The Indian 
Prince, 1915. United States Foreign Relations~ 1915, Supplement~ 
520, 522.) • 
5. In the case of The Marth-Bockhalzn~ 1919, The French ~on­
seil d'Etat said that non-contraband cargo owned by an American 
aboard a German vessel captured by tl}e French should be released, 
since the owner had proved his neutral nationality. (The Marth-
Bockhahn~ 1919. Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International Law~ 
VII, 11-12.) 
8. Non--Contraband. 
After the expansion of the contraband lists, little 
except hospital supplies were considered as non-
contraband and exempt from capture. At times dis-
cussions even arose about the status of hospital sup-, 
plies. 
1. "While hospital supplies usually received a measure of con-
sideration in transit from neutral to belligerent countries, other 
articles were from time to time allowed to be exported. Some neu-
tral states, owing to weakness, protested and submitted to restric-
tions generally admitted to be beyond the limits of legality. Some 
neutral states, for reasons less evident, submitted to unjustifiable 
interference with commerce." (United States Naval War College, 
International Law Situations~ 1933, 23.) 
2. Some articles, besides hospital supplies, which were considered 
supposedly as of no utility in war were mentioned now and again 
in dispatches. 
"Proclamation issued to-day requires that all articles exported 
to Holland be consigned to Dutch Government, diplomatic or con-
sular offices, vvith permission of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or 
Netherlands Overseas Trust, except printed matter, returned con-
tainers, worn clothing and personal effects, live animals not used 
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for food, sanitary earthenware, pottery and common earthenware, 
books, dolls, toys, wooden clock cases, slate and slate pencils, postage 
stamp and postcard albums. Proclamation apparently intended to 
permit free shipment of ar ticles here mentioned." (Consul General 
at London, Skinner, to the Secretary of State, December 23, 1916. 
United States Foreign Relations~ 1916, Supplement~ 490.) 
3. In a telegram to the Secretary of State the American Am-
bassador in Spain on September 22, 1914 said: 
"In an interview yesterday morning His Majesty informed me 
confidentially condition of wounded soldiers, par6cularly in French 
hospitals where there are inadequate supplies, especially of bandages 
and absorbent cotton, was deplorable and expressed an earnest 
wish for our cooperation in relieving this situ~tion. To that end he 
hopes that the United States and Spanish Ambassadors accredited 
near various European courts now at war will make a joint request 
for arrangements between countries of hospital supplies and the 
such supplies in transit on the high seas may be considered by them 
neither contraband nor conditional contraband of vvar but free. 
Please telegraph whether Department can see its way clear to give 
to our diplomatic officers C<?ncerned the instructions necessary to 
realize His Majesty's, hope.'' United States Foreign Relations~ 1914, 
Supplement~ 831. United States Naval War College, International 
Law SituationsJ 1933, 23-4.) 
4. The American diplomatic representatives in the belligerent 
countries were instructed by the State Department to communicate 
this request. A general agreement in principle was obtained. The 
Geman reply stated: 
"Your circular September 24. The Foreign Office replies to joint 
request that No. 28, paragraph 1, of the German prize ordinance of 
September 30, 1909, already provides that articles serving exclu-
sively to aid the sick and wounded shall not be treated as contraband 
and may be requisitioned subject to payment compensation only in 
case of urgent military necessity and when their destination is to 
the territory of the enemy or to territory occupied by the enemy 
or to the armed forces of the enemy." (United Stales Foreign Rela-
tions~ 1914, SupplementJ 835. (United States Naval War College, 
International Law SituationsJ 1933, 24.) 
5. The French Government stated: 
"While appreciating the humanitarian attitude of the United 
States Government, the French Government does not think the 
moment propitious for agreement between belligerents, even on a 
subject vvhich by its character could be placed beyond reach of 
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conflict. Experience of' contempt which certain belligerents sho\v for 
international conventions to which they have agreed gives grounds 
for apprehension that they would not observe a new agreement nor 
execute its provisions as soon as it was to their advantag·e not to 
do so. The French Government recalls that definition of objects 
mentioned in Article 29 of the Declaration of London was sum-
marily made in the general r·eport at the London conference by the 
drafting committee, and it was thus agreed that the immunity 
established under Article 29 applied to drugs and various medicines. 
The French Government adds that while it might be a delicate 
matter to be more precise and extend obligations of belligerents 
during vvar beyond where they were fixed in time of peace, never-
theless it would not refuse to study the suggestions of the American 
Government to draw· up a list of drugs and medicines whose 
ch~racter as 'articles serving exclusively to aid the sick and vvound-
ed' shall be closely defined." (United States Foreign RelationsJ 
1914, Supplement 836. United States Naval War College, Inter-
national Law SituationsJ 1933, 24.) 
6. "Since the beginning of the pre~ent war, the American Red 
Cross has invited contributions of money and supplies with which 
to aid the wounded and suffering of all the belligerents. We have 
shipped to the Red Cross societies of ·each belligerent hospital sup-
plies contributed to us for that purpose. We have found no diffi-
culty in sending such article to the Entente Allies. We have had to 
obtain permits from Great Britain for the shipments to the Red 
Cross of the Central powers. Until September 1915, there was sub-
stantially no delay in the granting of these permits by Great Britain. 
Since that time, we have had much difficulty in securing them, and 
the supplies donated in kind and designated for the use of the Cen-
tral powers have accumulated in our warehouses in New York. A 
permit was granted for only one shipment since that time-in J anu-
ary of this year. Through your pepartment, we are now in receipt of 
a communication from the British Government, announcing that it 
does not intend to permit any further shipments, unless it is a 
shipment to our own hospital units, in a territory of the Central 
powers. 'This exception amounts to no concession, for the reason 
that as the British Government was advised in August last, after 
the first of October, for lack of funds, we were able to maintain 
no hospital units in any of the belligerent countries. The authorities 
of the American Red Cross believe that under the Geneva conven-
tion, to vvhich the United States and all the belligerent po,vers are 
signatories, the United States has the treaty right to insist that 
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articles serving exclusively to aid the sick and wounded in the form 
of hospital supplies, shipped by the A rnerican Red Cross to the 
Red C ross of the Central powers, shall not be declared contraband, 
but shall be allovved safe-conduct to their destination:" ( Ex-Presi-
dent Taft, then chairman of the cent ral committee of the American 
Red Cross to the Secretary of State, May 8, 1916. U nited States 
Foreign R elations, 1916, Supplem ent~ 948 . United States Naval 
War College, I nterna1tional Law Situations~ 25.) 
7. Secretary of State Hull before the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations~ 1936. 
1. "The next thing that seemed to have been demonstrated by the 
World War was that, unlike preceding periods and preceding \vars 
of consequence, this was not a war between the military forces of 
nations alone, not a war between soldiers; it was a war between 
the combined populations, civil and military. It was not a war 
involving the use of military implements and instruments alone, 
but it was practically a test of the economic strength as well as the 
military strength of the nations. 
"The result was that the belligerent in control of the seas said, 
to all practical intents and purposes, 'We have to make absolute 
~ 
contraband what has been called conditional contraband in the 
past. We have practically to prevent commerce between neutrals 
and our, enemies either directly or indirectly. 
"The result was that the doctrine of continuous voyage was ex-
panded to cover virtually all commerce. The nation in control of 
the seas, before the war ended, dominated almost every dollar's 
worth of commerce between neutrals and any part of Europe. That 
\Vas through the •expanding of the whole doctrine of contraband, 
conditional contraband, and also, as I have said, the doctrine of 
continuous voyage, and furthermore, through curtailing other 
rights of neutrals. In other words, nearly all of what had thereto-
fore been the ordinary rules of neutrality and neutral rights were 
more or less set aside, so that when the war ended there was in 
several respects virtual chaos so far as neutral rights were con-
cerned." 
" ... When the United States entered the war it issued instruc-
tions for the Navy, June 30, 1917, which set f~rth a general list of 
contraband which may be considered almost as inclusive as the 
British list of 1916. In this American contraband list there was no 
expressed distinction between absolute and conditional contraband. 
Destination was the deciding factor." 
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" ... I should like to say that the situation when the war ended 
apparently was that the whole law ... on the subject of contraband, 
absolute and conditional, had been merged into the one subject of 
contraband, absolute. The question of destination to some extent 
figured . . . " (Testimony by Secretary Cordell Hull before the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the proposed N·eutral-
ity Act of 1936, Jan. 10, 1936. Hearings before the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, 74th Congress, 2d session, Jan. 10, 
1936 on S. 3474 regarding Neutrality, 11-2, 38, 39.) 
9. Harvard Draft Convention on the Rights and 
Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial 
War, 1939. 
This draft convention is an at!empt to resolve the 
conflict between neutral and belligerent rights. The 
principle underlying this proposal is as follows: on 
the one hand grant to the belligerents a broadened 
conception of blockade, and on the other hand give 
the neutrals more adequate guarantees for the pro-
tection of legitimate inter-neutral trade. The hope 
for result, of course, is less interruption of th~ com-
n1ercial life of the world in time of war. 
_ This plan grapples, therefore, with the difficult 
problems of continuous voyage and ultimate destina-
tion. To solve these questions, the draft convention 
proposes that the neutral states accept new duties in 
regard to the supervision of goods received in their 
'ports but intended to pass on to a belligerent. Trade 
between two neutrals is to be free and is to be pro-
tected by a certificate system for which both neutral 
and belligerent states are to be responsible. Under this 
certificate system contraband lists would be unneces-
sary, eliminating an objectionable feature of past 
practices in time of vvar. 
( 1) The Draft Convention~ 1939. 
Article 40. "Except as otherwise provided in this Convention, 
a belligerent may not interrupt trade in neutral vessels between 
two neutral ports.'' 
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A r ticle 41 . "A neutra l State may issue certificates of neutral-
ity in accordance w ith the rules laid do\vn in Annex I I to this 
Convention.'' 
Article 42. " ( 1) Prior to the clearance of a vessel with a cer-
tificate of neutrality from its ter r itory, a neutral State shall give 
a public notice of departure containing : 
" (a) ]'he name of the vessel, its tonnage, time of departure, 
approximate route, destination, probable time of arrival 
thereat and general description of the ship and its cargo; 
" (b) If the vessel is convoyed, an adequate identification of the 
convoying warship or warships. 
" ( 2) if the announced departure of the vessel is delayed, or if 
other announced details are altered, a corrected notice shall be 
issued. 
" ( 3) A certified copy of the notice shall be given to the master 
of each vessel named therin. 
" ( 4) A neutral State may also give publicity by radio to notices 
of departure. Upon the request of a belligerent, a neutral State 
shall use the radio facilities at its disposal to bring to the kno·wledge 
of belligerent warships or aircraft at sea notices of departure, but 
such messages may not be sent in code." 
Article 43. In regard to neutral convoys. 
Article 44~ Convoyed neutral ships with Certificates of N eu-
trality to be painted white and carry certain lights, etc. 
Article 45. Neutral state to prevent uncertified vessels from 
leaving with similar paint and markings. 
Article 46. Penalties for neutral ships violating these regulations. 
Article 4 7. " ( 1) A quota limitation is required for imports into 
a neutral State if demanded by a belligerent in accordance vvith 
th~ provisions of this article. · 
" ( 2) A belligerent may demand that a neutral State publish 
monthly data as to its imports, their amount, value, disposition 
or ultimate utilization, and data as to its exports, their amount, 
value and destination, if there are being imported into the neutral 
State goods which 
" (a) are publicly listed by any of the belligerents as to use in 
war; and 
" (b) are of a kind which the enemy of the demanding belligerent 
imports directly or indirectly; and 
" (c) are either imported into the ·neutral State for exports 
in their original or in a processed state, or imported 
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in amounts exceeding normal peace time imports, taking 
into account normal expansion not due to supplying war 
demands in belligerent markets. 
" ( 3) A neutral State shall at once proceed with the publication 
as demanded. 
" ( 4) Ho-wever, if the neutral State does not agree that factual 
conditions exist justifying the demand, it shall so notify the demand-
ing belligerent. At the same time it shall designate one of its nation-
als who, ·with a person designated by the belligerent, shall choose 
a national of a third State; and these three persons shall constitute 
an arbitral board to determine \vhether the factual conditions 
exist justifying the demand. If a majority of the board decides that 
the belligerent has made out a prima facie case under paragraphs 
(a), (b), and (c) of section (2) of this article, the neutral State 
shall continue the publication as demanded; if a majority of the 
board decides that the belligerent has not made out such a prima 
facie case, the neutral State may cease publication. 
" ( 5) If the belligerent is not satisfied by the neutral State's 
published statements that g0ods imported by the neutral State are 
not reaching its enemy in their original or in a processed state, 
it may notify all neutral States that it demands the fixing of a 
quota in accordance with Annex III to this Convention. 
" ( 6) The publication of data as required under section ( 2) 
of this article may be dispensed with if the neutral State consents 
to the fixing of a quota under section ( 5) ." 
Article 48. " ( 1) A neutral State may also issue a certificate of 
~eutrality to a vessel cove~ed by an agreement made by the neutral 
State with both belligerents. 
" ( 2) Such an agreement may specify the commodities and define 
the quantities thereof which may be shipped from the neutral State 
by private persons to a belligerent or from a belligerent to a neutral 
State under guaranty of safe passage. 
" ( 3) Such an agreement may be made for specific voyages or for 
specified periods of time. It may provide for cancellation upon notice 
in case of fraud or violation of its terms. 
" ( 4) Such an agreement may specify that certificates of neutral-
ity may be issued even though the shipment be made in a vessel 
flying a belligerent flag. 
" ( 5) Beyond supervision of leading and certification, the neutral 
State is not responsible fo r_ the execution of such an agreement." 
Article 61. " ( 1) If a vessel does not display the distinctive colors 
and markings required of a certified vessel under A rticle 44, or fails 
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to produce a cer tificate of neutrality, and if the belligeren t as a 
result of visit and search has reasonable grounds for belief that the 
vessel or its cargo is subj ect to condemnation or preemption, the bel-
ligerent may capture the vessel and conduct or send it to one of its 
por ts for prize proceedings. I f to conduct or send the captured 
vessel to port would involve danger to the safety of the captor or to 
the success of the operations in w hich he is · engaged at the time, 
the captured vessel may be destroyed subj ect to com pliance 'vith 
the rules laid do,vn in Article 54. I n such cases pr ize proceedings 
shall be held on the basis of the ship 's papers and other lawful 
evidence." 
Article 63. "A prize court shall be bound by the follow ing rules: 
" (a) A vessel which intended to run a blockade, may be con-
demned together with its cargo." 
" (b) Cargo destined for a blockaded port by sea, may be con-
demned; the vessel may also be condemned if the destination of 
the cargo was knovvn to the o'vner, charterer or master of the 
vessel." 
" (e) Cargo destined for belligerent territory either directly or 
through a neutal port, may be condemned in so far as it is composed 
of arms, ammunition or implements of war, or of other goods ship-
ped in violation of a neutral State's prohibition under Article 11. 
If more than half of the cargo by value, weight, volume or freight 
is composed of goods which may be condemned, the rest of the 
cargo and the vessel are similarly subject to condemnation." 
" (f) Any commodity in a cargo destined for a neutral State 
upon whose imports of that commodity a quota has been fixed 
under Article 47, but not included within a portion of the quota 
allocation to the State from vvhich the commodity was shipped, may 
be condemned." 
" (g) Enemy vessels and such parts of their cargo as are of 
enemy ownership may be condemned; the disposition of neutral 
cargo is not affected by the fact that it is carried in a belligerent 
vessel, but neutral cargo belonging to the owner, charterer, or 
master of a vessel which , under Article 64 or 65 a belligerent may 
treat as an enemy vessel, may be coridemned." 
" (h) Cargo destined for • unblockaded belligerent territory 
or for a neutral port affording convenient access to belligerent 
territory and not subject to condemnation under preceding para: 
graphs of this article, may be preempted by the capturing_ belligerent 
upon payment of the market price current in its territory on the 
date of the arrival of the prize in port, plus ten per cent." 
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" ( j) Enemy ownership or ongtn of cargo on a neutral vessel 
does not affect the disposition of the cargo: 'free ships make free 
goods.'" 
"(n1) Postal correspondence on a captured neutral vessel is in-
violable, unless it is being carried to or from a blockaded place 
on a vessel vvhich is subject to condemnation for breach of block-
ade." 
" ( n) Postal parcels may be treated as cargo." (Draft Convention 
on the Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval and A erial 
War~ (Harvard Law School, 1939). 33 American 1 ournal of I nt~r­
national La·w~ Supplement~ 1939), 181-4, 187-9.) 
( 2) Draft Convention Comments. 
(a) Contraband in general. uUnder the Declaration of London 
of 1909, neutral vessels were free to trade w·ith other neutral States 
but subject to the application of the doctrine of continuous voyage 
if the cargo contained absolute contraband. Neutral vessels were 
also free to trade with belligerent ports, if the ports were not 
blockaded and if the cargo contained only non-contraband goods. 
Neutral vessels carrying contraband and destined for a belligerent 
port or carrying non-contraband and destined for a blockaded port 
were subject to capture." 
uUnder t.he practices prevailing in the War of 1914-1918, the 
first type of trade was severely limited by the extension of the 
doctrine of continuous voyage into that of ultimate destination, its 
application to conditional as well as to absolute contraband, ·and 
the expansion of the contraband lists to a point at which the free 
list became practically non-existent. The extension of blockade 
principles to neutral coasts and the establishment of war zones on 
the high seas further crippled this trade. The second type of 
trade-from neutral States to belligerents-,vas practically elim-
inated by the s~me extensions of contraband .lists. Some modifica-
tions in favor of neutral trade were introduced by agreements 
permitting neutrals to import freely certain goods on agreeing to 
supply belligerents with certain other goods." 
• 
uu nder this Draft Convention~ trade betvveen neutrals 'vould 
receive maximum safeguards. From the earliest times the problem 
has been to reconcile conflicting economic interests of neutrals and 
belligerents. A belligerent naturally desires to prevent his enemy 
from obtaining supplies of any kind. A) neutral naturally desires 
to continue his trade without any restriction resulting from the 
war of other States. The rules of contraband, blockade, etc., gre'v 
up from an attempt to reach a compromise between these conflicting 
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interests." (General Comment~ Draft Convention on the Rights 
and Duties of Neutral States in Naval and A erial War~ (Harvard 
La\V School, 1939). 33 American Journal of International Law~ 
Supplement~ ( 1939 ), 488.) 
(b) On contraband lists. "The history of the law of contraband 
of vvar is particularly interesting. For more than t\vo centuries it 
has been agreed that actual arms and ammunition fall within the 
contraband category. But as soon as one leaves a very narrow list, 
differences of opinion appear. An analysis of the treaty provisions 
during the last one hundred and fifty years shows the wide disparity 
of definitions of contraband upon \vhich States from time to time 
have agreed." 
"~lthough at the present time it is recognized that there is a 
distinction between goods absolutely contraband and goods condi-
tionally contraband, little note has been taken of the fact that this 
distinction is, as a matter of general practice, very recent. There 
is not a single bipartite treaty concluded in the last one hundred 
and fifty years which makes a clear distinction between the two 
kinds of contraband and there are only two treaties which suggest 
any such distinction at all. A complete anyalsis of the national 
laws and regulations has not been made, but the indications are that 
even in naval instructions and the like, the distinction is of com-
paratively recent appearance. The distinction was fully recognized 
at the Second Hague Conference in 1907 and was the basis for the 
rules on this subject drawn up in the Declaration of London. Earlier 
examples of an acknowledgment of the distinction may, of course, 
be found, and the idea itself is usually traced to the classifications 
of Grotius." . 
" ... it cannot be said that a clear distinction between goods 
absolutely and conditionally contraband has any deep historical 
roots in the development of the subject." 
"There has never been a general agreement among the States of 
the world as t.o just what articles are contraband. From the seven-
teenth century on, many States have taken the position that a 
contraband list might properly be proclaimed by a belligerent dur-
ing the course of a war and that the belligerent vvas subject only 
to general limitations in deciding upon the specific articles which 
were to be included in such a list." 
"As is well known, during the vVar of 1914-1918, contraband 
lists were enormously extended . to a point at which they became 
practically all-inclusive; the distinction betvveen goods absolutely 
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contraband and goods conditionally contrabrand was practically 
abandoned by a number of States, although the United States 
support its continuance." 
The Harvard Draft Convention contains no contraband lists, 
because it would have no useful purpose. "The attempt made in 
the De~laration of London to draw up one list of goods absolutely 
contraband and another list of goods conditionally contraband and 
a third free list, proved to be of practically no value, thus support-
ing the view of the United States at the Second Hague Conference 
that it is impossible 'to formulate a list of articles on contraband 
that would continue satisfactory for a period of years.' " ( Gen-
eral Commen t~ Draft Conveintion on t.he Rights and Duties of 
_V eutral States in Naval a~nd A erial War~ (Harvard Law School, 
1939). 33 American Journal of International Law~ Supplement~ 
( 1939)' 488-9, 498-9.) 
(c) On destination of neutral cargo. "On the other hand, the 
distinction as to the destination of neutral cargo-on the one hand 
to the territory of a belligerent and on the other hand to the gov-
ernment or the armed forces-is very old and it is easy to find in 
the early practices the roots from which the modern notions about 
goods conditionally contraband ha.ve sprung." (General Comment~ 
Draft Convention on the Rgihts and Duties of Neutral States in 
Naval and A erial TV ar~ (Harvard Law School, 1939). 33 A meri-
can Journal of International Law~ Supplement~ (1939), 498.) 
(d) On plan of Harvard Draft Convention in regard to con-
traband: 
"At the Second Hague Conference, the British Government pro-
posed that the principle of contraband of war be abolished." 
"The proposal failed because of the opposition of Germany, 
France and Russia, but twenty-five States supported the proposal, 
with Japan, Panama, Rumania and Turkey not voting. The op-
position to the British proposal, as expressed by th~ German dele-
gate, was based on the fact that the suggested abolition of contra-
band was linked with a new description of a type of unneutral 
service which was said to place a greater restriction on neutral 
commerce than did the traditional law of contraband." 
"Montenegro also opposed the British proposal and the United 
States like·wise voted against it. The opposition of the United 
States, however, rested upon special grounds and does not seem to 




"In vievv of the long history of conflict attending the subject of 
contraband and in vie'v of the app<!rent irnpossibility of defining 
it in a satisfactory 'vay, it is believed that the only solution lies 
in reviving the British proposal in 1907. However, just as the 
British proposal failed in 1907, any similar proposal would prob-
ably also fail unless it took account of the traditional and inevitable 
#point of vievv of belligerents who will never tolerate the free 
shipment of essential war materials to the enemy if they have the 
physical po,ver to prevent it. The proposals contained in this Draft 
therefore contemplate some extensions of the belligerent right of 
blockade." 
"With the development of submarines and aircraft and also with 
developments in the use of mines, it is now possible even for States 
'vhich are not dominant maritime Powers to blockade enemy coasts. 
'fhere will, of course, be situations in which the superior power of 
one belligerent will make a blockade by the qther State ineffective, 
but obviously a convention dealing with neutral rights can not 
guide itself by the principle of equalizing unequal belligerent 
" power. 
"There vvould seem to be very obvious advantages to neutral 
trade if trade were free except to blockaded places even though 
notions of blockade be somewhat broadened. It is believed that a 
large part of the difficulty will be removed if adequate guarantees 
are offered for the protection of bona fide inter-neutral trade. This 
makes it necessary to grapple with the extremely difficult problem 
of continuous voyage and ultimate destination. This is not, how-
ever, an insoluble problem. If neutral States recognize that by the 
assumption of additional duties in regard to exports to belligerents, 
they can achieve a large measure of freedom for their sea-borne 
commerce, the result should be that war would involve less inter-
ruption of the commercial life of the world than is the case under 
the existing rules of international law and existing situations which 
make breaches of that law all too frequent." (General Comment~ 
Draft Convention on the Rights and Duties of Neutral States in 
Naval and A 1erial War~ (Harvard Law School, 1939). 33 A meri-
can I ournal of International Law~ Supplement~ ( 1939), 499-500.) 
(e) Summary of this Draft Convention~ s system. "Trade be-
tween two neutral States is free and is protected by a system of 
certificates for the accuracy of which both neutral and belligerent 
States make themselves responsible. As a further protection such 
vessels may be convoyed." 
• 
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"Neutral States must accept new burdens in regard to the super-
vision of goods received in their ports but intended to pass in transit 
to a belligerent." 
"In Article 48 it is contemplated that a neutral State may ,.enter 
into a tripartite agreement vvith both belligerent parties relative to 
certified and protected trade with the belligerents in specified com-
modities of definite amounts; instances of some·what analogous 
agreements may be found during the War of 1914-1918." 
"In certain cases quotas may be established to limit the imports 
of goods by a neutral where continuous voyage to a belligerent 
territory is alleged by a belligerent." 
"If a neutral vessel wishes to carry goods to a belligerent port 
or if it desires to carry to a neutral porf a cargo which may not 
under the rules be certified, the venture is wholly at the risk of 
the neutral individual, subject to Article 63·, which in certain cases 
limits the belligerent right to one of pre-emption. This device has 
been utilized frequently in the past, notably in the Jay Treaty of 
1794 between the United States and Great Britain, as a meal).S of 
solving the quandary created by the inability to agree upon a 
contraband list. In all such cases, however, there must be definite 
assurance regarding the safety of the lives of passengers." (General 
CommentJ Draft Convention on the Rights and Duties of Neutral 
States in Naval and A erial W arJ (Harvard Law School, 1939). 
33 American Journal of International LawJ SupplementJ (1939), 
( 500-1.) 
(f) On air tra1/Jic. "In certified and convoyed aircraft the neu-
tral can send to another neutral all postal correspondence; all 
passengers who are not i~ belligerent service; and all cargo and 
parcel post which have a bona fide ultimate neutral destination, 
subject to a possible quota limitation. In certified and convoyed 
aircraft the neutral can al~o send to a belligerent anything or any 
persons if both belligerents agree." 
"In uncertified aircraft, the neutral may send any persons or 
cargo to another neutral or to a belligerent subject to the risk of 
interception by a belligerent." 
"It is obvious, however, that important quantities of goods con-
sidered contraband of war may be carried by air." ( Genera1l Com-
mentJ Draft Convention on the f<ights and Duties of Neutral Stat es 
in Naval .and A erial W arJ (Harvard Law School, 1939) . 33 
American Journal of International LawJ Supplem entJ (1939), 
504, 757.) 
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10. f f7 orld IP ar I I . 
Docun1ents reveal that at the beginning of vVorld 
vVar II belligerent treatmen t of contraband of war 
was to be patterned after the p ractices adopted in the 
pe riod 1 916-1 918 in W or 1 d War .I . 
In varyi ng ways, the usual rules were stated by the 
belligerents: 1) enemy goods are safe on a neutral 
ship if they are not contraband, 2) neutral goods are 
s ~1 fe even on an enemy ship if they are not contraband, 
and 3 ) neutral goods are safe on a neut ral ship but 
only if they are not contraband. • 
Some countries stated that all goods are contraband, 
absolute contraband. Other countries published 
elaborate lists of contraband, n1aking the distinction 
between absolu te and conditional. But in reality, 
rnost goods were treated as being absolute contraband, 
for in total war the distinction between absolute and 
conditional could not be tnaintained for long. 
The doctrine of continuous voyage, as a result, was 
no'v considered as being applicable to most goods 
shipped from one neutral state to another, there being 
no real distinction between absolute and condi tiona! 
contraband. 
The navicert system -vvas instituted immediately by · 
Great Britain and 'vas supplemented by a system of 
mailcerts. Unlike the experience in World War I 
little or no objection 'vas raised to this ptocedure by 
the neutral states. 
Cases involving neutral American ships and car-
goes cannot be found because of the Neutrality Acts 
'vhich prohibited the voyage of P_dnerican ships or 
the carriage of American-owned cargoes into defined 
danger zones. 
As the war progressed most of the nations of the 
vvorld became involved in the vvar as belligerents. 
The few neutral states that were left could not trade 
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with each other without first submitting their ships 
and cargoes to rigid examination in order to gain 
navicerts. 
1. " ... Now it must be clear .. , in particular in the light of 
the problems and controversies raised by the World War, that there 
is at present no generally agreed prize law in "regard to some of its 
most important aspects. The controversy as to the legality or 
otherwise of the conduct of war in this sphere by the A\llied Powers 
is still raging. The various Governments have since maintained 
their respective, and widely divergent, positions.· It would not 
therefore, it is believed, be consistent with the function of an im-
• partial science of International Law to maintain that there exists 
at pres,ent a working body of generally agreed rules of prize law, in 
particular in its bearing upon the rights and duties of neutrals. 
l--Iistorically prize law has been, in this matter, a compromise be-
tween two conflicting principles: the freedom of neutral trade 
and the right of the belligerent to prevent such commerce with 
the opposing party as might be of military advantage to the latter. 
International Law has not evolved any overriding principle re-
conciling these claims in cases when they show a tendency to con-
flict. The compromise has frequently been the function of the 
relative military and political strength of the belligerents and 
neutrals. This absence of an overriding principle sho,vs itself in the 
hitherto unsolved difficulty, which proved of crucial importance 
during the World War, of answering the question as to whether 
the belligerents or the neutrals ought to bear the brunt of the 
changed conditions of modern warfare." (Oppenheim's I nterna-
tional Law~ · (6th edition, by Lauterpacht, 1940), 736-7.) 
2. " ... His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom 
intend to use their best endeavours to facilitate innocent neutral 
trade so far as is consonant with their determination to prevent con-
traband goods reaching the enemy. They will be compelled to use 
their belligerent rights to the full, but they will at all times be ready 
to consider sympathetically any suggestions put forward by neutral 
governments designed to facilitate their bona fide trade. 
"In order to secure their objects, His Majesty's Government 
have established contraband control bases at Weymouth, Ramsgate, 
Kirkwall, Gibraltar and Haifa. Vessels bound for enemy terri-
tory or neutral ports affording convenient means of access thereto 
are urgently advised to call voluntarily at the appropriate base, in 
order that their papers may be examined, and that, 'vhen it has 
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been established that they are not carrying contraband of war, they 
may be given a pass to facilitate the remainder of their voyage. Any 
vessel which does not call voluntarily will be liable to be diverted 
to a Contraband Control base if an adequate search by His 
Majesty's ships at sea is not practicable. 
"Every effort -vvill be made to expedite the examination of vessels, 
particularly those -vvhich call voluntarily for the purpose." (British 
Ambassador to the United States, Lord Lothian, to Secretary of 
State Hull, Sept. 10, 1939. Hackworth, G. H., Digest of Inter-
national LawJ VII, 7-8.) 
3. "1. We have noted the statement in the Embassy's note of 
September 10, that it is the intention of the British Govern-
ment 'to use their best endeavors to facilitate innocent neutral 
trade so far as is consonant with their determination to prevent 
contraband goods reaching the enemy.' 
"2. This Government on its part desires· that its trade with 
neutral countries proceed with the least possible disturbance due 
to the existence of a state of war in Europe. As regards trade of 
neutral countries (in particular the so-called northern neutrals) 
with the United States, it should be fully understood, as has al-
ready been publicly announced, that this Government reserves all 
rights of the United States and its nationals under international 
law and is not to be understood as eNdorsing any principle of 
interference with trade of genuine neutral character." (Depart-
ment of State to the British Embassy, Sept. 1939, as quoted in a 
telegram from Secretary of State Hull to Ambassador Kennedy 
on Sept. 29, 1939. Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International 
LawJ VII, 8.) . 
4. " ... The Ministry of Economic Warfare is concerned in the 
first instance with only two questions: the character of the goods 
and the character of the consignee." 
"If ... the goods are of such a nature that there is danger that 
the goods might be sent on to Germany and thus give comfort and 
assistance to the enemy, either by the export of the goods them-
selves or by the release of other commodities for export to Germany, 
then the goods are submitted to closer inspection and the character 
of the consignee comes into question. If the character of the con-
signee is such that the British Government is satisfied that he 
'vill not ship the goods to Germany, then the goods are released. 
This is accomplished sometimes by a guarantee given by the firm, 
sometimes by a guarantee given by the neutral country to which 
the goods are consigned, sometimes by both. The fact how·ever that 
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such guarantees are given is not in itself sufficient in many cases 
to cause the release of the goods .... " (American commercial 
attache in Great Britain, Dye, to Secretary of State Hull in regard 
to British practice in detaining cargoes destined for Europe, Dec., 
1939. Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International LawJ VII, 8.) 
( 1) Contraband ListsJ Asbolut~ and Conditional. 
1. "The I tal ian War Law of July 1938 continues to adhere to 
that country's abandonment of the distinction between absolute 
and conditional contraband. . . ." (Comment in Hackworth, 
G. H., Digest of International LawJ VII, 41.) 
2. Article 22 of the German Prize Law Code of 
August 28, 1939 declared: 
" ( 1) To be considered as contraband (absolute contraband) are 
all articles and rna terials which : 
"1. Directly serve the land, naval or air armament and 
"2. Are consigned to the enemy territory or the enemy forces." 
A few days after the outbreak of war, article 22 was 
changed, reading as follows: 
"The following articles and materials will be regarded as contra-
band (absolute contraband) if they are destined for enemy terri-
tory or the enemy forces: 
a One. Arms of all kinds, their component parts and their ac-
cessones. 
aTwo. Ammunition and parts thereof, bombs, torpedoes, mines 
and other types of projectiles; appliances to be used for the shooting 
or dropping of these projectiles; powder and explosives including 
detonators and igniting materials. 
ay hree. Warships of all kinds, their component parts and their 
accessones. 
aFour. Military aircraft of all kinds, their component parts 
and their accessories ; airplane engines. 
a Five. Tanks, armored cars and armored trains; armor plate of 
all kinds. 
a Six. Chemical substances for -military purposes, appliances and 
machines used for shooting or spreading them. 
aSeven. Articles of military clothing and equipment. 
a Eight. Means of communication, signaling and military il-
lumination and their component parts. 
aNine. Means of transportation and their component parts. 
aTen. Fuels and heating substances of all kinds, lubricating oils. 
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u Eleven. Gold, Silver, means of payment, evidences of indebted-
ness. 
uTwelve. Apparatus, tools, machines and materials for the 
manufacture or for the utilization of the articles and products 
named in numbers one to eleven." 
On Sept. 12, 1939, the following declaration \vas 
n1ade by the German Government: 
"The following articles and materials 'vill be regarded as contra-
band (conditional contraband) subject to the conditions of article 
24 of the Prize Law Code of August 28, 1939 ( Reichsegesetzblatt 
part one page 1585) : 
"Foodstuffs (including live animals) beverages and tobacco and 
the like, fodder and clothing; articles and materials used for their 
preparation or manufacture." (Department of State Bulletin_, I, 
No. 13, Sept. 23, 1939, 285.) 
3. Great Britain proclain1ed the following contra-
band list in Sept. 1939: 
"ScHEDULE I 
.... Absolute Contraband 
" (a) All kinds of arms, ammun1twn, explosives, chemicals, or 
appliances suitable for use in chemical ·warfare and machines for 
their manufacture or repair; component parts thereof; articles 
necessary or convenient for their use; materials or ingredients used 
in their manufacture; articles necessary or convenient for the pro-
duction or use of such materials or ingredients. 
"(b) Fuel of all kinds; all contrivances for, or means of, trans-
portation on land, in the water or air, and machines used in their 
manufacture or repair; component parts thereof, instruments, arti-
cles, or animals necessary or convenient for their use; materials or 
ingredients used in their manufacture; articles necessary or con-
venient for the production or use of such materials or ingredients. 
" (c) All means of communication, tools, implements, instru-
ments, equipment, maps, pictures, papers and other articles, ma-
chines, or documents necessary or convenient for carrying on hostile 
operation; articles necessary or convenient for their manufacture 
or use. 
" (d) Coin, bullion, currency, evidences of debt; also metal, 
materials, dies, plates, machinery, or other articles necessary or 
convenient for their manufacture." 
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"ScHEDULE II 
rr Conditional Contna1band 
" (e) A~l kinds of food, foodstuffs, feed, forage, and clothing 
and articles and materials us~d in their production." (Department 
of State Bulletin_, I, No 12, Sept. 13, 1939, 250-1. Canada adopted 
the same list, and France had a similar list.) 
4. In the course of giving a decision in the case 
of The Minna} the German Prize Court of Hamburg 
on December 14, 1939 said: 
" ... It may be considered as correct that the Zellstoff-Werke of 
Reval manufacture exclusively such unbleached strong sulphite 
woodpulp and that this material normally serves in general for 
the manufacture of paper at paper mills. It is also correct that 
the use of such unbleached strong sulphite woodpulp for the manu-
facture of explosives is not possible without further processing. 
This, however, is not decisive. Mr. Almberg himself admits that 
theoretically such woodpulp may be used in the manufacture of 
explosives by dissolving the woodpulp, treating it with chloride, 
bleaching it and then drying it." 
'..'This processing, termed by Mr. Almberg a 'theoretical possi-
bility' does not, however, lie beyond the limits of practicability. The 
convincing opinion of an expert, Dr. Gaertner, scientific adviser 
of the State Chemical Institute· of Hamburg proves that in practice 
such reprocessing is being carried out to a great extent .... " 
"In any case, whether or not it is a 'substance for the manu-
facture of munitions, explosives, et cetera' within the meaning of 
Nos. 12 and 2 of the German list of absolute contraband can by 
no means be determined by the question of whether the material 
under investigation is specially suitable or even intended for such 
processing. Just as little may economic c?nsiderations as to its suit-
ability play a decisive part, especially since in war-time special 
conditions \Vould be considered uneconomic but which are unavoid-
able during war. For the P:r:ize Court the only criterion is the 
objective adaptability (" objecktive Verwendbarkeit") of the ma-
terial under consideration to the manufacture of articles and 
products listed as absolute contraband." (The Minna_, 1939. T'Jze 
Minna" s cargo of wopdpulp, shipped from Estonia and consigned 
to the United States, was condemned as absolute contraband because 
The Minna intended to stop for coal in England, enemy territory. 
Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International Law_, VII, 27-8.) 
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' 
5. On O ctober 3, 1939, the Foreign Ministers of 
the A tneri can Rep ublics in a meeting held in Panama 
r.esolved : 
" 1. 1~o register its opposition to the placing of foodstuffs and 
cloth ing intended for civilian populations, not destined directly 
or indirectly for the use of a belligerent government or its armed 
forces, on lists of contraband." (R eport of the D elegate of the 
U nited States of A m erica to th e M eeting of t he Foreign Ministers 
of th e A m erican Republics~ Held at Panama~ S eptember 23-0cto-
ber 3, 1939. Department of State Conference Ser. 44, 1940, 58-9. 
H ackworth, G. H., Digest of International Law~ VII , 27 . ) 
6. "Objections to the British and French contraband list of 1939 
·were set forth by the Netherlands Government in notes to the 
Governments of the two countries in which it w as asserted that by 
the inclusion, in addition to specified articles, of 'articles necessary 
or convenient for their use; materials or ingredients serving in their 
manufacture' and 'articles necessary or convenient for the pro-
duction or use of such materials or ingredients,' the field of goods 
considered contraband could be extended to the infinite." 
"The distinction between absolute and conditional contraband 
"\vas said to be based upon reason and to have long been recognized 
by international law, and it was protested that under these lists 
articles indispensable to the life of the whole nation in matters 
unrelated to the military apparatus could be treated as absolute 
contraband. It was insisted that the limitations imposed by inter-
national lavv, which directly affected the rights and interests of 
neutrals, should not be lost sight of and that, since the belligerent 
right to seize contraband vvas an exception to the principle of 
freedom of the seas, it should be interpreted in a restrictive man-
ner." (Comment in Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International-
Law~ VII, 26.) 
7. "The British Government replied on Nov. 20, 1939 to the 
N etherlaqds Minister in London stating that the list of absolute 
contraband could not be regarded as unduly extensive in vievv of the 
number of articles now regarded as of direct military use and 
particularly in view of the certainty that any such articles imported 
by Germany would be intended for military purposes. Adherence 
to the distinction bet"\veen absolute and conditional contraband was 
promised. It was asserted : 
"' ... It is the undoubted right in international law of a bel-
ligerent Power to -declare \vhat articles it \vill consider as contra-
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band, within the general definition of contraband as being any 
article of use for the prosecution of the war.' " (Comment in 
Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International Law~ VII, 26.) 
8. In the case of the Hakosaski Maru~ the French Prize Council 
"held on May 22, 1940 that food (conditional contraband) des-
tined to Germany should be condemned as condi tiona! contraband 
having host.ile destination in view of the extent to which the state 
controlled the distribution of food." (Hakosaki Maru. 1940. Com-
ment in Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International Law, VII, 70.) 
9. In Great Britain in the case of The A lwaki and Other Ships~ 
194-0, the British Prize Court arrived at a conclusion similar to 
that in The Hakan. For The Hakan see above under World War 
I. (The Alwaki and Other Ships~ 1940. I Lloyd~s Prize Cases 
(2d), 43, 46. See also Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International 
L:a:w~ VII, 68.) 
10. "In declaring its contraband list in 1940, the Italian Gov-
ernment refer~ed to the fact that the British and French lists went 
beyond the list announced in the Italian Laws of War of July 8, 
1938, and it included all articles on the British and French lists." 
(Comment in Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International LawJ 
VII, 26.) 
11. "The reply of the Netherlands Minister, Jan. 12, 1940, while 
recognizing that 'the centralization and subordination of all the 
means of the nation to the purposes of war may involve certain 
consequences' as to rules regarding contraband which originated 
in a different epoch, stated that 'These considerations ... cannot 
justify the treatment as absolute contraband of goods or of materials 
which by their nature can serve the needs of the civil population 
as well as those of the armed force.' While refraining from express-
ing an opinion on the statement in the British note (quoted ante), 
the Nether lands l\r1inister expressed the belief that such an extreme 
extension as that adopted by Great Britain and France had the 
effect of nullifying article 2 of the Declaration of Paris, under 
which the neutral flag covers enemy goods with th~ exception of 
contraband, 'by making almost all imaginable goods fall within the 
category of contraband.' " (Comment in Hackworth, G. H., 
Digest of International Law, VII, 27.) 
12. "In 1940 the German Prize Court at Hamburg held that 
sawed timber and telegraph poles were contraband because they 
could be used in the construction of military equipment." (Com-
ment in Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International Law~ VII, 28.) 
(2) Destination-Continuous Voyage. 
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1. " T'he F rench instructions of l\1ar. 8, l 934 provide in article 
46 th at articles of cond itional contra band desti ned for the use of 
the anned forces or administ ration are subject to condemnation 
,vhether or not th e transport ing vessel is destined for a· neutral 
port or the cargo is documented fo r such port. A n absolute pre-
sump tion of enemy destination is es tablished vvhen the goods are 
consigned to an enemy agent, whether in an enemy or neutral port, 
or are destined to an enemy fortified place or base of supply ( ar. 
48). When the enemy government has taken measures to requisi-
tion or to control the distrubution of certain goods, a rebuttable 
presumption is established (art. 4 7) in the following cases: ( 1) 
,vhen the goods are documented to an enemy port; ( 2) when they 
are documented to a neutral port and the vessel is first to touch 
at an e~emy port or meet the enemy forces; ( 3) when they are doc-
umented to a neutral port 'vhich habitually serves as a port of trans-
it to the enemy country and the goods are consigned to order or 
the consignee in the neutral country is not named." (Comment in 
Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International Law_, VII, 41.) 
2. I tali an War Law of July 1938. "A hostile destination is con-
sidered (art. 161) to be the enemy forces or terri tory belonging to 
or occupied by the enemy. A rebuttable presumption of such des-
tination is established when the documents indicate that the goods 
are consigned to the enemy forces or are to be disembarked in an 
enemy port or one occupied by its forces. The presumption applies 
"vhen the goods are destined to a neutral port but the vessel ap-
proaches or touches at a port of or occupied by the enemy, or meets 
the e~emy armed forces before arriving at the neutral port." (Com-
ment in Hackworth, G. H·., Digest of International Law_, VII, 41.) 
3. German Prize Ordinance of August 28,1939, article 24 (2) : 
"On condition of reciprocal procedure on the part of the enemy 
the articles and materials named in par. 1 [conditional contraband] 
vvill not be considered as contraband if they are to be discharged 
in a neutral port." (Hackworth, G. H., Digest of Internat io nal 
Law_, VII, 42.) 
4. "In the case of the City of Joliet the French Prize Council 
on May 22, 1940 held that copper consigned ' to order' to the neu-
tral port ·of Antwerp should be condemned, since its ultimate 
German destination was to be presumed from a consignment 'to 
order' to the neutral port of Antwerp should be condemned, since 
its ultimate German destination was to be presumed from a con-
signment 'to order' to a port serving as a port of transit for Ger-
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many." (Comment in Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International 
LawJ VII, 41.) 
5. "A cargo of hides shipped before the outbreak of war in 1939 
from East Africa to the Italian port of Trieste and consigned 'to 
order' for the Yugoslav branch of a firm in Czechoslovakia was held 
by the French Prize Council, in the case of the EddaJ on May 15, 
1940, to be contraband with an enemy destination. The Prize 
Council referred to Czechoslovakia as territory under enemy oc-
cupation and held that the presumption of enemy destination arose 
from the consignment 'to order' to a neutral port serving as a 
normal port of transit to enemy territory." (Comment in Hack-
worth, G. H., Digest of International LawJ VII, 41.) 
6. "In the case of the Tormes the French Prize Council held on 
June 5, 1940 that a cargo of lemons shipped 'to order' and destined 
for Genoa should be condemned as conditional contraband. The 
Council found that Genoa was customary port of transit for goods 
bound to Germany and, in view of the German Government's 
control of food, held that the conditional contraband should be 
treated as if it had been consigned to the German Government." 
(Comment in Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International LawJ 
VII, 41.) 
( 3) Destination-Refinements. 
(a) Intervening belligerent port. In the case of 
TheM inna} the Hamburg Prize Court found ~hat the 
wood pulp cargo of this ship, although destined from 
Estonia to the United States, was absolute contra band 
and should be condemned since the ship had intended 
to stop at a British port for coal. The court declared: 
"On account of the existing possibility of interference on the 
part of the enemy as well as the absence of any reliable control 
in cases of this nature, it has for long been an accepted principle 
of international legislation to presume enemy destination for ab-
solute contraband, as contained in Article 23 ( 3) of the Prize La,v. 
Neutral countries suffering under this necessary and justifiable 
assumption, therefore, are not confronted by any surprising and 
consequently unfair novelty biit by an old, frequently practised 
custom of international law, which they must be supposed to kno\v 
and take into account." 
"A vessel carrying absolute contraband, the captain of which 
seriously contemplates a choice betw·een two possibilities open to 
97 
him including touching an enemy port of call, must be treated 
under P rize L aw as a vessel, the master of which has already de-
cided to touch at an enemy port. It must, therefore, be sufficient 
under the law that call ing at such a port was at the time of capture 
still conditional but could at any moment lose its alternative char-
acter and by the captain 's final decision become direct steering for 
and touching at the enemy port . For obvious reasons it cannot pos-
sibly be expected of a belligerent country in such cases to submit 
to the risk of immediate enemy interference and to permit a vessel 
laden with absolute contraband to proceed unmolested on its 
way." (Hackworth, G. H., Digest of I n terna,t ional Law~ VII, 
49.) 
( 4) N avicerts and M alcerts. 
1. " In November of 1939 British representatives announced the 
inauguration of the navicert system for inter-neutral trade between 
the United States and specified European neutral countries. U nder 
the system the neutral exporter filled out a form giving particulars 
as to the shipment and consignee, and the form was signed by 
British representatives. It was carried in the same vessel with the 
goods to enable favorable and speedy treatment by the British 
Contraband Control. In discussions with the British Embassy, 
the Department of State took the position that the system could 
only be regarded as a purely voluntary one for the benefit of 
exporters who might desire to take advantage of it. It reserved 
all rights of the United States and its nationals under il!_ternational 
law and stated that it did not desire to take any position at the 
time vvith respect to the introduction of the proposed system. The 
Department made it clear that such comments were based upon the 
assumption of the correctness of the following assertions: 
" '1. The proposed Navicert System will in no sense be used to 
interfere in any way with the normal volume of exports of genuine 
neutral character from the United States to any neutral country. 
" '2. The proposed Navicert System will not be used in any way 
to discriminate against the United States and United States ex-
porters. 
" '3. The granting or rejection of a Navicert shall be conditional 
upon circumstances related solely to the character of the goods 
and conditions in the country of importation and in no respect upon 
conditions related to American exporters or to the United States. 
" '4. Whenever applications for N avicerts are rejected a clear, 
concise statement of the reasons for such rejections shall be given 
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to the applicant for the Navicert.'" (Memorandum, Nov. 9, 1939, 
Department of State. Comment in Hack,vorth, G. H., Digest 
of International Law_, VII, 215- 6.) 
2. " ... the 'Navicert' system operates by voluntary application on 
the part of American exporters. No obligation is imposed upon any 
American exporter to apply for or to refrain from applying for a 
' .K avicert'. The United States Government is not responsible for 
nor connected 'v-ith the operation of the system. It has announced 
publicly and has informed the British Government that it reserves 
the right of the U ~ited States and its nationals under International 
La,v." (The Legal Adviser of the Department of State, -Hack-
'vorth, to Fred Christoph, January 31, 1940. Hack,vorth, G. H., 
Digest of International La~u_, VII, 216.) 
3. "On Jan. 17, 1940 the l\!Iinister of Economic Warfare 
( Cross) explained in the House of Commons that 'Over 11,000 
app_lications for navicerts had been received since the system 'vas 
introduced on November 1 [ 1939], and applications were coming 
fonvard at the rate of 500 a day.'" (Times_, (London), Jan. 18, 
1940, p. 3, col. 3. Comment in Hack,vorth, G. H., Digest of Inter-
national Law_, VII, 216.) 
4. "On Feb. 29, 1940 the German Legation at The Hague 'varn-
ed neutrals against accepting British navicerts. Similar 'varnings 
were issued at Berlin an~ at The Hague on the follo,ving days." 
( Times (London), Mar. 1, 1940, p. 8, col. 4. New York Times_, 
Mar. 1, 1940, p. 8, col. 6; Ibid._, Mar. 2, 1940, p, 4, col: 8; Ibid_,· 
Tvlar. 5, 19+0, p. 5, col. 4. Comment in Hackworth, G. H., Digest 
of International Law} VII, 216). 
5. A British Order in Council, July 31, 1940, effective August 1, 
1940 stated that Germany had violated the la,vs of maritime 'var-
fare. After provid.ing for the issuance of "ship navicerts" by British 
or allied authorities ·at British, allied, and neutral ports, this Order 
by 'vay of reprisals declared: 
"2. Any vessel on her 'vay to or from a port through ,vhich goods 
might reach or come from enemy territory or the enemy armed 
forces, not being provided 'vith a Ship Navicert valid for the 
voyage on ,vhich she is engaged, shall, until the contrary is estab-
lished, be deemed to be carrying contraband or goods of enemy 
origin or o'vnership, and shall be liable to seizure as Prize; provided 
that a vessel, other than a vessel 'vhich sailed from or has called 
at an enemy port, shall not be liable to seizure under the provisions 
of this Article unless she sailed from or could have called at a 
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port at which she \\·auld, if duly qualified, have obtained a Ship 
X avicert." 
''8. ::\"a thing in this Order shall be deemed to confer any immun-
ity from detention, seizure or condemnation on any vessel or goods 
by reason of being provided ,,·ith or co\·ered by any form of pass 
or permit." ( Stf!-1 utor;· Rules and 0 rdersJ 19+0, no. 1 +36. Hack-
\\·orth, G. H. , D igest of International L awJ \ 1II, 217.) 
6. Further articles from the Order in C ouncil of July 31, 19+0: 
"3.-( 1) G oods consigned to any port or place from ,....-hich they 
might reach enemy territory or the enemy armed forces, and not 
co\·ered by a valid Cargo X a\·icert or, in the case of goods shipped 
from a British or Allied port, by a ....-alid E xport or Transshipment 
License, ,,·here such License is required , shall, until the contrary 
is established, be deemed to ha,·e an enemy destination. 
" ( 2 ) Goods shipped from any port from "·hich goods of enemy 
origin or o\\·nership might haYe been shipped, and not co....-ered by 
a valid Certificate of Origin and Interest, shall, until the contrary 
is established, be deemed to be of enemy origin or o\\-nership. 
"4. G oods of enemy origin or o\\-nership shall be liable to con-
demnation. 
"5. P-'-ny ,·essel seized under Article 2 hereof and carrying 
contraband or goods of enemy origin or O\\nership shall be liable 
to condemnation in respect of such carriage." ( Statu tor)' R ules and 
OrdersJ 19+0, no. 1 +36. Hacb,-orth, G. H. , D igest of International 
La,,, ·vii , 141- 2. ) 
7. " On July 1, 19+1 the British GoYernment instituted a system 
of 'mailcerts' for parcels mailed from the United States to various 
European and African countries. The British ~Iinistry of Economic 
\\7 arfare stated that the purpose \Vas to enable the senders of such 
parcels 'to ascertain, in advance of posting ........ -hether facili ties can be 
given for their passage through British examination stations.' " 
( Counselor of Embassy in London, Johnson, to Secretary of State 
Hull, enclosure, July 9, 19+1. Comment in Hacb,-orth, G. H. , D i-
gest of International Law_, \TII, 216. ) 
11. Conclusions. 
Despite the relative scarcity of aYailable docun1ents 
for 'lF or ld \\r ar I I in regard to contra band, \Ye can 
state as a conclusion that contraband of \Yar still 
remains a Yalid concept. ...\s n1ethods of \Yarfare 
changed, the general classification of goods as contra-
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band has been expanded and the means of deter-
mining such goods have been refined, but as long as 
there remains a neutral country in time of war, the 
question of contraband will arise. 
As the concept stands today, the pro~lem of con-
traband will be found whenever neutral goods are 
shipped aboard a neutral or an enemy ship or when-
ever enemy goods are found upon a neutral vessel. 
The essential criteria of contraband remain: 1) the 
belligerent character of the goods, and 2) hostile 
destination. 
II. THE CRIMEA CONFERENCE 
(The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XII, No. 295, Feb. 18, 1945) 
For the past eight days, Winston S. Churchill, 
Prime Minister of Great Britain, Franklin D. Roose-
velt, President of the United States of America, a~d 
Marshal J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of 
People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, have met with the Foreign Secretaries, 
Chiefs of Staff, and other advisors in the Crimea. 
In addition to the three heads of government, the 
following took part in the conference: 
For the United States of America: 
Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Secretary of State 
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, U.S.N., Chief of Staff to 
the President 
Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to the President 
Justice James F. Byrnes, Di.rector, Office of War Mobilization 
and Reconversion 
General of the Army George C. Marshall, U.S.A., Chief of 
Staff, U. S. Army 
Fleet Admiral Ernest]. King, U.S.N., Chief of Naval Opera-
tions and Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet 
Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding Gen-
eral, Army Service Forces 
\~ ice A.dmiral Emory S. Land, War Shipping Administrator 
